by dbperry
We should have started this on 1/1/17. Guess we were all asleep at the switch. Anyway:
The signal / dispatch system on Framingham-Worcester died sometime slightly before 6:30 AM. Dispatch lost all control of switches and interlockings west of CP COVE. All underway trains eventually stopped at various interlockings until around 7:00 AM when the system was restored and normal dispatch / signal control was in effect. Crews were dispatched to hand operate switches but they never got into position and were not used / needed before the system came back on line. The outage appeared to be about 42 minutes.
Worcester originating local P500, the first victim, was probably ~60 minutes late into Boston.
Worcester originating express P502 was probably ~45 minutes late.
Framingham originating local P580 was probably about ~20 minutes late but I'm not sure.
Framingham originating local P582 equipment turns at Framingham and operated ahead of express P504, which was stopped at Ashland (in sight of CP 24). So P582 was 20 minutes late into Boston.
Worcester originating express P504 got stuck behind local P582 and was almost 60 minutes late.
Worcester originating local P506 was 20 minutes late.
Worcester originating express P508 was about 30 minutes late since it ran as a local to scoop up stranded passengers abandoned by cancelled Framingham originating local P584.
After that, trains seemed to get back to normal with residual delays of 5-10 minutes for P510, P586, and P552.
Communications was a big problem. Conductors, LED signs, text alerts, and official MBTA_CR feed all provided differing information regarding which track to board and if trains would be express or local. I honestly think they were doing their best to get info out, but there are some structural problems that prevent accurate info in such a rapidly changing dynamic situation. There could be some lessons learned or areas for improvement, but it also might not be possible to do better in the absolute worst nightmare scenario that happened this AM.
They did send customer service agents to at least Framingham to help. Not sure if they were useful since situation was primarily resolved before they got there - but good on Keolis to deploy them immediately since it wasn't clear how long disruption would last.
Loss of the signal system at 6:30 AM is probably just about the worst time for that to happen. Luckily restoration was relatively quick.
I have no idea if they had started arrangements for bustitution - but probably not since the contingency appeared to be hand operating the interlockings. I also don't know what kind of rules or speed restrictions that would have involved (operating a RR without a dispatch system).
Dave
The signal / dispatch system on Framingham-Worcester died sometime slightly before 6:30 AM. Dispatch lost all control of switches and interlockings west of CP COVE. All underway trains eventually stopped at various interlockings until around 7:00 AM when the system was restored and normal dispatch / signal control was in effect. Crews were dispatched to hand operate switches but they never got into position and were not used / needed before the system came back on line. The outage appeared to be about 42 minutes.
Worcester originating local P500, the first victim, was probably ~60 minutes late into Boston.
Worcester originating express P502 was probably ~45 minutes late.
Framingham originating local P580 was probably about ~20 minutes late but I'm not sure.
Framingham originating local P582 equipment turns at Framingham and operated ahead of express P504, which was stopped at Ashland (in sight of CP 24). So P582 was 20 minutes late into Boston.
Worcester originating express P504 got stuck behind local P582 and was almost 60 minutes late.
Worcester originating local P506 was 20 minutes late.
Worcester originating express P508 was about 30 minutes late since it ran as a local to scoop up stranded passengers abandoned by cancelled Framingham originating local P584.
After that, trains seemed to get back to normal with residual delays of 5-10 minutes for P510, P586, and P552.
Communications was a big problem. Conductors, LED signs, text alerts, and official MBTA_CR feed all provided differing information regarding which track to board and if trains would be express or local. I honestly think they were doing their best to get info out, but there are some structural problems that prevent accurate info in such a rapidly changing dynamic situation. There could be some lessons learned or areas for improvement, but it also might not be possible to do better in the absolute worst nightmare scenario that happened this AM.
They did send customer service agents to at least Framingham to help. Not sure if they were useful since situation was primarily resolved before they got there - but good on Keolis to deploy them immediately since it wasn't clear how long disruption would last.
Loss of the signal system at 6:30 AM is probably just about the worst time for that to happen. Luckily restoration was relatively quick.
I have no idea if they had started arrangements for bustitution - but probably not since the contingency appeared to be hand operating the interlockings. I also don't know what kind of rules or speed restrictions that would have involved (operating a RR without a dispatch system).
Dave
"Twitter Dave"
Engineering Manager, MBTA
MY POSTS HERE ARE UNOFFICIAL and are my own personal opinion. My posts are not official MBTA policy or communications.
https://twitter.com/FramWorMBTA
http://FramWorMBTA.weebly.com/
MBTA schedule archive: http://www.dbperry.net/MBTA/
Engineering Manager, MBTA
MY POSTS HERE ARE UNOFFICIAL and are my own personal opinion. My posts are not official MBTA policy or communications.
https://twitter.com/FramWorMBTA
http://FramWorMBTA.weebly.com/
MBTA schedule archive: http://www.dbperry.net/MBTA/