MP-54 Headlight Question

Hopefully my memory is accurate; the eastbound train failed to stop at a signal west of the gauntlet. The engineer, Jake Kiefer, claimed that he blacked-out. He was charged with manslaughter and later acquitted. The other engineer also survived - his name escapes me. There was a maximum speed of 30 MPH through the gauntlet-tracked area.

With regard to ASC indications (post accident), MAS was green, 30 was yellow/amber, 12 was red. As of 1952, none of these indications would illuminate simultaneously. When a train tranversed from "MAS" to "30," "30" to "12," a cab whistle would sound - loudly - and the engineer had 5-7 seconds to acknowledge this whistle/restriction indication. He would depress a pedal-like device to silence the whistle and then make a brake application to slow the train to 30 MPH (or 12 MPH, whichever applied). If he failed to do this, ASC would make the brake application.

Again, I am trusting memory - can't believe it has been almost 55 years.

UN Block:

Thanks a lot!

Just what I was looking for!

Now I can add another one to my list.

Dave Keller

Guys,

Thank you all for superb info. Jeff, that was not too much info. It was perfect.

In regard to the Thanksgiving eve wreck:
IIRC, a train broke down, and the brakeman failed to walk back and protect the disabled train. (Because they thought they would be able to get it going again.)
How did that train get rearended so bad...was there ATP in that area? It seems, from the magnitude of the crash, that the trailing train had no warning that the disabled train was in front of him.

Thanks again,
Tom

My old friend and retired LIRR conductor, the late Jeff Skinner, told me he spoke afterwards with one of the traincrew who was on that train, as they knew each other.

The man (trainman? conductor?) said he was in the last car walking forward. He walked through the vestibule into the next to last car when they were rammed from the rear.

He remembers being knocked off his feet and hitting his head on the ceiling of the car in which he was walking. Then all went blank.

Afterwards, he always attributed his good fortune of surviving the wreck by the quality of the construction of his trainman's cap. Though it was jammed down on his head and face, almost over his eyes, the frame of the cap kept his head from being crushed against the car's steel ceiling.

Dave Keller

Hey Guys,

This MAY have been one the early "urban legends" but, I recall hearing that the engineer of the fatal train at Richmond Hill saw the "clear" aspect of the signal in front of the train he hit. His cab signal, however, would have still been displaying restricting. Like I said before, with no speed enforcement..........

Not that the automatic speed control as used on the LIRR is so perfect, IMHO. The problem, as I see it, is using ASC with fixed blocks that are sometimes fairly long and slow trains down too far in advance. You've probably all experienced this at some time or another. As an example: an eastward home signal at the east end of a hypothetical station is displaying "stop signal", though there is nothing occupying the block beyond this location. The best indication you'll get at the previous signal is "approach". I see no reason why an eastward train shouldn't be able to enter said station doing at least 30 mph (if not more) and make a normal station stop. Correct me if I'm wrong (you signal experts!) but I THINK this can be helped with additional "code change points" at locations other than the insulated joints at the actual signals. This way, (assuming I'm not talking through my derrier!) after you pass the "approach" signal the ASC alarm won't ring and drop to 15 (0? on the new equipment) until a reasonable distance from the stop signal. Though I've seen code change points on signal drawings that were not at signal locations (I can't remember where, exactly) , I imagine it's an extra cost (to install and maintain) that may not seem justified by the powers that be.

Yes? No? Thoughts???

The speed control codes on the Long Island are not arranged to provide for automatic train control. In other words, an engineer still must know what the Maximum Allowable Speed (called MAS) is in a specific location. Speed restrictions on places like curves, etc, are usually not enforced by speed control, nor is the speed restriction of every approaching signal aspect.

In automatic block signal territory (signaled track) there are two types of signal/speed control configurations as designated by either Rule 409 or 410. Without quoting the rules, 409 is the traditional wayside signals supported by automatic speed control (ASC), and 410 is the same thing without any wayside block signals.

In either configuration, speed control code "change points" are placed using a formula that should stop a rogue train operating at MAS before the next train or stop signal. That's why you often crawl along when approaching that stop, medium clear or approach signal. Much thought is given to the location and aspects of these change points.

Code change points or signal blocks are created using insulated joints in the running rails. These isolate the signal blocks and circuits from one another. On electrified track, there is an impediance bond (those black boxes) which are actually matching transformers bridging these insulated joints.

For the electrically inclined, these are two center tapped transformers, sitting in oil filled sumps between the rails which permit the 750 Volt DC propulsion power (in the two running rails) to return past the insulated joints while keeping the signal circuits on each block isolated.

Propulsion power is Direct Current. The speed control frequencies which are induced onto the running rails are AC with a different frequency for each aspect. Trains read them through the magnetic current induced in a pair of "track receiver" coils behind the pilot. The frequencies are very low by todays standards and are usually created by swinging contacts in relays. Until a few years ago, the ones in Zone A (Amtrak) were created using switches that rode on motorized cams.

It's interesting to note that the M-1 cars were delivered with an ATO position on their controllers. When the engineer held the controller in the ATO position, the train would slow down or speed up automatically as commanded by the track codes. Since the codes didn't reflect all the actual speed restrictions or the actual MAS, the feature was disabled, although the position still appears on the M-1 consoles. The M-1's also came equipped with an Identra system that would automatically throw switches for the train's destination and set the roll signs. That system also wound up, along with the signs, in the trash.
.
This may answer a few of the posed questions.

Clemuel

Clemuel,

I would agree with much of what you said. In fact, many of your points appeared in other LIRR forum threads.
I would just add one word to your first sentence:

The speed control codes on the Long Island are not arranged to provide for automatic train control

How about if it said "...are not always arranged to provide for automatic train control."
You are, of course, correct that not all speed restrictions in curves and other places are enforced by ATC. The Engineer does have to know the speed restrictions in these areas.
However, a train with ATC operational is not going to come whizzing into Penn Station at 80 MPH, either. Whether the Engineer knows the allowed speed or not, it will be enforced by ATC in many, many places on the LIRR.

