Metro-North Blames Amtrak In CT Derailment

There are only two freight customers west of BRIDGEPORT, one of them is
Rings End Lumber in Darien (between Darien and Noroton Heights Stations) and the other is in Mamaroneck.
The only freight customers on the Danbury Branch between South Norwalk
and Danbury are in Bethel. The two above main line customers are either
served out of Croton West Yard or Oak Point.
There are a number of customers between New Haven and Bridgeport and
these customers are served out of New Haven.
Noel Weaver

Why? The accident was caused by the Amtrak crew's inability to follow the rulebook, not by the lack of a tower in the area. Had the Amtrak crew bothered to follow the rules, the accident wouldn't have happened.

Centralization of dispatching functions in central management offices creates a higher level of inattention and unawareness and this then translates to a decrease in operating safety. Aren't you the one that is always going on and on about how rulebooks are insufficient and we need more safety systems out on the rails to back them up? The currently popular dispatcher control system is spread too thin and is too detatched from the actual operation of trains.

Mike even New Haven west would not have prevented the Amtrak engineer from running by a missed signal.
Appearantly the qualifications of engineer were not sufficient to determine if signal was missing. He stopped after he already broke the switch, something only he would have known, it was then ludicrous to back up with or without permission, as the broken switch would guarantee a derailment.

hsr_fan wrote:Well, how many heavy freight trains operate on the Shinkansen ROW in Japan, or the "LGVs" in France? I realize that Amtrak can't afford to turn the NEC into a dedicated passenger line, but this is an example of the tradeoff in allowing freight (fortunately, a less severe example this time than the one in Chase, MD in 1987).

The Chase Md accident was not as a result of a freight train, it was an engineer that committed a Rules violation by failing to stop at a Stop signal and occupying a track with authority.........................this Acela derailment was also partly a result of the Acela's engineer passing a Stop signal.

Also Mr. HSRFan, it works both ways, how many times have main-line freights been delayed due to Amtrak trains. LOL

All it comes down to is rule compliance, not the type of train.

this Acela derailment was also partly a result of the Acela's engineer passing a Stop signal.

Nobody has actually said that you realize. First, I think if someone chould provide a diagram of the accident site that wold help greatly in analysis. Anyway, what has been said is that the ACElA stopped short of damage to a signal (what MNRR gets for insisting on using all dwarfs) and overhead wire caused by a freight train. The ACELA then made a less than authorized reverse movement when it derailed. Nobody has said that it passed a stop signal on it's reverse movement. Possibly there was confusion as to if the train was still inside interlocking limits at the time of the accident. The dispatcher, far off in his ivory tower, thought the ACELA was farther down in it's block and give it permission to reverse back to the interlocking so to not foul an all important MNRR movement he had comming through. The ACELA engineer thinking that his rear car had not passed the signal yet thought he was getting permission back through the interlocking.

I can only hope that this Corridor incident, the incidents in Texas on the UP noted over at their Forum, and the surely undocumented others are not indicative of a relaxing, arising either from enforcement or culture, of the industry's high standards regarding safety.

I'm not sure what impact 60/30, or eligibility for a full RRTA annuity at age 60 and 30 years of service, has had on the industry. 30 years of "life deprivation', even if the W-2 shows $100K on it, arising from being in the operating crafts, is too much. In my own case, eleven years in non-Agreement positions was "quite enough, thank you".

Surely when 60/30 was enacted (IIRC, it was pursuant to legislation), the "brain drain' occurred, and railroads found themselves in a situation not unlike that experienced by over-the-road trucking concerns, where annual driver turnover, even at major carriers with strong highway safety programs, approaches 100%.

I'm not sure if Amtrak is "scrambling' to the same extent for T&E as are the Class Ones; I would think the working conditions, even if the pay envelope is thinner, would be a "might bit better" on Amtrak or a commuter agency than elsewhere. But it would appear that safety could possibly be deterioriating.

We have several guys here, and considering I know one personally, who are/have been qualified over the New Haven's West End. who would never contemplate backing a train up without orders. I would certainly enjoy hearing their thoughts on this posting.

<i>Nobody has actually said that you realize.</i>

Oh come on, Mike. It's all over the net that the guy screwed up, and he's even fingered in press releases.

<i>Anyway, what has been said is that the ACElA stopped short of damage to a signal (what MNRR gets for insisting on using all dwarfs) and overhead
wire caused by a freight train.</i>

Actually, that's not what's been reported.

<i> The ACELA then made a less than authorized reverse movement when it derailed.</i>

Yes. i.e. it was <b>his fault</b>. he broke the rules, derailed. His fault, not the dispatchers.

<i>Possibly there was confusion as to if the train was still inside interlocking limits at the time of the accident. The dispatcher, far off in his ivory tower, thought the ACELA was farther down in it's block and give it permission to reverse back to the interlocking so to not foul an all important MNRR movement he had comming through. The ACELA engineer thinking that his rear car had not passed the signal yet thought he was getting permission back through the interlocking.</i>

If the Acela crew wasn't certain of their position, they should have opened a door, kicked out a crewmember, and visually verified their position.

No matter how you slice it, it was the crew's screw up, and their fault the derailment happened.

But Amtrak spokesman Cliff Black said officials of the national rail line listened to the same tapes and "are surprised by Metro-North's interpretation of them".

"On the tapes, the Metro-North dispatcher is quite explicit," Black said. "The dispatcher gives very clear authorization to the Amtrak engineer to reverse his train."

just curious , why would reversing a train cause it to derail .Wre the points set against it ?

David Benton wrote:just curious , why would reversing a train cause it to derail .Wre the points set against it ?

The version I heard (for what it's worth) was that a signal was somehow knocked out of position (perhaps by a preceding freight train) so that oncoming trains couldn't see it. The Acela crew passed the red signal, and ran over a switch that was aligned against them. The train then stopped, but hadn't completely cleared the switch. When the backup move occurred, part of the train kept going the way it came, and another part took the direction the switch was set for.

thank you Mr Maidson , ( switch = points in our lingo ! ) .

I wish I had a better understanding of what happened, but as a conductor,and if it was my train, the FIRST thing I would do, is 1, clarify WHAT the dispatcher said - "Reverse back TO the interlocking," is MUCH different than "reverse back THROUGH the interlocking"

"To the interlocking" would mean that they cleared the entire interlocking and are to reverse back to the home signal of the interlocking and stop before (at) it. The Conductor should have went to the hind end, to see where the hind end of his train was EXACTLY, and report that fact to the dispatcher. If it wasn't clear of the interlocking, he should have reported that to the dispatcher, and await further instructions. If they were still in the interlocking, and if over a swtich, the conductor should have first, asked for protection, then have gotten off in the front of the train and walked back, checking to see where the train was, and the condition of the switch they were over, if they ran through it, and then if the dispatcher said reverse back through the interlocking, if everything was okay of course, and all the wheels were still on the rail, and switches lined, (he would have noticed while he was on the ground inspecting while walking back) then reverse the train back from on the ground, watching the movement the entire time.

If they did run through the switch, then the LAST thing you do is reverse back, you continue forward THROUGH the switch, that prevents a derailment nearly all the time, but reversing through a run switch almost guarantees one.

The engineer isn't the only one at fault for whatever happened, the conductor is JUST as at fault, if not more, becuase it was a reverse move, and he should have been at the hind end (if he wasn't), and if the dispatcher didn't give clear enough instructions, then he is partially to blame too, but unless a move is clearly understood, the move is NOT to be made, so that goes back to the crew. But the engineer should be familiar enough with the territory to know when a signal is missing, or not displaying (dark) or whatever. Thats what being qualified is all about.