Red Line Collision between Ft Totten and Takoma on (6/22/09)

45 minutes from Farragut to Takoma today.

Website says 17 minutes.

I thought things were getting better

jamesinclair wrote:45 minutes from Farragut to Takoma today.

Website says 17 minutes.

I thought things were getting better :(

I'd guess you might do better with the Green Line to Ft. Totten; then catching the next Red at the platform. That bypasses all the backed up Red trains south of there......

farecard wrote:

jamesinclair wrote:45 minutes from Farragut to Takoma today.

Website says 17 minutes.

I thought things were getting better

I'd guess you might do better with the Green Line to Ft. Totten; then catching the next Red at the platform. That bypasses all the backed up Red trains south of there......

I feel like an unlucky transfer would mess that up though. If things dont get better, I might try it though.

"Jersey_Mike"
That diagram explains why I couldn't locate the lineside relay boxes as that functionality is centralized at the nearest station. I never really liked that setup (which is popular in Europe) as long cable runs between the detection point and the vital hardware increases the chance of interference and miswires. It also leaves you vulnerable to a disaster (fire, flood, crash) taking out a HUGE chunk of signaling in one go. I guess its easier on the maintainers and allows for climate control.

WMATA has a total of 92 line side train control rooms, RTUs (Remote Terminal Units), 5 control areas that do not have stations within them. That works out to an average of 1.09 miles between RTUs. There are 3 auxiliary RTUs between stations that may or may not have signaling system hardware in them.

All of WMATA cable runs on the surface are in concrete duct banks that are buried at least 8' below top of rail. The cable runs between the WEE-Z bonds and the nearest duct bank manhole is in a separate conduit in the same duct bank treanch.

The distance between the furthest WEE-Z bond at the wreck site and the train control room is I believe roughly 3,600'. Not sure if the train control room is in the building on the north end of the platform or the one at the south end. The distance between the two is roughly 700'.

Jersey_Mike wrote:

The photos of the train control room hardware racks are in fact 1970s vintage hardware. The photos in the linked PDF file matches the pictures in the signal maintainer manual I have that was produced in the 1970s. The lower photo in the PDF labeled train control module is identified as ATP transmitter/receiver module in my signal maintainers manual.

That diagram explains why I couldn't locate the lineside relay boxes as that functionality is centralized at the nearest station. I never really liked that setup (which is popular in Europe) as long cable runs between the detection point and the vital hardware increases the chance of interference and miswires. It also leaves you vulnerable to a disaster (fire, flood, crash) taking out a HUGE chunk of signaling in one go. I guess its easier on the maintainers and allows for climate control.

Actualy that is not the case. The CIH is usually located at interlockings where the majority of the vital cicuitry performs its function operating switch machines and signals. The wires eminating to the track circuits are low level audio frequency for tain detection and speed commands and presents no transmission problems. This also allows all signal control lines to be integrated within the housing rather than from wayside case to wayside case in ABS systems. Miswiring is less likely since it is done at one location and not over thousands of feet of right of way making it less likely to cause circuit design and installation errors.

WMATA Youtube Video: Inside L'Enfant Plaza Green Yellow Line (F03) Train control Control Room 5:15 07-31-2009

Latest news on the accident: FRA inspectors have been assisting NTSB in the investigation, and they provided a briefing last week to FRA Office of Safety staff. Apparently the standards of training and technical competence among the WMATA maintainers were found to be close to criminally negligent. Installation of equipment was sloppy, testing was improper, and response to emergency alarms was nonchalant. In one example given in the briefing, a supervisor was in the control house at Ft. Totten when a warning light came on (and by the way, about half the lights on the board were burned out -- this one still worked). He asked a maintainer to check it out, so the maintainer -- in front of FRA and NTSB staff -- unscrewed the bulb.

The meeting concluded with one of the FRA investigators saying, "I've got a SmarTrip card for sale, if anyone would like to buy it".

He asked a maintainer to check it out, so the maintainer -- in front of FRA and NTSB staff -- unscrewed the bulb.

Well it's like a check engine light, those things are always crying wolf

I haven't posted on this board for a while. I've noticed that WMATA has gone ahead and started to operate the 1000-series cars in the center of the trains. I saw numerous sets this week (Green and Red Lines) and nealry all of them had Rohrs in the center. Honestly I don't think it's worth the headache. Unless, Metro expects another train collision, what's the point? They might as well run trains at a top speed of 30mph. I have yet to see a unit train (all cars same series) this week, even on the Green Line.

Does anyone know if any of the cars 12 cars involved in the collision have (or will be) been returned to service?

quote="realtype"
I haven't posted on this board for a while. I've noticed that WMATA has gone ahead and started to operate the 1000-series cars in the center of the trains. I saw numerous sets this week (Green and Red Lines) and nealry all of them had Rohrs in the center. Honestly I don't think it's worth the headache. Unless, Metro expects another train collision, what's the point? They might as well run trains at a top speed of 30mph. I have yet to see a unit train (all cars same series) this week, even on the Green Line.

WMATA began sandwiching 1k car between the rest of the cars in the fleet less the 2 weeks after the wreck. It was done for two reasons. One to placated the demand made by the union and two to make every one feel that WMATA was doing something to make the train more safe to ride.

Does anyone know if any of the cars 12 cars involved in the collision have (or will be) been returned to service?

Based on past wrecks, the other cars that were not damaged beyond repair will be put back into service if they haven't already done so.

Meanwhile, the Red Line's reliability has been improving. My morning commute is just about back to where it was pre-accident, starting last Friday.

so this blind spott in the automatic system, i think that if we put a detector at the beginning and end of each block then this could potentially be solved. just my thought though.

"daylight4449"
so this blind spott in the automatic system, i think that if we put a detector at the beginning and end of each block then this could potentially be solved. just my thought though.

A more proper solution would be to diligently calibrate and maintain all of the line side and train borne hardware to designed specification.

Red Line is back to near normal. Despite frequent announcements that "trains are running at reduced speeds between Ft. Totten and Takoma stations", they aren't. What they are doing is (still) running a manual block between the two points. They've replaced the Sabrett hot dog cart umbrella with a chair that has a canvas sunshade at the north end of Ft. Totten, and there is an employee in a safety vest there, and another under another canvas sunshade at the south end of Takoma Park. It's going to get tough for these guys if this goes on through the winter...

Only problem now on the Red Line is the occasional bunching of trains as they wait to pass through the manual block both inbound and outbound. Operation is at normal speed, but trains can sit for a while at Takoma (inbound) or Ft. Totten (outbound) waiting for clearance.

Apparently all the wayside signal equipment between these two points is being replaced.

"NellieBly"

Operation is at normal speed, but trains can sit for a while at Takoma (inbound) or Ft. Totten (outbound) waiting for clearance.

Apparently all the wayside signal equipment between these two points is being replaced.

Based on your description, it sound to me like they have restored the speed command functionality to the track circuits but are still not satisfied the wayside hardware will to protect against collision.