UTUconductor1 wrote:... childish concern for frugal operations...?"
What do you mean?
Mr. U2-C, your captioned quote from Mr. Patrick's material should be evident to any industry observers - and especially to you as you have worked for the outfit. Whether you return when recalled is not of my concern.
As such an observer (far more so than being a railfan) it certainly would appear that if there were a corner to cut, MMA found it. I guess it is one thing to operate a train with a one man crew with a lading of lumber or potatoes if you could care less when it gets over the road, but to again to use my metaphor, 'when you play in the Class I sandbox' handling HAZMAT, you best be prepared to play according to their rules, which includes two man crews ready to be relieved at established crew change points. You also do not create a culture of fear whereby anyone should have recognized the potential gravity of the situation at Nantes and knew that they would not be on the carpet for having recalled the only employee within 100 miles qualified on train handling. It would be 'pretty petty' to assess discipline against any employee (and, if the disciplined was Agreement, I'm certain it would be overturned on appeal) who chose to break Engineer Harding's rest causing his ten hour rest clock to be reset when he was released from the emergency scene.
There further appears to be a culture that if the Rules give wide latitude to tying down trains, take that latitude for to properly tie down a train takes time - and that time is under HOS. It's also money.
Continuing, to what extent was the need for proper insurance evaluated when MMA began handling crude? Over at the temporarily closed Lac Megantic topic, Mr. Jim Boylan, having Short Line managerial experience, suggested that MMA may not have been able to obtain higher policy limits. If such were the case, where was the fortitude to simply not quote and otherwise withdraw from any consideration to handle the traffic?
Finally, it would appear that when the oil bonanza came MMA's way, they gave little thought to whether or not they had the institutional capacity to handling a dangerous commodity (and there have been enough transport incidents, rail AND pipeline, to suggest it is more so than widely thought) in large volume. It almost seems analogous to my exposure within the not-for-profit sector when I either saw or learned of an agency getting a real eye-popper of a grant - and they had, and had no means to develop, a program to apply such 'pro bono publico'. Within the community, it is known as 'chasing funding'.