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  • Was Conrail A Government Bail Out?

  • Discussion related to the operations and equipment of Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail) from 1976 to its present operations as Conrail Shared Assets. Official web site can be found here: CONRAIL.COM.
Discussion related to the operations and equipment of Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail) from 1976 to its present operations as Conrail Shared Assets. Official web site can be found here: CONRAIL.COM.

Moderators: TAMR213, keeper1616

 #645279  by kinlock
 
I keep thinking Conrail really needed "bailout" because the "deck was stacked against them". They had been given a hoared of problems from the past that needed cleaning up.

The current bailout thing is different. These banks, car companies, etc had a good thing and just mismanaged it. Today's news talks about AIG insurance. Poor AIG needs more bailout. But a couple of years ago they sure climbed all over me for money. I had a consulting contract that required "business risk insurance". Wonder what they did with all the extra they made from me and others?

...Ken
 #645459  by lvrr325
 
ABC News did a good job of explaining AIG's problem on the Monday night news broadcast, you might check their site for the details.

In short, they insured all the bad loans the banks have more or less been forced to make to anyone with a heartbeat who asks for one. Of course, the loans began to fail as people couldn't pay them. So whoever held the loans by that point (they were sold to become investments rather than held by the banks) turned to AIG for their insurance payout. AIG gambled the loans wouldn't fail, and lost, to the tune of several hundred billion dollars. The government feels they can't be allowed to fail because too many other companies, organizations and individuals would lose out as a result, so they're propping the company up with cash until the company's viable assets can be sold off.

That's a good deal different from the Conrail situation.
 #657957  by scharnhorst
 
kinlock wrote:I keep thinking Conrail really needed "bailout" because the "deck was stacked against them". They had been given a hoared of problems from the past that needed cleaning up.

The current bailout thing is different. These banks, car companies, etc had a good thing and just mismanaged it. Today's news talks about AIG insurance. Poor AIG needs more bailout. But a couple of years ago they sure climbed all over me for money. I had a consulting contract that required "business risk insurance". Wonder what they did with all the extra they made from me and others?

...Ken
I keep saying that all companys that have these problums should be nationalized like Conrail under a temporay matter by the government untill they are overhauled into a money makeing machine. But sents everyone is against my thoughts I'll turn the tide here isn't the take over of the LV, EL, PC, RDG, L&HR, CNJ and the outher R.R.'s that were taken over by the U.S. Government a form of COMMUNISM after all the U.S. Government Nationalized these lines and held them under Govenment Control till the public stock offering in the mid 80's.
Last edited by scharnhorst on Mon Apr 06, 2009 11:04 am, edited 1 time in total.
 #658048  by BobLI
 
Lets just say the Govt was a "holding" company until the stock was made public. Once it made a profit then it was time to sell and get the govt out of the RR business..
 #713204  by Engineer Spike
 
I think that there are a few very important points which have not been thought of in this thread. Remember that the east was still the "rust belt" in the 1970's. Sure, some of the problem was the start of the shift of industry to other areas. One major concern was that heavy industry would not have been able to function without railroads. The de-industrialization was only part of the problem. Many of the roads were built around coal. Once this was gone, they were dependent on the other industries, and overhead traffic. In many places, multiple competing lines were side-by-side.
Why would Chessie or N&W want to go into an already over saturated market? I think that this was a half-hearted attempt to bail out the loosers. NYC tried to get in on the C&O-B&O merger. They didn't want that white elephant.
Getting back on labor, based on my reading, many employees got labor protection. This was due to the threatened job losses, due to pre-Conrail mergers. Who in his right mind would give up a guaranteed lifetime job?
 #713361  by RDGTRANSMUSEUM
 
Only a few northeast roads were really bankrupt. But when the Govt got "interested" in a few, they all wanted to be included, and said they were broke. On paper you can do what you think works to futher your case. Conrail was a success because of union give backs,track/plant rationalization,ect. and the employees really made it work.There were some great presidents that ran conrail too. The only thing that should have been different on the labor side,was to dovetail the roster. some guys feel they lost too much in the way of seniority/jobs,like the EL guys. This was the general feeling in the Allentown area where I spent alot of time working out of.
 #713394  by SooLineRob
 
RDGTRANSMUSEUM wrote: The only thing that should have been different on the labor side,was to dovetail the roster.
Very difficult subject to address. No matter what was done, some group wouldn't have been happy!

