Major derailment @ Spuyten Duyvil

RearOfSignal wrote:

Tommy Meehan wrote:

RearOfSignal wrote:The problem with a subway vs a railroad in that situation is that not all railroad trains operate at the same speed over the same track. Secondly subway trains typically don't pass platforms, so station timing would be inefficient for express trains on a local track.

I think another related problem is, they have to place the trippers where it will stop the heaviest train on the line short of the obstruction. In this case that would be a 130-car freight train. Placing them that far in advance would impact passenger train schedules. And if the freights were made exempt then you still have the difference in weight between a seven-car Shoreliner with a Gennie and a six-car MU train. Then you're going to have snowfall in the winter. Most of the subway lines are either underground or on elevated structures. Snow doesn't accumulate.

I thought the best suggestion was to put the curve speed-reduction code into the cab signals. If it's feasible they may do it yet.

Yes, NYCT does this by having 2 or 3 signals between where they want to train stop versus where they have to stop. So a train would have to go through a couple of stop signals a couple hundred feet apart before traveling far enough to strike a train on a conflicting route or ahead of it.

Again yes, most practical short term fix to this is to lower the cab signal code to Medium Speed for the curve. But PTC will fix this as well at least in the long term.

Perhaps a temporary measure to reduce the likelihood that another similar accident will occur where there is a significant speed reduction would be to install strobe lights at some distance from the curve (or other slow area), with the hope that they would "wake up" a sleepy driver.

Excon90 that's a hard question to answer. There was a wreck on the Penn Central around 1975 or so where a freight train passed the distant signal to a lift bridge that was displaying an approach indication. IIRC it happened in Cleveland or Toledo, anyway the engineer started hollering on the radio for some railroad and the tower op told him via the radio to " Keep it coming Cap you will have the signal in a minute." I think the boat took its sweet time or the bridge mechanicals tripped out. The speeding freight ran the stop signal and hit the bridge counter weight and cleaned two Geeps off at the frames. The crew was killed. The ICC accident report stated that the junior / senior relationship in the cab between the engineer and fireman precluded the fireman from taking any intervening measures like pulling the dump valve on his side of the cab until it was too late. Another thing that came out of that particular wreck was a rule instructing tower ops or dispatchers to never tell a train...."you have the railroad" or......... "Keep it coming you will have it in a minute."

The old timers I fired for were a bunch of tough cookies World War 2 vets that saw horrific action in the pacific and one guy who hit Omaha beach and lived through it, there were semi-pro boxers, maniac alkys, guys that hired out in the 1920's shoveled 20 tons of coal going to Enola on drag freights for years and at 65 year's old could and would punch your lights out if you crossed them.

If a fireman had a few years under his belt and the engineer did some really off the wall stunt I'm sure the dump valve might be pulled but he better make damn sure he 's doing the right thing or it could get ugly real fast. Back on topic if a fireman was present maybe this wreck might not have occurred but it did and the what if game will be played out for years.

CPSK wrote:So it would be easy for the engineer to nod out while keeping his foot on the pedal.

Right.

Pennsylvania RR used timed signals on the hill near Horse Shoe Curve in the 1940s. I don't think they had Automatic Train Stop there at that time, but they did have Cab Signals without it. Stop Signal would be displayed until enough time had elapsed for a train entering the block before the signal to reach it at 30 m.p.h. It's mentioned in some I.C.C. accident reports at http://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/

Zeke wrote:If a fireman had a few years under his belt and the engineer did some really off the wall stunt I'm sure the dump valve might be pulled but he better make damn sure he 's doing the right thing or it could get ugly real fast.

This is a culture issue, and this sort of thing has contributed to and/or caused airplanes to crash also. The airlines have been working on changing it.

If this sort of attitude prevails on the railroads, then it needs to be addressed there as well.

scoostraw wrote: This is a culture issue, and this sort of thing has contributed to and/or caused airplanes to crash also. The airlines have been working on changing it.

If this sort of attitude prevails on the railroads, then it needs to be addressed there as well.

The airlines pretty much HAVE changed it, at least in the US. CRM is pretty much a mandatory part of training for airline crews. There's plenty of examples of it working, out there.

Nasadowsk wrote:

scoostraw wrote: This is a culture issue, and this sort of thing has contributed to and/or caused airplanes to crash also. The airlines have been working on changing it.

If this sort of attitude prevails on the railroads, then it needs to be addressed there as well.

The airlines pretty much HAVE changed it, at least in the US. CRM is pretty much a mandatory part of training for airline crews. There's plenty of examples of it working, out there.

Amtrak employs Crew Resource Management very heavily thanks to the airline industry. It does come in handy although if you do screw up, the whole crew gets hung. I'm staying silent on the issue of this derailment until the findings are available instead of guessing.

Zeke wrote:Excon90 that's a hard question to answer. There was a wreck on the Penn Central around 1975 or so where a freight train passed the distant signal to a lift bridge that was displaying an approach indication. IIRC it happened in Cleveland or Toledo, anyway the engineer started hollering on the radio for some railroad and the tower op told him via the radio to " Keep it coming Cap you will have the signal in a minute." I think the boat took its sweet time or the bridge mechanicals tripped out. The speeding freight ran the stop signal and hit the bridge counter weight and cleaned two Geeps off at the frames. The crew was killed. The ICC accident report stated that the junior / senior relationship in the cab between the engineer and fireman precluded the fireman from taking any intervening measures like pulling the dump valve on his side of the cab until it was too late. Another thing that came out of that particular wreck was a rule instructing tower ops or dispatchers to never tell a train...."you have the railroad" or......... "Keep it coming you will have it in a minute."

