What if....

Here is a hypothetical question: If Studebaker-Worthington HAD NOT purchased Alco, would ALCO survived on its own ?
I have not seen this questions asked anywhere else.

My own feeling is that the answer would have been yes.... for 5-10 or more years beyond 1969 if they secured more orders.Maybe longer. Remember ALCO was forced to cancel almost 100 orders before they closed. 75% of these orders were export.They would have most likely have to secure the bulk of these as export orders with a dribble of domestic orders. At the very least, it would have been an uphill battle domestically as GE had deep pockets for R&D and ALCO would have been at GE's mercy unless they found another electrical supplier (Hitachi).

MLW would have survived longer without losing locomotive orders as they did once BBD took over.

What's your thoughts on this ????

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It seems like the suggestion here is that Studebaker the ailing car company took Alco down with it. By the time Studebaker was acquired by Worthington in 1967, it had already stopped building cars; they had real estate and some other side products separate from the car company that were still worthwhile. The last Studebaker autos were 1966 models.

I'd never heard about the Studebaker-Ford thing, though it kind of makes sense. Somewhat-healthy Packard bought ailing Studebaker in 1954 at the insistance of Nash president George Mason, who had just merged Nash and Hudson to form American Motors, and wanted to bring in Packard and Studebaker; along with Packard's lower-priced Clipper brand (which only lasted one year) they'd have a five brand structure like General Motors. Before that final merger happened, Mason died and George Romney took over AMC and abandoned the idea to merge with Studebaker-Packard and instead created Rambler. At the same time, Ford was working on creating two new brands to have its own five brand structure like GM. Ford and Nance probably figured that Studebaker and Packard could be those two new brands (possibly renamed). Ford's board probably though they had already gone too far with their own plans to change directions, though, and Ford went ahead with its Continental and Edsel brands, while the Packard name was sacrificed after 1957 so S-P could focus on Studebaker. Ford might have been able to save Studebaker, and maybe even Packard, but it wouldn't have had any effect on Alco, which would have needed the C415 and/or C636 to be hugely successful to make going on beyond 1969 worthwhile, regardless of Studebaker.

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I think ALCO could have survived for at least another 10 years if Worthington had not purchased the company.

ALCO was still the biggest exporter of locomotives in the United States in 1968. ALCO was slightly profitable, or at least breaking even. Investors and a board of directors with no connection to the community of Schenectady saw fit to close a low profit portion of their corporate family. They had no concern for the ties to the community or the history of the company, their only concern was profit, not the closures affect on the community (sad that some profit is not enough for corporations but it has to be excessive, not enough to keep a community going and people at work...Yeah.. Capitalism!). If Worthington had not purchased ALCO the decision makers of the company would have had deeper ties to Schenectady and may have tried to keep it open.

Yet it is important to point out the ALCO had serious labor problems. The Unions were asking for ever larger pieces of a rapidly shrinking pie. Here is an interesting question.... What if ALCO was bought and then operated by its employees? They might have had a chance.

If the company survived to 1973 the oil crises would have made much more fuel efficient ALCO products very attractive. Though ALCO could never match GE and GM's ability to influence RR decisions makers with under the table offers of freight traffic.

Hope this stirs some discussion.

Matt

Here's another plausible idea i came up with. Highly unlikely that it would happen, but i could've seen a EMD-ALCo merger sort of thing. If you look at it like i have.. In the 60s' EMD was having much sucess with their new 6axle line of locomotives. But, a downfall was some EMD 567 engineblocks(ie the 567B) werent as powerful as EMD would've liked them to be. But, had a EMD-ALCo sort of merger taken place in like pre 1955, look at the advantages EMD and ALCo would've reaped off: EMD would've gained the power from the new(in 1955) 251 Engine Block line, while ALCo's Electrical problems would've been solved with EMD electronics. Quite plausible if you ask me. Im sure with EMD's sucess of the SD9, and all the other 6 axles that were made, alco could've very well lived on into the 80s with EMD's help. By then, it could've been that ALCo Chief Mechanics and EMD Chief Mechanics that they built a super powered Eco friendly locomotive block, almost like building the EMD 710 ECo in like 1977. Have the power of an ALCo Block, but the efficency of a EMD block you know? Thats an idea i wonder about. Its highly possible that the C636 could've had the same success that the EMD SD40 line did if that merger some how worked out. But, apparently it didnt. We can only dream hehe...

