• Red Line Collision between Ft Totten and Takoma on (6/22/09)

  • Discussion related to DC area passenger rail services from Northern Virginia to Baltimore, MD. Includes Light Rail and Baltimore Subway.
Discussion related to DC area passenger rail services from Northern Virginia to Baltimore, MD. Includes Light Rail and Baltimore Subway.

Moderators: mtuandrew, therock, Robert Paniagua

  by WMATA Black-Black
 
Just a FYI.....This past week I've noticed that trains are no longer holding @ Takoma & Ft. Totten so I'm guessing the absoloute block has been discontuined. However while on a inbound trip approaching Ft. Totten my train stopped in approach to Ft. Totten "due to a train servicing Ft. Totten".......sounds like WMATA hasn't learned yet
  by WMATA Black-Black
 
Just past where Train 214 (struck train) was sitting when the crash happened.

As a side note I noticed the supervisors were back on duty this morning at Takoma and it seems that the absoulte block was back in effect, key phrase is seems
  by farecard
 
The NTSB has issued an immediate warning letter http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2009/R09_15_16.pdf to WMATA and the other parties. They are concerned about the track modules going into oscillation and spoofing the receiver.
Testing found that a spurious high-frequency modulated signal was being created by parasitic oscillation from the power output transistors in the track circuit module transmitter. This spurious signal propagated through the power transistor heat sink, through the metal rack structure, and through a shared power source into the associated module receiver, thus establishing an unintended signal path. The spurious signal mimicked a valid track circuit signal. The peak amplitude of the spurious signal appeared at the correct time interval and was large enough to be sensed by the module receiver as a valid track circuit signal, which energized the track relay. This combination—of an alternate signal path between track circuit modules and a spurious signal capable of exploiting that path—bypassed the rails, and the ability of the track circuit to detect the train was lost.
I think Alstom's insurer just had a very bad day....
  by pumpers
 
farecard wrote:The NTSB has issued an immediate warning letter http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2009/R09_15_16.pdf to WMATA and the other parties. They are concerned about the track modules going into oscillation and spoofing the receiver.
..
Yikes, that is a pretty pathological problem. A circuit designer's worst nightmare. Not the non-linear issue we speculated about earlier, but it was one that only appeared at high signal levels. I am an electrical engineer and just about everyone of us has encountered a circuit with parasitic oscillations (often intermittent) at one point or another. Incredibly hard to track down and harder to predict. Actually there were 2 pathological/difficult to predict problems. First, the change in impedance bond required a larger output signal from the amp, and at the peaks of the signal the amp would go into oscillation. Second, this oscillation was somehow getting transmitted through a parasitic (unintended) path into the receiver. If the path was through the power supply, I'm not sure why you need to invoke the heat sink and the electronics rack -- the current spikes from the oscillation are often enough to cause effects in the power supply.
JS
  by Jersey_Mike
 
Yikes, that is a pretty pathological problem. A circuit designer's worst nightmare. Not the non-linear issue we speculated about earlier, but it was one that only appeared at high signal levels. I am an electrical engineer and just about everyone of us has encountered a circuit with parasitic oscillations (often intermittent) at one point or another. Incredibly hard to track down and harder to predict. Actually there were 2 pathological/difficult to predict problems. First, the change in impedance bond required a larger output signal from the amp, and at the peaks of the signal the amp would go into oscillation. Second, this oscillation was somehow getting transmitted through a parasitic (unintended) path into the receiver. If the path was through the power supply, I'm not sure why you need to invoke the heat sink and the electronics rack -- the current spikes from the oscillation are often enough to cause effects in the power supply.
Does this validate my previous intuition that concentrating large amounts of signaling equipment in a centralized location can lead to more problems than if the equipment is parceled out in individual cabinets along the right of way?
  by Sand Box John
 
"Jersey_Mike"

Does this validate my previous intuition that concentrating large amounts of signaling equipment in a centralized location can lead to more problems than if the equipment is parceled out in individual cabinets along the right of way?


To certain extent yes.

There is the issue that WMATA's signaling system uses a lot of electronic hardware. There is more to their signaling system then racks full of relays.

