Amtrak to FRA: Lightweight HSR trains, please

amm in ny wrote:

Jersey_Mike wrote:I can't even remember the last time Amtrak had a major wreck on the NEC.

You don't remember the wreck of the Colonial? I'm sure that neither the Amtrak brass nor the FRA will forget it any time soon.

That's 25 years ago, and 13 years before the first Acela train entered service.
I wouldn't call that wreck recent, but I'll admit recent is a subjective word.

I believe the last wreck on the NEC was the Night Owl in Back Bay in 1990, and before that the Colonial at Gunpowder in 1987. I also believe both of those would be readily prevented by modern train protection systems now in place.

The EGE wrote:I believe the last wreck on the NEC was the Night Owl in Back Bay in 1990, and before that the Colonial at Gunpowder in 1987. I also believe both of those would be readily prevented by modern train protection systems now in place.

And will be in place on all passenger tracks soon.

Let's not forget. This accident likely wouldn't have happened if Ricky Gates didn't smoke up and then go drive a train down the busiest passenger mainline in North America (and through a stop signal). The Colonial accident was Ricky Gates' fault.

The EGE wrote:I also believe both of those [accidents] would be readily prevented by modern train protection systems now in place.

Since accidents are fairly rare events, and tend to happen in unforseen ways, it takes a long time to get any kind of confidence that the new systems are effectively preventing (almost) all collisions.

Some good points in the last few posts.

Some thoughts to add:
1) Accidents don't happen out of the blue. There's an analogy used at times called the "Swiss cheese" theory. Basically imagine all the events of an accident being pieces of Swiss cheese. As long as all the holes don't line up, you're fine. And it only takes ONE slice to stop an accident. But when they all line up, watch out.

2) I recommend a book for the geeky called "Normal Accidents". It discusses the almost certainty of accidents in complex systems. One of the issues is that the more complex systems tend to have accidents in unexpected ways.

I can pretty much guarantee that PTC will have an accident or failure in some mode that is unexpected or surprising.

IE Niles, Michigan, where PTC was switched off? PTC *shouldn't* be switched off when a train is nearby, and Ricky Gates *shouldn't* be smoking doobies, and the Chatsworth motorman *shouldn't* be texting. All three happened anyway.

Now you're confronted with two paths: (1) create a better culture of safety and proactivity through training and education; (2) legislation.

I can guarantee which is going to work far better. It's the culture of safety option. Legislation only results in more rules. More rules result in more work-arounds and loopholes, and you're back to a problem...

Tadman wrote:Now you're confronted with two paths: (1) create a better culture of safety and proactivity through training and education; (2) legislation.

a. You've left out (3) improved procedures and technology. PTC is an obvious example of improved technology. Improved procedures are what industries do that are willing to go beyond blaming disasters on "stupid employees" (or "stupid drivers") to see what might actually prevent similar disasters in the future. (I don't know if the USA railroads are such an industry.)

b. These are not mutually exclusive options. They're more like ingredients, and often work better in combination.

Tadman wrote:I can guarantee which is going to work far better. It's the culture of safety option. Legislation only results in more rules. More rules result in more work-arounds and loopholes, and you're back to a problem...

The reason the legislation exists is that "culture of safety" wasn't working at all. By all accounts, Ricky Gates & Co. were not exceptions. Conrail had a culture where operating trains under the influence and a casual attitude towards safety procedures were at least generally condoned. I'm fairly confident that Conrail had lots of safety training, motivational posters, etc., because every railroad I've ever seen has been littered with that sort of stuff, but it didn't make any difference. Everyone knew what was going on, but no one was willing to report their coworkers or even apply social pressure to make it stop. Legislation is a blunt heavy hammer, but I do not see how anything less would have changed anything.

I also don't think Conrail was fundamentally an exception. As long as the cost of insuring against accidents isn't too high, there's no real incentive for freight railroads to spend significant amounts of money on safety, or even to change how they do business. It takes outside pressure, which means legislation (or FRA rules, which are based on legislation) to make them change.

I'm speaking of railroads because this is RR.net, but the same applies to any industry. After all, why does OSHA exist?

Both the Chase, MD and Back Bay accidents proved the robustness of Amfleet equipment in the face of both an extreme head on collision and standard type derailment, however both accidents were of the type that has since been protected against by basic train control systems. Where robust crash resistance comes into play are the 97% of accidents that are not preventable be PTC or any form of signaling for that matter such as grade crossings and derailments. The NEC has effectively no grade crossings (some driveways in CT don't count), very little freight and well maintained track. While there have been several close calls with runaway cars (Cranston) and minor derailments (Portal x2 ), a 20+ year stretch free of major incidents means that relaxing the Tier II crash standards for NEC equipment is an acceptable risk.

Even if the crash standards are reduced for low risk situations I am still against any use of off the shelf European equipment for the reason that European equipment will quickly fall apart in North American service. European equipment expects both well maintained track and preventative maintenance, neither of which are available domestically due to how our public transport systems are funded. It's just like buying a BMW. They don't work in the snow and are always ready to bite your ass with a failed clutch or differential.