What Alco electrical problems?

If you are thinking of Amplidyne, it's replacement with static in the mid '50s and type E in the early '60s solved those problems. And I don't think EMD will ever catch up to GE in terms of transmission systems.

A later thought: What is this statement about "the power of an Alco block, but with the efficiency of an EMD block"? A four cycle engine is more fuel efficient than a two cycle engine of comparable horsepower.

Lehighton, I suspect you are young, but please do a little research before you make statements like these.

I doubt that the outcome would have been much different. One of Alco's major problems was financing. There were quite a number of sales that Alco missed out on because they didn't have the financing arm that GM and GE had. Most people do not consider the financial end of the business but it is nearly, if not as important as the technical end. What good is a superior product if your customers cannot afford to buy it?

One example I can give is the PRSL. They tested the C415 and were quite pleased with it. PRSL was ready to sign for some but could not arrange the financing. EMD offered the GP38 with GMAC financing. Guess who got the order? GM did with some dual control GP38s.

I work in the overhead crane industry, and I was always surprised one of the bigger American players of the 1960s, such as Shepard-Niles or Whiting, didn't attempt to buy Alco. Both companies produced heavy steel mill cranes running on DC, so they could have supplied traction motors and control devices to replace the GE motors.

Think they would have survived when they would be able to find a financing partner for their business.
Based on Mexico´s long term use of Alco´s the quality surely would not have been the problem.

Perhaps if ALCO went it alone they would have continued to exist as a corporate entity but dropped the new locomotive line entirely at some point, simply retaining foreign licenses and the parts division. ALCO had many other product lines besides locomotives, a number of which exist to this day (even the 251 engine line). Perhaps they would have taken the lead of Fairbanks-Morse, dropping the locomotive line and going on without it.

Except that in F-M's case they were an engine manufacturer (among other things) that had expanded into locomotives. They had been building engines for marine and stationary uses for decades before they ever built a locomotive, and they continued to do so, so when the locomotives didn't catch on, it was no big deal for them to give up on them and focus on their core business. In Alco's case, locomotives were their core business. I think the side products, including the other applications of the 251, continued under the Alco name for awhile after locomotive production ended. If Alco had remained independent, they could've possibly continued to exist for a while without locomotives as a much smaller company, but would have likely been bought out eventually by a larger company, like F-M, who did eventually end up with Alco's engine designs and makes the 251s today.

I wouldn't really say that the nuclear and oil refining products were just "sidelines". Nor was the non-rail side of the 251, since F-M still builds the engines; expressly for the non-rail markets. Even their spring business continues on to this day under the name ALCO Spring. They manufacture all kinds of locomotive and car springs to stock dimensions as well as custom dimensions, and they also sell to other, non- rail markets. They're a business within themselves!
The point is, a business will do what it has to do in order to survive. I think (and history has proven) that ALCO would have had to give up domestic locomotive production in order to survive. Maybe not as early as 1969, but they would have eventually.

A business will do what is in the best interest of its owners, and sometimes that means selling out when the right offer comes along, as I think an independent Alco would have eventually done after ending locomotive production, which also would have happened eventually (I think EMD's Dash 2 line would have done it). I never suggested that there was anything wrong with Alco's other ventures, or that they were insignificant; the fact that some of them have lasted so long validates the products, but I don't think Alco ever intended them to replace locomotive production, only supplement it, just as F-M didn't intend locomotive production to replace their core business. Now, sometimes it happens that a side venture becomes so successful that it becomes a company's new core, but I don't think Alco was in that situation. If Alco had remained independent, though, those other ventures might have stayed together at their new home, maybe still under the Alco name, rather than being sold off in pieces by SW.