I happen to believe to real solution is to meticulously maintain the track circuit hardware to design specification down to the last fastener and stand of wire.
  by farecard
 
Jersey_Mike wrote:
Does this validate my previous intuition that concentrating large amounts of signaling equipment in a centralized location can lead to more problems than if the equipment is parceled out in individual cabinets along the right of way?
Not really, to my mind. The only surefire solution would receivers in one building, transmitters in another. But there are many other solutions to the coupling problem; ones that do NOT require many more physical locations along the track.

I agree with pumpers that is a EE's nightmare; one far more likely at RF frequencies than audio. I recall struggling with various crystal oscillators that wanted to NOT oscillate; or oscillated wherever they wanted, but not where the crystal fundamental frequency was.
  by pumpers
 
farecard wrote:
I agree with pumpers that is a EE's nightmare; one far more likely at RF frequencies than audio. I recall struggling with various crystal oscillators that wanted to NOT oscillate; or oscillated wherever they wanted, but not where the crystal fundamental frequency was.
From what I can infer from the NTSB memo, the system was oscillating at high (RF?) frequency, not audio. it would just do it at the peaks (postive and/or negative) of the audio-frequency track signal. One could say the RF oscillation was modulated (in a non-linear fashion) by the magnitude of the track signal. The oscillation was strong enough and of the right frequency to get transmitted by a parastic path to the receiver, unlike the regular audio frequency signal. So if you low-pass filter it or take the envelope (more or less which is what the receiver must have been doing), you would get something like the original track signal at the receiver, which was the fatal flaw. JS

PS. I'm not sure that maintenance and adhering to proceedure on the part of the signal department could have prevented it. It could have been that the transistors aged in some way that changed their characteristics so that the amp would be prone to oscillate in some conditions. Adjusting the strength of the transmitter (as part of the adjustments after the impedance bond was replaced) to a high level is what pushed it into the region which made it osciallate it seems, but that could have just been following the book. Again, very pathological and a nightmare and it COULD have been almost impossbile to predict on the part of the original designer, can't say for sure without knowing all the details.
  by CSXTfan
 
I remember when this crash occered.

It was what seemed a normal day in the summer at the pool, A metro police officer came bye to watch his daughters swiming lessons(not sure) With activity brewing on his scanner.
After a while he left to go back to work. Then when i left and whent back home and turned on the news (being the news buff i've always been :P )
And all i saw was

Brakeing news comeing from yadda yadda and saw videos off a train on top of the other.
All i herd from the reporters was thart it looked like part of the strikeing train was torn undeer neath the hit train.
It was just a terrible day.
  by farecard
 
The NTSB has announced details on the upcoming hearing: http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2010/Washing ... fault.html

"
* Tuesday, February 23, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.
* Wednesday, February 24, 2010
* Thursday, February 25, 2010

The hearing will be open to the public and will take place in the Board Room and Conference Center at 429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C." {Good luck getting a seat, folks....}

Agenda http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2010/Washing ... agenda.htm

Exhibits: http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/RailRoad/DC ... efault.htm {fixed}

Webcast URL to be announced.
Last edited by farecard on Wed Feb 24, 2010 11:57 am, edited 1 time in total.
  by Sand Box John
 
"farecard"
Webcast URL to be announced.


Links will appear to the live webcast at the NTSB Public Hearings page. Links will also be on the same page to that will allow one to watch on demand after the live webcast.
  by Silverliner II
 
I was in Washington on the 14th of January and did some riding around on a number of Metro lines in the course of going to a number of destinations scattered across the system. I noticed that manual control is still in effect, including manual opening and closing of the doors.

Is that the reason why all trains, regardless of length, are stopping at the extreme ends of the platforms, instead of more towards the middle as they would in automatic mode?
  by HokieNav
 
Silverliner II wrote:I was in Washington on the 14th of January and did some riding around on a number of Metro lines in the course of going to a number of destinations scattered across the system. I noticed that manual control is still in effect, including manual opening and closing of the doors.

Is that the reason why all trains, regardless of length, are stopping at the extreme ends of the platforms, instead of more towards the middle as they would in automatic mode?
Because WMATA feels that their operators aren't smart enough to know how long their trains are and to stop at the appropriate markers.

On an unrelated note, this NTSB document seems to suggest that the operator of train # 112 (the striking train) should have been able to get the train stopped in time.
http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/RailRoad/DC ... 434700.pdf
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