Jersey_Mike wrote:
Even if the crash standards are reduced for low risk situations I am still against any use of off the shelf European equipment for the reason that European equipment will quickly fall apart in North American service. European equipment expects both well maintained track and preventative maintenance, neither of which are available domestically due to how our public transport systems are funded. It's just like buying a BMW. They don't work in the snow and are always ready to bite your ass with a failed clutch or differential.

Yes, European rail equipment need tracks maintained better, the few commuter rail agencies using European equipment aren't finding that difficult to accomplish. Their lines are relatively short and there isn't much for them to maintain. Your point only applies to Amtrak which operates over 20,000 miles of freight maintaned tracks nationally. Expecting Amtrak to maintain the NEC is not too much to ask, they would have to to run HSR trains anyways, no matter where these trains are built.

The british hsr125 sets have been running in australia on "colonial track for years .the trucks were modified to cope wit the rough track , and engines derated for the heat,but otherwise off the shelf .

David Benton wrote:The british hsr125 sets have been running in Australia on "colonial track for years .the trucks were modified to cope wit the rough track , and engines derated for the heat,but otherwise off the shelf .

My impression in riding on a HST in Australia (Grafton to Sydney - 1980s) was that it performed ok, though perhaps not as fast as in Britain.

I've spent thousands of hours in industrial installations, and believe me, there is a huge difference between putting up safety posters and leaflets and actually creating a culture of safety. It's "talking the talk" versus "walking the walk". GE, BP, and NS all have a significant culture of safety, and it's not because of leaflets and posters.

Improved procedures is a critical component of the culture of safety. For example, BP truck drivers have a procedure called "first move forward". It means they back into a spot so their first move while driving is in forward gear, due to a lack of alertness typical of the first few minutes in a vehicle. Technology, on the other hand, can be either a crutch or a tool. If technology is too heavily relied upon, we forget to be proactive. Imagine a truck with a backup beeper. After a while, it becomes second nature to throw it in reverse and assume people clear from the beeper sound. What happens when the beeper quits working? You flatten someone. If that sounds hard to believe, it's quite similar to the fact set present in the Niles Amtrak derailment last fall.

What's clear in the Ricky Gates case is not that culture of safety wasn't working, it's that culture of safety wasn't being emphasized. Culture of safety means live it-love it-learn it.

amm in ny wrote:

Jersey_Mike wrote:To be fair a high speed trainset captive to the NEC would eliminate most of the problems with grade crossing accidents, ...

You'd have to define the NEC to not include NYP to BOS, or anything south/west of Washington. I'm not sure what grade crossings there are between PHL and Washington.

There are no grade crossings on the NEC between NYP and WAS whatsoever. The last one was sealed off in the 80s. The Keystone Corridor is soon to be fully grade separated as well. As far as NYP-BOS goes, all the grade crossings except those in downtown New London are feasible to be replaced with overpasses and/or closing and the New London grade crossings are in a slow-speed area near a station stop anyway. The key here is more that there will be temporal separation from freight, which is certainly feasible. A small handful of grade crossings in low-to-medium speed zones would be fine.

Tadman wrote:IE Niles, Michigan, where PTC was switched off? PTC *shouldn't* be switched off when a train is nearby, and Ricky Gates *shouldn't* be smoking doobies, and the Chatsworth motorman *shouldn't* be texting. All three happened anyway.

Now you're confronted with two paths: (1) create a better culture of safety and proactivity through training and education; (2) legislation.

I can guarantee which is going to work far better. It's the culture of safety option. Legislation only results in more rules. More rules result in more work-arounds and loopholes, and you're back to a problem...

Can you link me to the actual report that says PTC was disabled? I've yet to see it. Additionally, there are legitimate reasons where PTC can be disabled. A few days ago, trains on the NEC had to run DCS rules. On a REMAN, you'll have to cut out your cab signals electronically. When you do that, you disable your ADU, which means ASCES will not display. To avoid penalties, you'll need to cut out your ACSES electronically as well.

So, as Greg Moore stated, the Swiss Cheese theory is warming up. Here you are, with no cab signals, no ACSES and it is night time. You're on the south end of the corridor and all of the freight trains have come out to play. one train left you a little present in the form of a container that wasn't properly secured and it fell off the train. You are now heading for it, with no cab signals and no PTC. In this story, you're only operating with a 59 maximum speed, but when it happened in real life with the cabs cut in, the train was doing 100mph and the container didn't shunt since it wasn't across the rails. It missed by 6 inches.

Lost in the Portal incident is the fact the Mail 12 sideswiped 79 as it passed. All the PTC in the world isn't going to help avoid if that happens. Who remembers trains 90's incident in Delaware? That could have been a disaster if another train was nearby.

HAM: No explanation needed. Either you know what it means or you don't.

The NEC is just like every other railroad in the country. Accidents do happen. It is sheer luck (and probably Divine Intervention) that the NEC has been fortunate. However, I see the need for the crash standards. Just because the NEC doesn't have grade crossings on the west end, doesn't mean you can't hit cars.