Railroad Forums 

  • The rationalization of redundant trackage...

  • Discussion related to the operations and equipment of Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail) from 1976 to its present operations as Conrail Shared Assets. Official web site can be found here: CONRAIL.COM.
Discussion related to the operations and equipment of Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail) from 1976 to its present operations as Conrail Shared Assets. Official web site can be found here: CONRAIL.COM.

Moderators: TAMR213, keeper1616

 #88534  by crazy_nip
 
jmp883 wrote:EL had also investigated a merger with the N&W (Chessie System) but was unable to do so
since when are the N&W and the chessie system the same thing??

actually the "chessie system" was not a railroad.

You actually mean the C&O

the N&W wanted parts of the former PRR (which I think it ended up getting) and EL and C&O wanted others

the C&O and EL unions could not work out their differences and a whole lot of trackage ended up getting abandoned
 #88723  by jmp883
 
I get confused when it comes to all those Southern roads :-D .

It just seems that they all ended up in either NS or CSX......seriously, I do appreciate the information.

Thanks!

Joe P :-D

 #89370  by Otto Vondrak
 
crazy_nip- it's assumed that when you talk about "Chessie System," you are talking about the company that jointly operated and marketed C&O, B&O, and WM... NOT just C&O. I dont want to split hairs over it, but "Chessie" is not just C&O.
 #95962  by Matt Langworthy
 
Getting back the original topic- EL was not necessarily redundant. Chessie almost bought EL, and Santa Fe at least considered it. If either of those railroads had bought EL, it would have become their core route to the New York City/northern NJ markets.

Keep in mind that some of EL's more lucrative traffic, like UPS traffic, was shifted to PC routes, to prop up the traffic flow there. Furthermore, CR was able to capitalize on the revenues it received from running stack trains on the Southern Tier to upgrade clearances and such on routes like the West Shore so the traffic could eventually be routed thru those lines.
If EL had remained out of CR, I don't think the Water Level Route would be as lucrative as it is now, although it would still be profitable.

And CR could have made better use of EL. H. Roger Grant's book on the EL compares it to western routes. Certainly, EL had less customers and fewer terminals, which means less congestion and bottlenecks. CR also was just about as ruthless at chasing away old EL customers as it was with ex-LV customers. The shutdown of the Mt. Pocono automobile facility is a good example of that. CR wanted a monopoly, period. They didn't want to keep any routes that could have turned into competition. Unfortunately, they weren't the only business to act that way.

 #139339  by Scrap The U34CH
 
HI,
I just found this thread tonight. Quite interesting.

Follow the link to a great new page that details the EL's $$$ situation and shows the was EL was in a death spiral after 1970. Well before the storm damage in 72.

Someone here said the EL made money in 75 but this page says EL lost a record 94.5 million in 75.

Anyway, Have a look around this guy's site, He has a lot of good info there.

http://www.geocities.com/gero404/gray/ELNumbers.html

 #140503  by catfoodflambe
 
Andyt293...

Re- the Charmin plant in Mehoopany....

Trust me – the story related to you about the traffic being too profitable is inaccurate. I did a case study on this traffic as a college student majoring in Transportation and Logistics in the mid 1980’s

Factor #1 : When Mehoopany was on LV's main line pre-1976, the LV was hauling 150 empty boxcars a day past the factory while returning empties back to their western connections at Buffalo. Considering that the LV, which terminated 75% of their boxcar traffic, was responsible for per-diem on empties all the way back to the home road, the car-hire savings more that offset the minor additional cost to stop and drop the empties. Also - all the LV had to do was herd the cars into three connection blocks at the plant and drag 'em down the pike to Buffalo to the interchange.

When CR stopped running through trains via the LV, the railroad now had to round up the empties, drag them a hundred miles out of the way to Scranton, then negotiate what was essentially a 100-mile, high-maintenance, one-customer spur line. They also had to ferry two or three switch crews a day back and forth from Scranton. They then had to drag the loads back to Allentown, switch them, and THEN move them to connections. The increase in handling cost was substantial. Toilet paper was about as low-rated a commodity as you could find, and Conrail very quickly realized they were losing their butts on the (regulated) traffic.

2. Charmin opened or purchased a Wisconsin paper mill in the late 1970's which began supplying customers as far east as Ohio. At that time, the output at Mehoopany was redirected to supply eastern and southern markets. Conrail's pre-Staggers Act break-even line-haul distance for this rate level was around 350 miles, which puts you outside of CR territory to the south, outside Charmin’s distribution zone to the west, or in eastern New England. The latter meant you still had an empty boxcar on your hands, another ten days accumulated car-hire expense, AND an additional 350 miles to move the blasted car. Remember - CR could NOT refuse to handle the freight.

3. CR's immediate reaction was to negotiate a surcharge with Charmin to at least cover the costs - I --think-- it was about $125.00 per carload. This stopped the immediate bleeding - just in time for Congress to deregulate the trucking industry. Suddenly, the 3300 empty private trucks that departed the Northeast every day for points west and south could haul toilet paper for whatever they felt allowed them to break even. I know the trucking company I worked for in the late 1980’s was hauling truckloads of Elmer’s glue from near Binghamton NY to points in Ohio for fifty cents a mile – and delivered door-to-door in less than 24 hours for close to the cost of the surcharge alone. You can predict the outcome from there.

Cash flow is not always the same thing as profit!
 #144621  by Matt Langworthy
 
catfoodflambe wrote:When CR stopped running through trains via the LV, the railroad now had to round up the empties, drag them a hundred miles out of the way to Scranton, then negotiate what was essentially a 100-mile, high-maintenance, one-customer spur line. They also had to ferry two or three switch crews a day back and forth from Scranton.
Just a minor quibble, but CR was running trains like BUOI and CGAL past the plant. Despite the symbols, they really functionned more as long-haul locals- making a lot of pick-ups and set-outs enroute. Considering that, there must have been at least some empties to return. CR probably could have found a way for one of those trains (especially OIBU/BUOI) to handle the traffc.

It always amazes me how CR dropped one low-performing operation but would in turn retain a similar operation on another line. And there is certainly little defense for CR's treatment of the ex-EL Mt. Pocono facility- their surcharges practically chased Ford out of distribution by rail for a decade or more. And when it returned, it was on the more customer-friendly CN, not CR.