Railroad Forums 

  • Smoke incident near L'Enfant Plaza 1/12/201

  • Discussion related to DC area passenger rail services from Northern Virginia to Baltimore, MD. Includes Light Rail and Baltimore Subway.
Discussion related to DC area passenger rail services from Northern Virginia to Baltimore, MD. Includes Light Rail and Baltimore Subway.

Moderators: mtuandrew, therock, Robert Paniagua

 #1313013  by Sand Box John
 
I went though my various WMATA documents and have determined where all of the traction power tiebreaker and substations are:
F Route: Substation north end Archive station.
F Route: Tiebreaker station double crossover north end L'Enfant Plaza station.
F Route: Tiebreaker station F&L Junction south end L'Enfant Plaza station.
L Route: Tiebreaker station fan shaft 9th Street & Maine Avenue / Water Street SW.
L Route: Substation north end Potomac River bridge.
F Route: Substation fan shaft 7 & I Streets SW.
 #1313022  by DiscoveryAnalysis
 
Sand Box John wrote:I went though my various WMATA documents and have determined where all of the traction power tiebreaker and substations are:
F Route: Substation north end Archive station.
F Route: Tiebreaker station double crossover north end L'Enfant Plaza station.
F Route: Tiebreaker station F&L Junction south end L'Enfant Plaza station.
L Route: Tiebreaker station fan shaft 9th Street & Maine Avenue / Water Street SW.
L Route: Substation north end Potomac River bridge.
F Route: Substation fan shaft 7 & I Streets SW.

Do your documents show how far F&L TBS covers the L route before handing off to the Water St TBS?
 #1313030  by Sand Box John
 
"DiscoveryAnalysis"
Do your documents show how far F&L TBS covers the L route before handing off to the Water St TBS?


The TBS at F&L is connected to all 6 third rail segments on either side of the junction. 3 on track 1 and 3 on track 2. The other end of the segments on the L route are connect to the Water St TBS. The other end of the F route segments are connected to the 7 & I Streets TPSS. To the north they are connected to the TBS in the double crossover at the north end of the L'Enfant plaza station.

During normal operation all circuit breaker are closed creating a continuous bus fed at multiple points by multiple substations.

See: Orange Line Contact Rail Schematic (1.25 MB PDF file) for single line drawing of how things are connected together. Note the drawing is old as it does not show the as built K&N junction.
 #1313047  by Tommy Meehan
 
Mainland wrote:There's a longer 14 minute video from inside the train here:
Youtube link
The operator makes repeated announcements to stay in the train and not go into the tunnel. However, he's also heard pleading with any transit police on the train to communicate on their end to release the train on the platform at L'Enfant...
That video was excellent. I've always wondered what it would be like to get caught up in one of these incidents, as a rider, and now I know. I must say, having ridden MetroRail dozens of times, I was impressed with the train operator. I think he acted and sounded professional although there was obviously not a whole lot he could do.

One problem I seem to see in a lot of these incidents is the railroad or agency wanting to try and handle the situation themselves without calling in police and fire but then sometimes letting things go too far. Having worked in (non-railroad) industry I understand and am sympathetic to that thinking, We can handle this ourselves, I really am. In fact a gentleman I know who worked for Penn Central in New York City -- when they were repeatedly criticized for the same thing, not promptly notifying FDNY when there was a problem -- said he personally dreaded having to get city firefighters involved when there was a problem that seemed relatively minor. Reason being, the fire department would take over control of the affected line and was not cooperative with railroad staff that wanted to try and limit disruption to other riders. He said once FDNY got involved everything came to a halt and usually stayed that way for a l-o-n-g time! :-)
 #1313408  by JDC
 
There was a big briefing tonight and lots of news came out of it. Once the stories are written up, I am sure they will be posted here.

In the meantime, there is a regularly-scheduled Board meeting tomorrow, including the Safety Committee. The NTSB's acting chairman will attend and brief the committee. You bet this will be heavily covered, and I wonder how often NTSB chairman get this involved. http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/news/P ... aseID=5861
 #1313534  by JackRussell
 
It sounds like DC Fire recently changed their equipment to encrypt communications, but that Metro's equipment was not configured correctly, which may have led to the communications problems that they were having on the day of the accident.

http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local ... 75111.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
 #1313563  by pumpers
 
More grist for the mill, regarding lack of communication & coordination from the Fire Department to Metro (as described in the previous post) and from Metro to the Fire Department : http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/tra ... story.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Requa [Metro interim general manager] said it was eventually determined that firefighters had changed the encryption codes on their radios without notifying Metro. The agency needed to know so that it could alter the signal-relay equipment in the subway system so that the equipment would recognize and transmit the firefighters’ radio signals.
Asked why firefighters had not notified Metro, Requa said he did not know.
Questions also remain ... about Metro’s initial call to the D.C. fire department to report the smoke. Metro reported “heavy smoke at our L’Enfant Plaza Metrorail station” but did not initially convey that passengers were aboard a train stuck in the tunnel, according to a transcript of the 911 call.
JS
 #1313758  by Sand Box John
 
Metro Deputy General Manager orders safety actions during investigation
For immediate release
01 22 2015 9:54 AM

Metro Deputy General Manager Rob Troup today ordered a range of early-action safety items. The steps were identified in collaboration with the NTSB investigation team and are not to be misconstrued as formal recommendations from the NTSB. The NTSB investigation remains ongoing and has not yet determined the cause or identified findings.