Example: 1966 EL guys following '72 PC (PRR) men in North Jersey; '69 EL men ahead of '65 PC (NYC) men in Indiana.

For virtually all people involved, Conrail was a "bailout" that worked.
 #713499  by Noel Weaver
 
The arrangement in Dewitt and Selkirk was very fair. Each roster got out exactly what they put in so far as freight miles
were concerned prior to the Conrail merger. In so far as engineers are concerned the EL people chose to go the way they
did in Buffalo and thus they worked in Selkirk and elsewhere with much less seniority.
In summing up, no matter what was done it was not going to satisfy everybody. In so far as the order of selection
arrangement was concerned, it was very fair to everybody in my opinion and I was affected by it in more ways than one.
Order of selection was also done on Amtrak, Metro-North and other merged operators too.
Noel Weaver
 #718504  by GWoodle
 
ex-tc driver wrote:Thanks for the reply and thead ecouter, never thought the formation of Conrail was that complicated but it seem to work
I'd call Conrail a successful reorganization of bankrupt lines. Having Ronald Regan and a spirit of deregulation & cutting of unprofitable lines helped. Aggressive salesmen getting new traffic for the lines helped more. The Eastern Rust belt isn't the same as 60 years ago. A lot of manufacturing & freight left the area. Spinning the commuter lines off to the local governments helped more. Creating Amtrak took the passenger losses off the books. A ton of money was spent getting the ROW back into a state of good repair. Having new shares of stock sold to the public paid off the government's investment. Having NS/CSX buy out Conrail should have made the government more money in capital gains taxes. The Staggers act & cost cutting efforts seems to have restored the profitability of freight railroads.

I don't know how much Conrail benefits from eastern coalfields or burning Western powder river coal. Becoming part of a transcontinental double stack container route helped more.
 #718723  by lvrr325
 
RDGTRANSMUSEUM wrote:Only a few northeast roads were really bankrupt. But when the Govt got "interested" in a few, they all wanted to be included, and said they were broke. On paper you can do what you think works to futher your case. Conrail was a success because of union give backs,track/plant rationalization,ect. and the employees really made it work.There were some great presidents that ran conrail too. The only thing that should have been different on the labor side,was to dovetail the roster. some guys feel they lost too much in the way of seniority/jobs,like the EL guys. This was the general feeling in the Allentown area where I spent alot of time working out of.
CNJ - bankrupt 1965, so bad they just gave up their PA ops in '72 and pulled out
New Haven - certainly in bad shape if not bankrupt before PC merger
Penn Central - bankrupt 1969
Lehigh Valley - followed Penn Central, their 80+% majority owner
Erie Lackawanna - bankrupt 1973 following Hurricane Agnes

The only one I don't remember a year on off the top of my head is the Reading. In addition, the NYS&W and Boston & Maine were bankrupt as well. The L&HR I believe was solvent but redundant without it's New Haven connection. The D&H was about the only northeastern road to remain solvent through this period, excluding shortlines. I believe the PR-SL also remained solvent, but was wholly owned by the Penn Central and Reading, and was in bad enough shape their last locomotive order was delivered to the PC instead over financing concerns.

Only a few?
 #718765  by scharnhorst
 
lvrr325 wrote:
RDGTRANSMUSEUM wrote:Only a few northeast roads were really bankrupt. But when the Govt got "interested" in a few, they all wanted to be included, and said they were broke. On paper you can do what you think works to futher your case. Conrail was a success because of union give backs,track/plant rationalization,ect. and the employees really made it work.There were some great presidents that ran conrail too. The only thing that should have been different on the labor side,was to dovetail the roster. some guys feel they lost too much in the way of seniority/jobs,like the EL guys. This was the general feeling in the Allentown area where I spent alot of time working out of.
CNJ - bankrupt 1965, so bad they just gave up their PA ops in '72 and pulled out
New Haven - certainly in bad shape if not bankrupt before PC merger
Penn Central - bankrupt 1969
Lehigh Valley - followed Penn Central, their 80+% majority owner
Erie Lackawanna - bankrupt 1973 following Hurricane Agnes

The only one I don't remember a year on off the top of my head is the Reading. In addition, the NYS&W and Boston & Maine were bankrupt as well. The L&HR I believe was solvent but redundant without it's New Haven connection. The D&H was about the only northeastern road to remain solvent through this period, excluding shortlines. I believe the PR-SL also remained solvent, but was wholly owned by the Penn Central and Reading, and was in bad enough shape their last locomotive order was delivered to the PC instead over financing concerns.

