Oil train disaster in Lac-Mégantic, Québec 07-06-2013

Gilbert B Norman wrote:What has apparently been established is that Bakken is what goes boom; for Mt. Carbon has established that there can be "boom" in whatever car is used.

Agreed, although it's worth noting that diluted bitumen (also known as tar sands) can also go boom in the new cars, as was the case with the recent Canadian National wreck.

Further back in this thread we've had a lot of discussion about MM&A's various problems, and it was suggested by some that the disaster might have been averted if the train had been operated by a competent Class I railroad. That's probably true, inasmuch as better-managed railroads might be less likely to have runaway trains in general... but as we've seen with the CSX and CN oil wrecks, Class I roads are not immune to the dangers of hauling these products, and in fact there have now been more oil-wrecks-with-explosions on Class I roads than on regionals or shortlines.


Edit: an additional observation related to the subject at hand: the Class I roads are expressing interest in one-man crews on mainline freights. That's not just "an MMA thing."

http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/railroads-wa ... ght-trains" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

It's easy enough to filter out the blogger's editorial tone and read the vapor pressure numbers, and see how that fits with the producer's view that the volatiles are a selling point and the Industrial Commission's concerns about adding natural gas liquids to bring the vapor pressure up to the limit. Searching for 'bakken ngl' turns up 1) there's a lot of NGL in ND, 2) the state is trying to reduce flaring, 3) pipelines and processing plants are being built to deal with NGLs; too much fits together too nicely for me to write him off as a conspiracy theorist.

I had a friend of mine send me an e-mail today with a link to the Canadian Transportation Safety Board Lab Report on the locomotive that caught fire that night. I don't know if this was posted before but I thought that I would post the link here as it is very interesting reading.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/lab/rail/2013/ ... 812013.asp" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

John L.

Wow. The pictures really say it all.

Thanks very much for posting this link.

Pretty strong evidence against running without inspection and maintenance...

So much for using epoxy to repair engine castings,that was a slipshod repair from the start,along with other badly
done "quick fixes" on this engine,finally came back to haunt MM&A BIG TIME! All to save $$ instead of a proper repair
or replacement engine swapped in.
To think that if an 0ther engine in the consist was used to keep the air up,this might not have happened!

Due to this apparent extraordinary negligence I have to wonder if this could breach the paper ownership barrier and put Rail World, Inc. at risk.

Seems like the meat is in Section 3.1 of the TSB report:

It was reported that locomotive MMA 5017 had experienced a destructive engine failure on 17 October 2012. At that time, PA L5, R5 and R6 as well as cam segments R4, R5 and R6 were replaced as a result of an articulated rod failure on R5. It is considered most probable that the engine block was deformed and fractured at the R4/R5 cam bearing bore during this previous engine-failure event. Normal repair procedures for this type of engine block damage generally require the engine to be disassembled, followed by welding and machining operations to rebuild the missing portion of engine block. In the present case, the damaged engine block was repaired using a polymeric material, which did not have the strength and durability properties required for this type of application. All repair records had been signed and approved by MMA repair and supervisory personnel prior to the locomotive being released from the shop.

I would not want to be one of the men who signed off on those repair records, that's for sure.

Ridgefielder wrote:Seems like the meat is in Section 3.1 of the TSB report:

It was reported that locomotive MMA 5017 had experienced a destructive engine failure on 17 October 2012. At that time, PA L5, R5 and R6 as well as cam segments R4, R5 and R6 were replaced as a result of an articulated rod failure on R5. It is considered most probable that the engine block was deformed and fractured at the R4/R5 cam bearing bore during this previous engine-failure event. Normal repair procedures for this type of engine block damage generally require the engine to be disassembled, followed by welding and machining operations to rebuild the missing portion of engine block. In the present case, the damaged engine block was repaired using a polymeric material, which did not have the strength and durability properties required for this type of application. All repair records had been signed and approved by MMA repair and supervisory personnel prior to the locomotive being released from the shop.

I would not want to be one of the men who signed off on those repair records, that's for sure.

Have any of these people been brought up on criminal charges as a result of this? It looks like the liability for all of this could go way up the management team. Poster child example for regulatory oversight of RR. operations & maintenance.

John L.

Backshophoss wrote:To think that if an 0ther engine in the consist was used to keep the air up,this might not have happened!

Ironic that they picked to have only the 5017 online verses one the other units on the train. Didn't the engineer complain about how it was performing on the run from Farnham? Wonder who who at the MM&A made the decision to keep only this engine operational to maintain the air pressure during the period of the time the train was tied down and waiting for the next engineer to take the train east?

CPF363 wrote:

Backshophoss wrote:To think that if an 0ther engine in the consist was used to keep the air up,this might not have happened!

Ironic that they picked to have only the 5017 online verses one the other units on the train. Didn't the engineer complain about how it was performing on the run from Farnham? Wonder who who at the MM&A made the decision to keep only this engine operational to maintain the air pressure during the period of the time the train was tied down and waiting for the next engineer to take the train east?

Among other "what if questions". What if they had turned on one of the other locos and shut down the lead engine.

BandA wrote:[What if they had turned on one of the other locos and shut down the lead engine.

47 souls in Lac-Mégantic would likely still be alive today, and the name of this forum would be quite a bit shorter.

No matter where one looks at the former MMA every rule, from serious track defects, loco maintenance, operating personnel and senior management was ignored or nuanced to maximize profit and safety be damned. I do blame the engineer for he had the last word when he left his train with an obvious dangerous condition and hopped in the taxi, even the taxi driver noted the oil shooting out of the stack but the very last link in the accident chain remained in place. The engineer will serve time but I firmly believe senior management belongs in the jail cell with him as this operation had a willful blatant disregard for public safety and a complete lack of common sense.

Zeke wrote:No matter where one looks at the former MMA every rule, from serious track defects, loco maintenance, operating personnel and senior management was ignored or nuanced to maximize profit and safety be damned. I do blame the engineer for he had the last word when he left his train with an obvious dangerous condition and hopped in the taxi, even the taxi driver noted the oil shooting out of the stack but the very last link in the accident chain remained in place. The engineer will serve time but I firmly believe senior management belongs in the jail cell with him as this operation had a willful blatant disregard for public safety and a complete lack of common sense.

100% agree. A fish rots from the head, as they say. Management was completely negligent in setting the tone of the operation.

were there differences in safety cultures between the Canadian and US parts of the railroad?

The thing that is amazing is they had their own shops which did heavy overhauls, but they fixed the engine casting with epoxy instead of welding it. No wonder CMQ disposed of most of the engines.