"Metro and NTSB have been reviewing standard procedures and looking for opportunities to further enhance the safety of this system," Troup said. "The ten items that we have identified so far are actions Metro is taking now based on our collaborative review with NTSB."

"I must emphasize that these steps should not be interpreted as being related to the cause of the L'Enfant incident," Troup said.

The ten items ordered by Troup are:

1. Write SOP for train operator to cut EV immediately upon stopping for smoke incident. (RTRA, Completion - 1/22/2015)

Note: The minute a train stops for a smoke incident, the train operator will turn off air intake systems. Under the former SOP, the instruction for turning off air intake comes from the Rail Operations Control Center. This ]b[is not related[/b] to tunnel fans.

2. Write SOP for incident management in ROCC to provide specifics for site discipline in the ROCC to avoid cross-talk and unnecessary interactions. (RTRA, Completion - 1/26/2015)

Note: To ensure that key personnel who are responsible for managing an incident are not distracted, this SOP will ensure that ROCC employees stay at their own desks and not engage those managing the incident.

3. Set schedule for next three years for emergency quarterly drills to be conducted wayside. Sequence station, then a tunnel section, then an elevated section (note tunnel and elevated sections shall be between stations). Please sequence each quarter in a separate jurisdiction. Coordinate type of drill and logistics with MTPD. (RTRA, Completion - 1/26/2015)

4. Design and implement exterior signage for exterior doors to clearly delineate access in event of emergency. (TIES, Completion - 2/13/2015)


Note: Metro has an extensive training program for emergency responders. However, in the event that one of the trained responders is not first on scene, there will be new signage on the outside of the train to identify emergency doors and access points.

5. Provide engineering and operations report on all third rail jumper cables in tunnel sections for condition and installation. (TIES, Completion - 2/27/2015)

Note: Metro personnel will conduct inspections looking for wear and tear on cables and assess the condition of cable installations.

6. Recommendation on installation of low smoke/low halogen on high voltage third rail jumper cables. (TIES, Completion - 2/13/2015)

Note: Already an ongoing effort under its rebuilding program, Metro is installing low-smoke cables.

7. Install mechanical protection on third rail jumper cables that may be exposed to wear from vibration against other materials. (TIES - Begin work immediately)

Note: If a cable that has begun to lean over the years (as a result of vibration), then install protection to prevent the cable from coming in contact with other materials.

8. Review of ground fault detectors on third-rail circuit breakers. (TIES, Completion - 2/27/2015)

9. Operational analysis of running trains at 45 MPH in the core with limited acceleration. (TIES and RTRA - 3/31/2015)

Note: This will be an operational analysis to see if Metro can limit current flowing through electrical infrastructure.

10. Provide report on installing zoned smoke detectors using ETS boxes for location and transmitting of information, also investigate use of wireless smoke detectors. (TIES, Completion - 2/27/2015)

Note: The report will determine feasibility.

###

One item mysteriously missing from the above:

Clean the accumulated brake, brake rotor, wheel, rail wear dust from the trackbed, third rail cables, negative return cables and fasting hardware, third rail insulators and third rail covers.
 #1313796  by JackRussell
 
Sand Box John wrote: One item mysteriously missing from the above:

Clean the accumulated brake, brake rotor, wheel, rail wear dust from the trackbed, third rail cables, negative return cables and fasting hardware, third rail insulators and third rail covers.
What would it actually take to do this cleaning? Is it something that will require manual effort to scrub them down, or is it something that could be automated (like a rail-mounted vacuum or power washer)?
 #1313854  by Sand Box John
 
"JackRussell"
What would it actually take to do this cleaning? Is it something that will require manual effort to scrub them down, or is it something that could be automated (like a rail-mounted vacuum or power washer)?


There is a vendor out there that makes a machine that scrubs and power washes third rail insulators. Requires the use of distilled water when washing the third rail when hot.

Vacuum might get 40 percent of the crud. A combination of power washing and vacuuming might get 70 percent. The crud on the third rail insulators is like dried food stuck on dirty dishes except worse. Multiple cleanings would in my opinion be needed to get everything at least 85 percent clean. The crud on the third rail insulators that is to stubborn scrub and or power wash off would require changing out for new ones.