Tom

P.S. I would also wonder about Identra automatically throwing switches. Sounds dangerous. Are you sure about that? I've never heard that stated before.

The slowing down at times when it seems unnecessary I guess is a necessary evil in a two block, fixed block system. Where is the train in that fixed block? Is it 500 feet in or near the end of the block that it is in? The system doesn't know. All it knows is there is a train shunting the circuit somewhere within that block. Prudence dictates that the safest course of action is to mandate that the trailing train can stop safely behind a train that is just into a block. On a clear, sunny, afternoon with 30 mile visibility, this might seem silly. But, the system has to be designed for that foggy, slippery, night as well.
Moving block would certainly help speed things up, as would CBTC. They cost money.

Somewhat related side note: When I was an apprentice, we rigged up 9001/9002 for stopping distance testing. We took out some seats, rigged testing equipment, and put a D-4 air compressor inside the car to spray a variety of material, as well as water, from 55 gallon drums in the car vestibule, onto the tracks in front of the test train.
I don't know if that was FRA mandated, or the LIRR did it on its own (I highly doubt that), but that testing undoubtedly led to block length considerations. Remember that all M-3 and all M-1 (except CCM overhauled cars) always have slide control enabled during braking, even in emergency brake application. (M-1 CCM cars do not enable slide control in emergency brake application.)

Right you are...

The Automatic Speed Control certainly does provide a good level of automatic control in that it will stop or significantly slow a train should the engineer disregard a signal...

What I ment to communicate is that it is not a substitute for the information conveyed by the signal aspects of an interlocking or for the engineer's compliance with the proper Maximum Speed. But now I sound like a rules examiner.

I find that when teaching new employees as well as when communicating with even experienced conductors, who have never operated a train, many folks believe the ASC system actually fully controls the speed.

Sorry if I duplicated the points made in other posts --

Interesting story about the testing you guys did on the M-1's. While there were braking tests for the M-3's and M-7's, anything like you described was done off-Island, if at all.

Identra was a system of automatic routing wherein a two letter code would be dialed in on the unit, located in the rear of the M-1's, that would designate the destination. This would set the roll signs, and send a coded pulse to wayside transponders. In theory, they would convert the train's identity to a route which the interlocking machine would theoriticaly line.

The system was tested on a very limited basis at Valley in 1969. I don't know if it was tried anywhere else and doubt it ever even lined switches. I do know track receivers were installed and the codes read at Valley. The LIRR's routing of trains is simply too complex for a system as simple, and the roll signs were plagued with indexing problems caused by sunlight upsetting the reading of primitive bar codes printed on the signs for automatic indexing. Even the roll signs were abandoned after less than a year or so.

The Identra equipment is still in the M-1 lockers, the last time I looked. Would be interesting to look inside one...

Clem

Re: that red lens on the MP-54 headlight mentioned earlier. Were they used until those cars were retired circa 1971? Or were they discontinued after the ASC system was installed in the 1950's? Reason I ask is that I was a kid watching and riding MP-54's in the 60's and I don't ever remember seeing a lighted red headlight on the rear of a train. Just the tiny marker lights. In fact in about 1970 I remember seeing a train in Jamaica station with the rear (clear lens) headlight incorrectly turned on, and the brakeman noticed it and turned it off. So I assume that red lens was no longer in use by that time.

Also: regarding UN Block's theoretical stop signal at the end of a station: The preceding signal showing "approach" would require an immediate speed reduction only to 30mph, "prepared to stop at the next signal". I think maybe he confused "approach" with "approach-slow" which I assume would require a reduction to 15mph (?)

You can watch that at Mineola when an eastbound Oyster Bay train crawls thru the block over the hill into the station where the signal at the east end of the platform is showing "slow-approach" for the diverging route onto the O.B. line. I assume the previous signal showed "approach-slow"It is maddening to watch the train come down the line so slowly, but I understand that's the way the system works.

The large, rear vestibule marker lamps were removed long before the cars were withdrawn from service in the early 1970s.

The actual year they were removed, I have no idea, but I don't see them on photos taken in the 1960s.

Dave Keller

As we have been discussing this issue (signals), I recall this was the prime cause of the AMTRAK/MARC accident at Silver Springs (Kennsington), MD in 1996 - a station located within a block and how this contributed to this accident. I've included a web site which addresses this wreck.
http://danger-ahead.railfan.net/acciden ... /home.html

Clem,

The Identra equipment is still in the M-1 lockers, the last time I looked

Sorry to say they're all gone... Along with the old OEM radio/PA equipment that was in there. The overhauled M-1s have the equipment and piping for the bathroom in that cabinet. It's usually blue and yuckky in there on the overhauled cars. The non-overhauled M-1 cars have just an empty space there.

Thanx for the additional info on Identra.

Tom

Interesting story about the testing you guys did on the M-1's.

I remember it well. Special attention was paid to what the wheel slip/slide system was doing.

Totally useless, self-indulging side note: They were afraid to send 9001/9002 into Dunton Shop for PI with all this testing equipment inside. So, the illustrious General Foreman "Hoagie" grabbed me and another guy, as we were heading out for Maxiburgers, and made us put new M/A brushes and check the traction motor brushes and whatnot on the two cars in E Yard. We never did get our Maxiburgers that day.
Hoagie used to wear blue labcoats. So, when he was looking around for a blue flag to put up, I told him he looks like a blue flag. Maybe he should stand in front of our train to protect us. Hmmmmm...in retrospect, I'm starting to see why he didn't like me.

Tom