CN9634 wrote:Gokeefe,
I would like to make a few suggestions to clarify your direction in this thread. First (from my interpretation) I would like to say that you are approaching this topic as if traffic has magically appeared and management has not thought of where it would add in capacity. The oil increase has been gradual and has allowed the railroad to 'tool up' its infrastructure and work out crew and locomotive bugs that have arised. In terms of efficieny, it is only a short matter of time when performing the same task over and over again that it becomes easier. Then, when the traffic really booms, the RR although challenged, will be able to more effectively deal with the increase.
Not necessarily. Above all else I am simply an outsider attempting to gain an understanding based on observation and discussion of one of the single most important parts of my (yours/our) state's economy. The problem with this perspective is what you've outlined, and chiefly that is that neither myself nor the rest of us who don't work for or have some substantial connections within the industry can't always understand how well (or not) the organization in question is dealing with change.
I keep in mind at all times that a) PAR is a rational and sound actor and b) the consequence of a) is that they tend to make good decisions within their own business context. Understanding what they
perceive their business context to be is one of the general subtexts of almost any discussion of PAR, and its importance inflated by the fact that they are a privately held company, and even by private standards they are rather closely held at that.
Speaking specifically to your first sentence I would note that I understand and expect exactly what you've described. But I would also note that until recently oil trains had to be severed in Waterville and six axle power wasn't running through either. That is probably more than anything a function of the specific timing of the execution of the oil contracts (maybe?) in 2011 which prevented PAR from planning ahead of time for the 2012 summer trackwork season. Consequently as KSmitty reported we saw an extended season of work (perhaps?) that focused at the very end on the northern end of the PAR system. In general I would agree that the traffic of course "didn't come out of nowhere" but in the strategic sense (5-10 years perspective) it almost did. No one in 2010, not in Billerica (that we are aware of) or anywhere else was planning for oil trains. Had that been the case I can't imagine that Irving would have had to act as quickly as they did to expand their rail facility.
So on the one hand I strongly agree, concur with and appreciate your assessment. I think it's perfectly sound. On the other hand, using a more historical perspective we are watching a number of different very significant regional actors make some quick changes to adapt to new opportunities. I would strongly concur as well that overall they've done a great job taking advantage of this opportunity and I expect nothing less moving forward. Finally, and perhaps most importantly I would relate my conversation with Mr. Fink, Jr. on the
Downeaster inaugural train to Brunswick in which he stated in so many words that the railroad had in fact been caught unprepared as it were for the logistical challenges presented by the initial operation of the
Downeaster in 2001. These problems were ultimately overcome and the company has since learned, as he was very careful to indicate, to ensure future passenger service expansions (inclusive of the Brunswick extension) had sufficient capacity built into them to address the challenges presented by mixed freight and passenger service trains.
In summary there is a history of logistical challenges and also a history of successfully responding to them with sustainable strategies that ultimately ensure the company's continued profitability. If nothing else that trend is what I would think most of the discussion in this thread will revolve around. Personally (and for other professional reasons as well), I find the analysis and dissection of these problems and the decision making process that goes into them to be extremely edifying.
CN9634 wrote:Secondly, management of the RR has a much better grasp than you are giving them credit for of their own system and the relative age and use of the sidings and storage from which they have the ability to use short hand. Essentially, there have always been general plans of how to deal with increased traffic, but implementation is a different story (IE, money and nessecity). Now keep in mind that capacity is just a piece of the function for railroad efficiency. While yes, capacity at times may be short, you must also realize that a number of other factors influence capacity. Equipment shortages, crew shortages and hours, as well as other unexpected conditions are all pieces of the efficiency equation and each will have an impact on capacity in a similar way as capacity will impact them.
I would note that perhaps my own mistake here has been to allow you (or anyone) else to get the impression that I think my outside perspective is roughly congruent with the internal outlook of the company. I do as a matter of course understand, minimally, the additional limiting dynamics that can be present due to staffing, equipment, weather, and track conditions but I certainly don't think that our perspective here is at all as well informed as theirs. In general I assume that they certainly understand their system quite well, by asking questions as they respond to new challenges hopefully I (and others as well) can learn more too.
CN9634 wrote:The way things are now aren't bad at all. The biggest issues arise when Irving calls and can't handle a job just yet. That means an oil job has to sit in a siding somewhere. That however, seems to be improving. With all this being said, I can tell you there are plans for 4 or 5 reactivated sidings up 'nawth' to allow these jobs to sit. Which ones you can think of I will leave to you.
Indeed. In fact I'm frankly impressed with how quickly PAR appears to be responding to everything in general, they needed better track north of Bangor and they built it (with more improvements to come of course), they needed more motive power and they got it, they needed crews and they hired them (with more to come there as well). All fairly straight forward really. Good to hear that they will be adding sidings a needed. I have to wonder what this implies for signaling.
CN9634 wrote:I'll leave you with this. If the RR was a finely tuned machine it would hardly ever have jobs sit and wait, but more so than the broader issues, come the unexpected surprises. A broken rail, a late commuter train, a stubborn unit, a hot axle or even locked breaks are just a few examples of many. They will always face these challenges and sometimes that is the reason the train can't move.
Personally I never question why they can't move a train. Most of the time the answer is safety related and in the case of Irving and their capacity issues that's ultimately a safety issue as well. I do find it interesting to observe the kinks in the system as their traffic base expands. What their ultimate response is to these problems is, as indicated above, one of the most significant aspects of this discussion and even more broadly than merely PAR it teaches the reader about the ability of 21st century railroads to move freight. Here we have a problem that in 20th century terms, especially pre-1950/1960 might have implied the necessity for system wide double main line track, extensive signaling and station staffing requirements and large quantities of motive power and supporting shop forces. In the 21st century construct we can see that information technology overlaid onto diesel-electric hauled freight trains has made the system so flexible that a sustained 10%-30%
annual increase in traffic can be met with a minimal addition of system track mileage and some expanded maintenance of way efforts.
I find that capability to be pretty remarkable but I also find the situational dynamics that may potentially lead to a more dramatic response interesting as well.
In essence problems that used to require the addition of entire separate tracks now merely require a change in the standards of upkeep and the addition of some new ties (perhaps with heavier rail to follow). With good reason modern railroads are deeply averse to adding track miles, reactivating old lines or taking other steps which require them to substantially increase their physical plant. In fact I believe "construction aversion" may be among the single most ingrained responses in the contemporary American railroad professional's head. That being the case watching circumstances come together which force them to act against their most deeply held and valued instincts and add physical plant
of any kind, essentially utilization of measures of last resort, is a very interesting dynamic. As alluded to earlier I have other professional reasons for being interested in understanding those dynamics. Regardless, the economic implications for the State of Maine are more than sufficient to keep my attention on this discussion for some time to come.
Thanks for taking the time to bring up some of the more fundamental questions and issues that this thread faces. I appreciate the opportunity to think through the purpose of this thread and to better describe my reason for starting it. Feel free to reply or of course PM me at any time if you have any additional concerns. I personally value and appreciate your opinion and discussion.
