Some, but certainly not all of the reasons:
There's very little governmental workforce in design or planning. It's contractors supervising contractors supervising contractors. There's no incentive to keep costs down, no incentive to make the best decisions, and no incentive to get it done quickly - making it slower, more expensive, and riddled with change orders means more money for the contractors. So you end up with gigantic stations without cross-platform transfers.
The public vote to (partially) fund the project was based on a barely-achievable running time to which the money is legally pinned. So every bad decision costs triple elsewhere to keep the running time.
Local politics, part 1: they're building the Central Valley segment as the initial operating segment because it's the easiest part. But they're not following through with the hardest part (the tunnels to get out of the Central Valley to SF and LA), so it's easy to paint it as a "train to nowhere". And all this in the most conservative part of the state, with massive land-takings because of strange route choices.
Local politics, part 2: the SF entrance is over Caltrain along the Peninsula. That's 45 miles of shared running with much slower commuter rail trains, on a mostly two-track line, with numerous grade crossings. (See previous comment about running time). That decision was made partly on cost, but partly so that Caltrain electrification (a worthy project, but not really related) could get HSR funds. The proper decision would use the Coast Subdivision through the East Bay, which could be built to true HSR standards with no freights and no grade crossings, and a second Transbay Tube to get to SF. A bit more money there, but vastly better running time and operations.
There's very little governmental workforce in design or planning. It's contractors supervising contractors supervising contractors. There's no incentive to keep costs down, no incentive to make the best decisions, and no incentive to get it done quickly - making it slower, more expensive, and riddled with change orders means more money for the contractors. So you end up with gigantic stations without cross-platform transfers.
The public vote to (partially) fund the project was based on a barely-achievable running time to which the money is legally pinned. So every bad decision costs triple elsewhere to keep the running time.
Local politics, part 1: they're building the Central Valley segment as the initial operating segment because it's the easiest part. But they're not following through with the hardest part (the tunnels to get out of the Central Valley to SF and LA), so it's easy to paint it as a "train to nowhere". And all this in the most conservative part of the state, with massive land-takings because of strange route choices.
Local politics, part 2: the SF entrance is over Caltrain along the Peninsula. That's 45 miles of shared running with much slower commuter rail trains, on a mostly two-track line, with numerous grade crossings. (See previous comment about running time). That decision was made partly on cost, but partly so that Caltrain electrification (a worthy project, but not really related) could get HSR funds. The proper decision would use the Coast Subdivision through the East Bay, which could be built to true HSR standards with no freights and no grade crossings, and a second Transbay Tube to get to SF. A bit more money there, but vastly better running time and operations.