The wreck you're speaking of was known as the "OV-8" wreck (from the train's symbols) and happened in Cleveland in 1973 or"74. The stripped frames ended up in a dead line near the former East Altoona roundhouse, and were still there in the late spring of '75.

2nd trick op wrote:The wreck you're speaking of was known as the "OV-8" wreck (from the train's symbols) and happened in Cleveland in 1973 or"74. The stripped frames ended up in a dead line near the former East Altoona roundhouse, and were still there in the late spring of '75.

May 8th, 1974 - I.C.C. accident reports at http://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; (look under "I.C.C. Historical Railroad Investigation Reports (1911-1994)" then expand "1974" and "PENN CENTRAL TRANPORTATION COMPANY")

The description in this thread is a bit misleading. The drawbridge operator verbally cleared the train but did not clear the home signal (at 3:52am). Then the drawbridge operator remembered that the boat had been waiting since 3:20am and opened the bridge. He did not communicate the change to the train and the collision occurred at 3:56am. If the drawbridge operator had cleared the home signal the bridge would not have opened and the boat would have had to wait a few more minutes.

Was that the last incident caused by an engineer anticipating a change in signal and not following the actual signal received? No. Unfortunately old habits die hard and once one gets in the habit of expecting a signal to change to more favorable before one reaches it the potential is stronger that something really bad will happen when the signal does not change as anticipated.

"Exceeding speed limit" (as seen at Spuyten Duyvil) has also been seen before ... I wish I could say it would never be seen again.

I think coding speed restrictions for each curve into the existing system is a good one, if it can be done. Other solutions: My 5 year old Navigon gps has an "alerter" that says "CAUTION" in a stern British-like voice any time I go more than 15 MPH over the speed limit (on a highway). The device cost me all of $99. Biometric scanners could watch the Engineer and detect nodding head, slumping, closed eyes, eyes not looking at the track for extended periods of time. Add this as an additional alert, or rat him out via streaming video to HQ. (I'm joking about the surveillance video alert, sort of).

Another solution: cc: all train alerts to the conductor's cell phone/radio. Minor alerts send text message and vibrate, major alerts sending text, audible and alarm tones - maybe the conductor would have time to pull the emergency brake. One of the quoted articles talked about automation needs to be approached cautiously or skills will erode.

It's unlikely that the railroad will add back the Fireman or otherwise increase crew size.

BenH wrote:This set of images was posted on the MTA's Flickr page earlier today:
Metro-North Track Repair
http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtaphotos/ ... 335392616/

Cool pictures. Notice they are replacing cement ties with wood. What is the trench in between the tracks? Are they just reconnecting the track circuit, or doing a complete rewire?

Forgive me if this is a matter already covered --- this thread is incredibly long and I admit I haven't read everything.
Also, please note I am an industry outsider, so something that I declare to be "relatively simple" may not be quite so simple in practice.

I seems one remedy that can be implemented almost immediately and seems to me to be relatively simple, and would prevent anything like this
from ever happening again at the same location is to make the block immediately before the curve at Spuyten Duyvil a permanent "approach medium."
This would automatically force any and all trains to slow to medium speed before the curve. I know this has been done in other places, it has been pointed out to me.

BenH wrote:This set of images was posted on the MTA's Flickr page earlier today:

Metro-North Track Repair
http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtaphotos/ ... 335392616/
"Metro-North Railroad crews at work on Tue., December 3, 2013 repairing a damaged section of track after a derailment near the Spuyten-Duyvil station on Sunday, in preparation for limited restoration of service on the Hudson Line Wednesday morning."
Photos: Marc A. Hermann / MTA New York City Transit and Patrick Cashin / MTA
12/4/2013

Pretty intensive repairs there.

When repairing the track from something like this (where so much track needs to be replaced), what tools do crews use to ensure that the track is placed exactly where the prior track was located? Lots of measuring tape from fixed points? GPS?

Dieter wrote:The Union now has the fodder to make a case to reinstate a second person in the cab of a train. I'm sure a lot of operators at this stage would prefer to work alone but in the interest of "Safety First", as we have seen all too often, anything can happen.

An aircraft with anything from a handful of people to well over 200 passengers has two trained and licensed operators in the cockpit. It seems that trains carrying up to 1000 people should have the same safeguard.

Aircraft are far more complex by orders of magnitude in systems, operation, emergency actions, navigation, weather effects and so forth. In my opinion the comparison is not appropriate. Airline aircraft also have annunciators and alarm systems to alert to the crew to issues. That is a fair comparison, and improvements to such, i.e., PTC as the goal with interim measures implemented as soon as practicable.

Both aircraft pilots and rail engineers do share the same susceptibility of dozing during periods when there is little to do.

RearOfSignal wrote: Again yes, most practical short term fix to this is to lower the cab signal code to Medium Speed for the curve. But PTC will fix this as well at least in the long term.

Installing cab signal drops in advance of high risk curves is also a long term fix and a lot more sustainable than spending a billion dollars to save 4 lives. This is another accident that could have been prevented by proper use of ATC best practices.

The system you're describing is pretty much a form PTC with moving parts to trip the train. ACSES a form of PTC would do the same using radio transmitters and receivers and no moving parts. Theoretically, less moving parts, easier to maintain.

Actually just because "wireless" is solid state and, well wireless, doesn't mean it is cheap or any easier to maintain. PTC was sold on being inexpensive, but the result has been far more costly than just installing things like timers, which are solid state as well.