Routine washing of the tunnels once every couple of months should be sufficient keep ahead of the accumulation dirt. The issue doesn't exist on the surface because the rain washes things.

The wash water would likely have to be captured to prevent it from being pumped out into the municipal sewer system by the ejector pumps.
 #1313856  by DiscoveryAnalysis
 
Sand Box John wrote:"JackRussell"
What would it actually take to do this cleaning? Is it something that will require manual effort to scrub them down, or is it something that could be automated (like a rail-mounted vacuum or power washer)?


There is a vendor out there that makes a machine that scrubs and power washes third rail insulators. Requires the use of distilled water when washing the third rail when hot.

Vacuum might get 40 percent of the crud. A combination of power washing and vacuuming might get 70 percent. The crud on the third rail insulators is like dried food stuck on dirty dishes except worse. Multiple cleanings would in my opinion be needed to get everything at least 85 percent clean. The crud on the third rail insulators that is to stubborn scrub and or power wash off would require changing out for new ones.

Routine washing of the tunnels once every couple of months should be sufficient keep ahead of the accumulation dirt. The issue doesn't exist on the surface because the rain washes things.

The wash water would likely have to be captured to prevent it from being pumped out into the municipal sewer system by the ejector pumps.
I thought at least during one point in the 80s WMATA had a power washing machine to do tunnels & stations?
You bring up a good point SBJ that I'll bring to the forefront as to how often tunnels are cleaned as well as how often the railcars are put through the car wash. I know it can't be daily like it was in the mid 90s
 #1313908  by Sand Box John
 
"DiscoveryAnalysis"

I thought at least during one point in the 80s WMATA had a power washing machine to do tunnels & stations?
You bring up a good point SBJ that I'll bring to the forefront as to how often tunnels are cleaned as well as how often the railcars are put through the car wash. I know it can't be daily like it was in the mid 90s


WMATA does have all the equipment needed to power wash stations and they do it on a somewhat limited basses. However the power washing goes no further then the ends of the platforms. Walk to the end of a platform and you will notice how much dirtier the tunnel track bed is compared the tunnel track bed in the station.

The tunnels have NEVER been cleaned ! ! !

Former General Manager David L. Gunn pointed out this fact in a Presentation to Metro Board of Directors (9.90 MB PDF file) of an analysis he was commissioned to do back on 03 11 2010.
 #1313942  by JDC
 
Several of these recommendations jumped out to me, not including the ones discussed above. For the issue of tunnel cleaning, I know it's a big job but it sounds like something that should be done at some measured interval. Even the lighting in the tunnels, which is there for emergencies, is hampered by the thick layer of grime covering the casings.

9. Operational analysis of running trains at 45 MPH in the core with limited acceleration. (TIES and RTRA - 3/31/2015) - This seems to be a big one, no? Running trains at a slower speed in order to limit the electrical demands on infrastructure? I can see this being necessary during short-term projects, but as a new SOP?

5. Provide engineering and operations report on all third rail jumper cables in tunnel sections for condition and installation. (TIES, Completion - 2/27/2015) - This seems to be something Metro should already be doing, and I guess is 'low hanging fruit' that looks nice to add to the other points.

4. Design and implement exterior signage for exterior doors to clearly delineate access in event of emergency. (TIES, Completion - 2/13/2015) - This one confuses me. Statements from first responders indicated they had trouble accessing the trains. What doors were they trying to use? The doors at the rear of the train? Isn't that the door they are supposed to use? Were they trying to access the train from the side doors?
 #1313943  by JDC
 
Sand Box John wrote: Former General Manager David L. Gunn pointed out this fact in a Presentation to Metro Board of Directors (9.90 MB PDF file) of an analysis he was commissioned to do back on 03 11 2010.
That is one damning report. I don't see Metro using any language like that these days.
 #1313952  by Sand Box John
 
"JDC"

4. Design and implement exterior signage for exterior doors to clearly delineate access in event of emergency. (TIES, Completion - 2/13/2015) - This one confuses me. Statements from first responders indicated they had trouble accessing the trains. What doors were they trying to use? The doors at the rear of the train? Isn't that the door they are supposed to use? Were they trying to access the train from the side doors?


There seem to have been some confusion among the fire fighters on which doors could opened during emergencies from the outside. End door are kept locked at all times, doors between coupled car are not. Center side door can be manually opened from both inside and outside of the car.

Me thinks the signage for the exterior should not be necessary. This should be a training issue. Fire fighters are trained what the correct procedures are for fighting a given type of fire. They are trained on procedures on how to open elevator door. They should also be trained on procedure on how to open the doors on Metrorail cars.