Only a few?
You are correct about the L&HR they moved all there traffic from connections in the South to the New Haven and vis versa. When the NH was eaten up by PC all the NH Traffic dryed up and went by was of alternet New York Central routes.

The PRSL was the only railroad that was not Bankrupt when it was foled into Conrail. The PRSL fully dieseled with Baldwins in the 1950s. They were later supplemented by 15 GP38's between 1967 and 1970 5 of these units were assigned to Penn Central.

At the start up of Conrail it was thought that the Boston and Maine would be included into Conrail but the B&M opted to reorganize in bankruptcy court.

Info came from vaied pages of of Scott Hartley's Conrail Volume 1: 1976-1982
 #913613  by KevinD
 
ToledoTerminalRy wrote:
I would say Conrail was much less than the "bailout" or partial government takeover we are seeing today, it was more of a government assisted "boost back on your feet". Conrail only used 2.2 Billion dollars in about 6 years as now in our "Bailout" we are on the hook for over 3000 times that amount (7 trillion) in about 3 months! The government never really took over the railroads like they did with banks and want to with the automakers. Wasn't over regulation why the great depression went on for so long? Maybe that is why when the gov't introduced the Staggers Act (deregulation) it HELPED Conrail so much along with other railroads.

IMO -The railroads suffered from over regulation (govt), so do the automakers (unions). The only difference is that the automakers put themselves into this position by accepting union agreements. The banks were also "forced" into this position by the Govt but also helped along by each banks employees greed. The banks were encouraged to make A+ loans to people who could NOT afford an A+ loan.

Actually, USRA was a government-owned corporation. USRA took $3.3 billion in congressional appropriations over the years, and Conrail was re-privatized in 1987, so it was owned for 11 years by the government. Its 1987 re-privatizing IPO, which at the time set a record for its size (later surpassed by some dotcom IPOs) netted the government $1.9 billion in cash for the railroad, so the actual net loss to the taxpayer was only around $1.4 billion. At the rate Conrail was making money by 1987, if the government had retained ownership for 2 more years, it would have made back ALL of the taxpayer's money. But by 1987, Reagan was in his second term and was up against term limits, and he wanted the government out of the railroad business while a republican was in the White House. So it was a 'fire sale' of sorts, the $1.4 billion loss merely the cost of rushing the sale process, with the government exiting early "on principle". And then in 1999, the property was sold to NS and CSX for $10 billion, netting a hefty profit of for those initial investors who bought the railroad in 1987 for $1.9 billion.

The government actually did use a USRA-style takeover to handle GM, too. The government-owned corporation in this case was NGMCO, Inc. (the equivalent to USRA), but the GM bailout also had some unqiue 'features' that the Conrail bailout did not have, and that difference was driven by the era - when Conrail happened, the financial industry was not as deregulated as it is today. Deregulation in the finance sector added a whole new layer of problems for GM that did not exist with Conrail. NGMCO ended up taking a $50 billion taxpayer infusion, and the re-privatization IPO for GM only netted about $12 billion in revenue for the government, so the net loss for the taxpayer over the GM bailout was $38 billion. The government only held GM for less than a year, due to the political pressure of today being much greater than in the Reagan era.

After the cold war ended, alot of the unemployed mathematicians and scientists that used to build weapons systems went to work on Wall Street instead, creating exotic financial products built around complex mathematical algorithms. These products were known as derivatives. The use of these products was deregulated in the late 1990s, and some derivatives were used as a type of unregulated insurance policy. The unregulated insurance derivatives were called "swaps".

Normal forms of insurance, as most people know it, is heavily regulated. Within normal insurance, one of the long-standing regulations require insurance companies to maintain enough assets to pay out on all claims. Also, in the regulated insurance sector, a person can only insure an asset once, and the asset can only be insured by the owner. For example, I, and only I, can take out a single fire insurance policy on my house. Normal insurance also cannot be used speculatively. It is illegal, for me, to take out a fire insurance policy on your house, purely for speculative reasons, as I would then have a vested interest in your house burning down.

