1 Train Collision 1/4/24

Gilbert B Norman wrote: ↑Wed Jan 17, 2024 7:54 am But after reviewing what I believed to be pertinent Rules, I cannot find any authority to operate a train from anywhere other than the head car.

Now I admit; I have not been aboard an NYCTA train since '15 (many times of course when I resided in NY '62 and 63 and I only knew the #6 as the IRT Lexington Ave Local) when I made like Duke Ellington to get from Bay Ridge area of Brooklyn where my Niece resided at the time, to JFK (as well as "rip off" Air Train), but the operator in other than the head car, if such was the case on my ride, would have been "disturbing".

Nobody is doing OTHC operations on a revenue train carrying passengers. Stop.

BR&P wrote: ↑Wed Jan 17, 2024 11:58 amMy apologies to member "hxa", who DID post a rulebook in its entirely. I missed that, looks like we're over 70 replies so far. Therein, Rule 51 on Page 43 does allow for pushing a disabled train, as quoted here by "justalurker66".

The intent was to help people who did not want to download a PDF and find the answer (or even if one was present in the rules). Yes, thanks to hxa for finding the source material.

GirlOnTheTrain wrote: ↑Wed Jan 17, 2024 3:26 pmNobody is doing OTHC operations on a revenue train carrying passengers. Stop.

Rule 51 provides a specific method of using OTHC to allow trains to proceed to the next station platform. Safer than making passengers on a stranded train walk along the ROW or reversing the train against the normal traffic flow (if possible). Passengers are carried to the next station then the cars being pushed are set off in the next available siding.

While the subway runs on rails I note that it is not a railroad. Signal spacing and operations vary between the subway and most railroads. Multiple signals on platforms and in interlockings make it easier to pass three red signals than on a regular railroad. (One may find that signal density at a terminal with several platforms.)

I look forward to the NTSB report. Based on prior reports we should get a list of exactly what signals were ran and the distance between them.

That's what they attempted to do, right? Drop off the passengers asap then get the train to the nearest siding. My point about the dispatcher/control center was they theoretically could have halted the other train. But there probably wasn't enough time or signal system visibility. Is there a radio in the front cab or an emergency button? Brakes are cut out but aren't the rest of the systems still on? Maybe they had to shut everything off.

The train was discharged at 79 Street when they couldn't get the brakes reset. From what I've heard the electrical portions were retrieved, therefore there were no trainline communications. The SMEE equipment don't have onboard radios either. It was all portables, the quality of which leave much to be desired. (Why can I hear New Lots in Brooklyn from my terminal in the Bronx, but I can't hear the car inspector at the other end of the platform telling me someone took a dump in the north motor of the train and can we use the other train so the cleaners can take care of it?)

The train crossing from 3 to 4 absolutely could have been held in the station until the BO train made it to 103 middle. The train has a leaving home signal that could have been left at danger until the BO train did what it needed to do. A question among many employees is just that - why was the road not held to allow the train to clear into 103 middle?

justalurker66 wrote: ↑Wed Jan 17, 2024 7:16 pm Rule 51 provides a specific method of using OTHC to allow trains to proceed to the next station platform. Safer than making passengers on a stranded train walk along the ROW or reversing the train against the normal traffic flow (if possible). Passengers are carried to the next station then the cars being pushed are set off in the next available siding.

I'm aware of what the current rulebook says pertaining to OTHC operation. Chances are pretty slim that a train full of passengers is going to be operated OTHC - and it was not in this case. Unless the train is stuck between stations with no way to key a door panel onto a platform, the train will be discharged before the train moves another inch - therefore there is no need for GBN to ramble about being disturbed by hypothetical OTHC operation.

With all due respect, the train was stopped (by vandals) near the 79th St station and was moved into the 79th St station (using Rule 51) to discharge passengers. Not hypothetical. And per the rule, no passengers were carried past the first available station. Mr Norman has been (appropriately) corrected.


My question (for anyone with knowledge of current operations) is how the interlocking north of 96th St station controlled. Is it done by a centralized control center that is tracking all movements and knows which train is where and where that train needs to go or is it controlled by the train operators? There is a mention in the rule book about train operators requesting routes via a keypad. If (big if) the train operators are selecting the route it may be a case of the in service train reaching the control box at the north end of the 96th St station first, selecting their route and getting their green. With the out of service train failing to stop and ending up running into the side of the in service train. (If it is all centrally controlled now it would kill this theory.)

