Metro train runs red signal, OCC stops train before crash

Thanks dcmike. That explanation of the modes makes perfect sense now.

It doesn't sound like this train proceeded into an occupied block (the station block). Rather it was the block before the occupied block. A train will not be allowed into the block adjacent to occupied block from what I understand. So the operator would have gotten a zero speed command from ATP/ATC (plus the red interlocking signal) due to the programmed separation limits. The operator, maybe being out of service, in a rush, or confused, stopped and proceeded not realizing there was a train at the station?

How quickly can an 8 car empty consist stop at 15mph? Anyone know what the sightline is like approaching the station. I'm curious, if OCC didn't tell numbnuts to stop, would he/she have seen the train at the station with enough time to stop before hitting it?

MCL1981 wrote:Thanks dcmike. That explanation of the modes makes perfect sense now.

It doesn't sound like this train proceeded into an occupied block (the station block). Rather it was the block before the occupied block. A train will not be allowed into the block adjacent to occupied block from what I understand. So the operator would have gotten a zero speed command from ATP/ATC (plus the red interlocking signal) due to the programmed separation limits. The operator, maybe being out of service, in a rush, or confused, stopped and proceeded not realizing there was a train at the station?

How quickly can an 8 car empty consist stop at 15mph? Anyone know what the sightline is like approaching the station. I'm curious, if OCC didn't tell numbnuts to stop, would he/she have seen the train at the station with enough time to stop before hitting it?

The distance between trains must not be less than the safe braking distance. Whatever that number is equates to number of minimum blocks between trains.

An empty 8 car consist traveling at 15 mph can be stopped relatively quickly if emergency brake is applied. I would say less than 4-5 seconds? Correct me if I wrong DCmike.

Sightlines differ from station to station. Some stations are close to each other and on a flat grade so you have great visibility. Other stations are on on upward grade or downward grade and an approaching train to that station won't have visibility until you are within 400 ft of the station.

Updates:

One, the two employees involved - the operator of the train that missed the red and the controller at the ROCC have been removed from duty.

Second, this WP article says that the train that passed the red was directly facing the train stopped at the station. So, if there were to have been an impact, it would have been head on and not a rear end collision. This makes it seem like the train the blew past the red also crossed over onto the opposite tracks. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr- ... ing-train/

"JDC"

Updates:

One, the two employees involved - the operator of the train that missed the red and the controller at the ROCC have been removed from duty.

Second, this WP article says that the train that passed the red was directly facing the train stopped at the station. So, if there were to have been an impact, it would have been head on and not a rear end collision. This makes it seem like the train the blew past the red also crossed over onto the opposite tracks.

Both trains were on the same track (track 2). The train at Smithsonian was heading westbound, the other train that ran the red was heading eastbound. Base on this the interlocking was set to crossover the train at Smithsonian.

Sand Box John wrote:"JDC"

Updates:

One, the two employees involved - the operator of the train that missed the red and the controller at the ROCC have been removed from duty.

Second, this WP article says that the train that passed the red was directly facing the train stopped at the station. So, if there were to have been an impact, it would have been head on and not a rear end collision. This makes it seem like the train the blew past the red also crossed over onto the opposite tracks.

Both trains were on the same track (track 2). The train at Smithsonian was heading westbound, the other train that ran the red was heading eastbound. Base on this the interlocking was set to crossover the train at Smithsonian.

A WP story picking up on the tweet John cited: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr- ... ing-train/

New WP story has many more details, which explain why the trains were facing each other - namely, the operator had been told to reverse his train after unloading passengers due to a switch problem ahead of him. He ended up reversing past the station he was supposed to stop at, and almost struck a train 2 stations behind him. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr- ... ge%2Fstory

Un.
Freaking.
Believable.

Not only did he run through the red signal, but he ran through a switch not lined for him and damaged it. How do you do that with your eyes open?? How functional is ATP/ATC when they're going the "wrong way"? What works and what doesn't work? Would he not have received the stop command at the signal, forcing him to stop and proceed?

If it wasn't for the red signal and switch thing, this would be way more of an OCC controller failure than the operator. The operator read back the instructions as he heard them, which was incorrect. The controllers job is to catch that, which is why they do it. Not only did the controller not pay attention to the read-back, the controller failed to notice the train well beyond where it was authorized. Up that point, major controller failure, minor operator failure.

Of course, then the operator blew it even more by running a signal, wrecking a switch, and almost plowing into the other train.

Here is a report on the investigation from yesterday's Board meeting (2.11.16). http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/board_ ... idesV5.pdf

JDC wrote:Here is a report on the investigation from yesterday's Board meeting (2.11.16). http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/board_ ... idesV5.pdf

They had more at the Board meeting, but it was on large pieces of paper. WMATA's CSO was attempting to explain the track layout and systems that failed to the Board, who insisted on no acronyms. I failed to take photos of the board, unfortunately.