afiggatt wrote:SouthernRailway wrote:OK, so I'm seeing that if you don't count the capital costs of buying and maintaining the train cars, locomotives, or other infrastructure (or depreciation), and if you count government subsidies, then the Carolinian makes a profit.
That's not profit in the real world. All that shows is that since Amtrak already bought the equipment and pays for infrastructure, and since NC chips in for the trains, it's helpful for Amtrak's finances to run the train.
The cost of maintenance of the rolling stock is included in the operating cost. The capital cost of replacing the equipment is what the Capital Charge column is for. If you want to get way off in the weeds on how the cost of operating the service is allocated or determined, the methodology used to derive the allocated cost numbers in the Route Performance table has been agreed to by Amtrak, all of the states that will be required to provide state subsidies for routes of < 750 miles (except Indiana DOT which refused to go along) and the Surface Transportation Board in accordance with Section 209 of the 2008 PRIAA act. If you want to see what costs are included in the allocation, see
http://www.highspeed-rail.org/Documents ... 083111.pdf
and a viewgraph briefing package to explain it:
http://www.highspeed-rail.org/Documents ... 061011.pdf
Nice! Thanks, afiggatt.
SouthernRailway, you have not seen the real world of transportation if you think that carriers don't make real profits on routes that are subsidized by locals via capital or operating help. Essential Air Service is real world. Terminals paid for by locals, Runways paid for by Feds (or an airbase gifted, as at Orlando International, whose code is MCO because it was McCoy AFB basically gifted to the City of Orlando--a capital cost savings which Orlando can pass along to airlines, and we don't complain that the airlines' accounting isnt' real), waivers of landing fees for initiating new service. When airlines make profits this way, they still flow as profits through their GAAP accounted financials. Also what truckers and bus companies pay in motor fuel taxes for their use of the highways is a tiny fraction of the costs they impose due to their vehicle's heavy weight and heavy pounding of the pavement that is *not* paid for by motor fuel taxes (cars subsidize trucks as far as pavement wear goes, but we don't as Schneider National to show its ROW subsidies on its books).
So this is managerial accounting of the normal kind, designed to say where assets are best deployed. If every state deal looked as good as the Carolinian, Amtrak could be privatized as a for-profit operator just like Veolia.
And as afiggat notes, the capital charge when it finally appears, will pretty much just be cost-of-owning (depreciation/replacement cost) with everything else, (like mileage and maintenance) already in "operating" but is complicated by 1) operational pooling of rolling stock 2) differences in how some rolling stock is owned, leased, or was sold-and-leased-back over time 3) historical differences in deals as they were cut on a state-by-state, route-by-route basis. 4) Routes (like the Carolinian, Lynchburg, and NPN/NFK/RVR) that operate partly as Amtrak's train between WAS and NYP/BOS, and partly as state-paid extensions (how do you allocate the cost of a whole train moving between the two parts of the system, by train-mile, car-mile or seat-mile, by passenger, or by city-pair--all are possible/permissable/valid under GAAP).
States coming late to the game (NC and VA) got essentially commercial-quality deals: State pays the cost of ownership of the rolling stock off Amtrak's books as the contribution to the route. The rolling stock isn't free, but being free to Amtrak, Amtrak will be free to account the routes profitable to it, just like Southwest was profitable because it inherited all of Dallas Love field's capital stock at cut-rate prices, though it was built-and-paid-for by the Braniffs of the world and often takes incentives to start service to a new city (e.g. Panama City, Florida, which waived landing fees that usually pay for the runway). Or
The more I familiarize myself, the more I see that the Carolinian's rolling stock (here's a manifest
http://www.bytrain.org/equipmt.html) was paid for separately by NC as its way of keeping some costs off Amtrak's books, the same way cities attract air service. With those costs off, Amtrak makes a profit as far as it is concerned, and its managers are best off chasing such profits as are identified under S209 and dumping routes that don't show such profits.
Or Amtrak will show losses on the capital account for NC which NC has already provided for (if Amtrak has to "pay" for its rolling stock, it would also find that NC, by buying such rolling stock, has already funded that loss). Either way, NC's subsidy is real, but Amtrak's profits can be real too. Having bought its railcars, NC needn't appropriate a continuing operating subsidy, which is important politically. And such routes are many times more sustainable and worth celebrating here.