I believe most interlockings are controlled by "Master Towers" today. The wayside route selection panels are located at some places in the system where routes diverge. I'm not sure if the route selection button controls the switch ahead or if it gives an indication to the tower operator that the train is requesting a certain route.

Anyone please correct me if I don't have that right.

The majority of the A division is controlled by Rail Control Center with the exception of immediate terminal areas (Terminals have control of their immediate vicinity) and the 2 and 5 lines in the Bronx, which is handled by Unionport tower.

ATS-A has taken over from local towers.

You guys are obsessing over the wrong rule. Try rule 39k on page 26 of the cited .pdf.

westernfalls wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2024 1:01 am You guys are obsessing over the wrong rule. Try rule 39k on page 26 of the cited .pdf.

Okay, I got the PDF up and condensing it down to *this* scenario. Rule 39k, paraphrased...

Part 1: Operator must call up to the Desk Superintendent by radio to get a Supervisor down to the train. Supervisor must put a Flagger at the head end of the train, Operator in the functioning cab, and *TEST* the communication between the two via radio or "sound powered telephone" (nothing else).

Part 2: (related to in-yard moves)

Part 3: Operator must not start the train until it is safe to move the train, waiting for the proper signal from the Flagger up front. Flagger acts as Operator's eyes/ears/etc and is responsible that track is clear and switches/signals are properly set for movement, and relays that info to Operator. Flagger is equally responsible as Operator.

Part 4: Operator must be "close to the action" in first working cab facing forward(direction of travel).

Part 5: Operator must continue to receive and answer voice signals from the Flagger while train is moving. If signals stop at any time, flagger or Operator must stop the train and find out why.

Part 6: If a sound powered phone is not available or is disabled, more Flaggers must be put on so that Operator can hear the signals.

Part 7: 10 MPH speed limit while operating this way. Passengers must be offloaded at next station and train stored at nearest yard or siding.

Now, what went wrong here? The original operator got put in the Flagger position and the Supervisor was put in the Operator position. Gee, what qualifications did the Supervisor have?

More questions for NTSB to find out.

With all these citations of Rules and Control Points, are we sure we haven't got a Local Chairman or two at this Topic?

The question is why was the train not stopped when communication was lost or if the train could have been stopped at all.

The other question is why was a revenue train crossed in front of a BO train in the first place, when ideally it should have been held until the BO train was out of the way. That decision was made higher up.

While it will "never happen" as 'Trial" transcripts are deemed outside of any FOIA laws, sure would be interesting to see how many of the Rules we have noted here are addressed at any NYCTA employee's Hearing.

GirlOnTheTrain wrote: ↑Tue Jan 23, 2024 5:28 pmThe question is why was the train not stopped when communication was lost or if the train could have been stopped at all.

The "operator" (in the lead cab) has publicly claimed that he told the "supervisor" (operating from the sixth car) to stop and stay. Is there a record of that instruction? If the instruction was missed, was the supervisor aware that the communication was lost?

The rule is vague about how far the train can be moved or how much time can elapse between each update from the flagger to the operator. There is no definition of requiring an update every X number of feet or Y number of seconds before considering communication lost.

GirlOnTheTrain wrote: ↑Tue Jan 23, 2024 5:28 pmThe other question is why was a revenue train crossed in front of a BO train in the first place, when ideally it should have been held until the BO train was out of the way. That decision was made higher up.

I expect that if they KNEW that the BO train was going to run the stop signals they would have stopped the in service train. Hindsight is easier than foresight.

Training dictates if positive communication is lost at any time, the move stops. There is no definitive distance. You are supposed to continuously talk through the move. Not "Ok, the signal is in 20 feet" and say nothing. "Keep it moving 20, 19, 18, 17, 16..." etc is the proper protocol so that it's evident communication is lost. If he was in fact, screaming stop and stay as he claims - tapes can be pulled to verify this.

The second question remains: was the train actually able to stop? Since the TSS isn't running to Channel 7 with his side of the story we don't know if he heard the transmission and was trying to stop and couldn't.

Service has been held back plenty of times for a bad train to clear a river tube or a bridge. It's not really hindsight, it's competent dispatching 101. This move should have been no different, especially since those in charge of making such decisions KNOW the train has a compromised braking ability.