Palmetto - Train 89 Incident

SemperFidelis wrote:Though I support the legalization of most drugs for any use, I have to say that, since learning companies are allowed to do as they see fit, I thank G-d companies like Amtrak are allowed to keep in place thier policies.

STrRedWolf wrote:The engineer, in short:

• Positive for Marijuana but unaccounted for.

This is the exact situation the post-Ricky Gates reforms were intended to prevent. Though back in Gates' heyday, the "culture" and "attitude" was dramatically different.

It still seems to be how the transfer between the shift foremen was handled as was how the Fouls were handled.
You would think any "active" fouls should have been removed at least 15 minutes before the shift change between the foremen,
and they have the proper equipment and manpower(ie flagmen with shunt jumpers.) protecting the work area.

Still waiting for he NTSB report.

Should be noted that same CFR is quoted word for word to the drivers holding a CDL and subject to drug testing.

Head-end View wrote:V-e-r-y i-n-t-e-r-e-s-t-i-n-g............ I'd like to see if the NTSB investigation comes up with the same conclusions that the Amtrak hearing board reached. If it does not, then we might wonder about Amtrak's politics. Stay tuned.......

Amtrak does not need the NTSB support to enforce their rules.

The NTSB will probably fault the lack of PTC on that section of track. That seems to be their most common cause. I'd rather not blame the lack of PTC without comparing the incident with and without PTC present - and what form PTC actually becomes on that section of track. If a form of PTC is installed that manages foul time and would have communicated the status of the tracks to all workers and the relieving foreman that may have helped. But I cannot say that the form of PTC that will be installed would have improved the communications between the foremen. Would PTC have alerted the relieving foreman that the foul was lifted?

Shunting the track would have been the simple way of protecting the workers. But it appears that no one on site was prepared to use a shunt.

What we have here is a failure to communicate. Each foreman had their own idea of what was heard by the other foreman. Releasing the fouls via a private phone conversation instead of over the radio where other workers could have been alerted was a problem. Releasing the fouls without removing workers from the track was a problem. Both of these problems were caused by the now terminated foreman.

Working safely can slow down the work. Clearing the track before removing the foul would have taken time. Why not let the workers keep working while one foreman release fouls and the next foreman gets their own fouls? Answer: If you don't clear the track you leave people in harms way during the time when the track isn't fouled. Why bother using shunts when fouls should protect the track workers? Answer: A working shunt provides physical protection that cannot be removed by the dispatcher. Is it better to work safe or to work fast?

There is sometimes a culture that it's better to work fast--until one day it isn't. The NTSB report, if it mentions PTC, should also mention that ACSES, in effect in that territory, also blocks the use of a track by action of the dispatcher when a foreman places a foul on a track--the line on the model board changes color and no movements may be signaled over it. When the foul is lifted, the dispatcher can then release the track and the line turns white again. If the foreman had not reported the track clear the dispatcher would not have released the foul, the line on the board would have stayed the same color (blue or purple?), and the signals would have remained at their most restrictive indication. The use of shunts was introduced before ACSES was in place (HOOK tower was still in service), and ironically resulted from an accident of exactly the same type only a few miles from this one owing to an error by an operator at HOOK during a shift change. (And while the shunts theoretically would not have been needed, they were required by the rules and should have been installed.) From what has been reported, it appears that the accident resulted entirely from the foreman's action in releasing the track before it was clear.