In Derivatives universe, a "swap" had basically the same function as an insurance policy, but it legally could not be called "insurance", because insurance is a regulated entity, and this form of private contract risk swapping was not regulated. So it was labeled a "swap" instead. In Derivatives universe, assets could be insured more than once, and assets also could be insured by outside entities purely for speculative purposes. This practice of someone buying insurance on someone else's assets, a practice that is illegal for you and me to engage in here on Main Street, was a legal everyday practice for the high rollers on Wall Street.

As GM began to stumble from mismanagement, the legitimate investors who had an ownership stake in GM went out and bought credit default swaps. They were essentially insuring their own investments, using this form of unregulated insurance. They were looking to get paid by insurance proceeds in the event GM went out of business and they lost their original investment. There were also other third party players who had no ownership or investment in GM who were buying credit default swaps. These people were simply gambling, speculatively, over whether GM would live or die. These speculators who purchased swaps now had a legal right to get paid by insurance proceeds, too, had GM gone out of business.

The bulk of this unregulated insurance had been sold by - you guessed it - AIG, and AIG had previously become a ward of the taxpayer, so the taxpayer would have been on the hook to pay off on all of these unregulated insurance claims. It was simply cheaper for the taxpayer to take control of GM, pump money into it to stabilize it, and avoid having all these unregulated insurance claims be triggered by GM's potential demise. The taxpayer was staring at funding between $300-500 billion in insurance claims should GM die, and only $50 billion to make sure GM lived on and never triggered the insurance. The takeover of GM became a no-brainer decision. The lion's share of the $50 billion spent on GM was used to buy up these insurance policies as "toxic assets" for pennies on the dollar, removing their loss magnification effect from the GM equation. By comparison, the union's underfunded pension issues was but a tiny fraction of the overall cost.

The impacts of credit default swaps simply did not exist back in the Conrail era, because the financial sector in this country was still largely guided by the post-depression regulatory structure. Conrail recovered over 60% of the taxpayers money, and cost the taxpayer $1.4 billion due to excessive railroad regulation, while GM recovered only 18%, and cost the taxpayer $38 billion due to a lack of regulations over exotic financial products. The regulatory pendulum has swung from an over-regulated rail industry to an under-regulated financial industry, while the cost to the taxpayer has skyrocketed.

The entire area of unregulated swaps was operated by the investment bank/insurance conglomerates much like a ponzi scheme. Since there were no regs on maintaining sufficient assets to pay on all claims, most of the revenue from the sale of swaps was passed directly on to the employees of AIG in the form of excessive bonuses. The revenue was never retained for the proverbial rainy day. AIG often funded any claims made against the swaps by using revenue from new sales. And that fits the classic definition of a ponzi scheme. They were taking in money from new buyers to pay claims made by previous buyers. It was literally a "run on the bank" by all the people holding legitimate "insurance claims" from swaps underwritten on mortgage backed securities sold to investors that imploded the banks and AIG overnight. When the people with legitimate insurance claims came to collect, there was no "there" there to pay on all the claims.

And to think Madoff went to jail for his own investment-based ponzi scheme that was far less elaborate and far narrower in scope than Wall Street's insurance-based ponzi scheme, a scheme executed by players who are still walking around unprosecuted.
 #915479  by gprimr1
 
A few months ago I was confronted with someone who said that Conrail was a massive intrusion of government into free markets.

This was his argument:

That's an excellent example of goverment intervention limiting competition and distorting the market. Norfolk Southern Railway was two profitable railroads that operated in some of the same markets as Conrail and was forced to merge into one company after the formation of CSX. Now the three companies share infrastructure and compete in name only.

To this day, I can't imagine any of the southern railroads wanting to buy up the assets of the Penn Central.

I would say that the government made the right decision. The railroad infrastructure in the Northeast would probably have been consumed by real estate developers and we probably would have not been able to rebuild, and I don't want to think of the traffic conditions.

I also agree that pumping government money into Penn Central would have been a "bailout" and would have been a terrible decision. Instead, the government let Penn Central fail, and then was able to turn it back into something profitable, then return it to private enterprise. Money well spent if you ask me.

Here's the thread: http://railroad.net/forums/viewtopic.php?f=52&t=78591
 #927680  by RDGTRANSMUSEUM
 
.........and NS today is nothing more than Conrail phase 2. The Govt/states money is being pumped in to a private corporation to help it compete with trucks and other forms of transportation......that is a fact