Getting back to the Worcester Main Line with its new owner, expensive upgrades and increasing traffic common sense tells us something has changed. Now, what could it be?
Is it because of the wave of a magic wand, that someone "cares", or with the arrival of a "new sheriff" in town only a year ago?
Or, could it be a CSX now earning doubled returns and above its cost of capital where it did not in 2016? Could it be a more efficient CSX with a 14% lower operating ratio in 2022 v. 2016 allowing them to better compete for traffic, build on their network instead of spin off segments to lower-cost operators or allow others to make acquisitions, and grow justification to spend capital? Could it be the doubling of 2016's free cash resources generated from operations and available to make acquisitions?
You don't have to be a rocket scientist to make the connection between what's happening with the WML and the transformation at CSX with the arrival of Hunter Harrison. Even early on things began to change here in New England with traffic lost under previous management to other Class 1's returning and the momentum continues to build including within investments approaching $1B contrasting with previous strategic ambivalence about the region. And, just by looking around the same playbook used to similarly transform CN and CP can be seen with all 3 railroads top industry performers.
Bringing in Joe Hinrichs to execute for growth off that transformation and in light of the major impact of Covid and scapegoating of PSR for every industry ill turned political by self-interests came from the previous CEO. PSR hasn't disappeared with this strategy, it's just been rebranded "Scheduled Railroading" for PR purposes.
Furthermore, "talking with those different departments hamstrung by Boychuk" is simply the PR of CSX's CFO pumping up the new CEO's tires at an investor conference to an important group skeptical of the "new sheriff's" performance and COO's departure.
While it's important for folks to feel heard, the recent "common sense" changes on the WML and B&A occurred primarily because of traffic growth demands and CSX's ability to finally execute PAS' separation.
PSR didn't cripple NS' advance in New England, it's their inability to justify spending $500M to $1.5-2B in an attempt to compete against a much better CSX network, only made more muscular with PSR. That can't be confused with their $150M PAS investment that was as much about defending a presence in New England, made in the context of a CSX willing to shed New England traffic, and providing a half-ownership strategic stake in the property including bisecting PAR's route via the WML to the competing gateway.
Sure, fan and buff history will spin PSR a failure, but in the real world of the railroad business, certainly at CSX, CN and CP, where operating genius Hunter Harrison was involved it's been transformative and here in New England a watershed on par with the creation of Conrail, deregulation and labor reforms. In both cases nothing was perfect, but as always in the business of railroading, it's the most important things that count including what became of the WML back then and what will come again. Now we have Mr. Hinrichs' "One CSX", back then Mr. Hagen's "Conrail Quality" to provide the calm after the storms.