Nessman writes:
The notion that Conrail execs "hated" the E-L is complete hogwash that serves nothing more than an argument point for die-hard foamers. I also believe that the theory that Conrail would abandon lines so they wouldn't become through routes for competing roads is also a load of crap... not once have I seen a shred of credible evidence citing competition as a reason for abandonment.
The reasons behind Conrail's decisions to abandon select routes was purely business. The money losers got axed. It's pointless to keep debating this.
Response:
I don't have time to fully wade into this debate, but some misconceptions are fairly straightforward to disprove.
1.) It is correct that powerful Conrail executives did not "hate" the EL. In some cases, however, they did bring with them a profound disdain for the EL that they had learned at NYC, where a desire to wipe out the Erie had been part of basic training since the 1860s.
2.) Did Conrail abandon lines to keep them out of the hands of competitors? Absolutely. Examples:
a.) Erie River Line, abandoned 1981 to keep it out of the hands of P&LE, which was then agitating to force sale of the Southern Tier Line so P&LE could use it to move Pennsylvania coal to New York State and New England power plants.
b.) Lackawanna Cutoff, abandoned 1984 after an investor group working with D&H failed to come up with $6.6 million to buy the line. This group got its chance only because a federal judge blocked the abandonment on antitrust grounds. The deal fell apart when NS announced its intent to acquire Conrail in February 1984.
c.) Corry-Meadville, attempted abandonment in 1995. Northwest Pennsylvania Rail Authority acquired the line using a compulsory procedure available under the Interstate Commerce Act, prevailing against Conrail's legal opposition. The Northwest Pennsylvania Rail Authority acquired the line using financing provided in large part by the Delaware Otsego System, which was at that time rather closely working with CSX on intermodal traffic. Many correctly viewed this as a case of CSX protecting the viability of an alternative through route in the event it was confronted again with an NS takeover of Conrail.
These are only the examples in which I have been personally involved in my career. There are others. In all cases they are well known to those executives who were involved as well as many others.
Perhaps the best illustration, which I have previously related, is a 1995 meeting held in the office of Rep. Amo Houghton, attended by Dave LeVan and other Conrail officials, the executive director of the Southern Tier West Regional Planning Board, Rep. Houghton, and me. I was working for as STW''s consultant at that time. We set up the meeting to make a last-ditch effort to persuade LeVan to sell STW the derelict Hornell-Corry line so we could revive it for local service. LeVan replied, heatedly, that his objective was to abandon thirty to forty miles somewhere between Hornell and Meadville so CSX could not fashion a connection with D&H/CP. If he succeeded in abandoning Corry-Meadville, we would be allowed to acquire Hornell-Corry. Otherwise, he would move to abandon Hornell-Olean, and then we could have what remained.
In March 1997, barely two weeks before CSX and NS announced their agreement to split up Conrail, the Asset Management group was still fiercely attempting to win the consent of NYSDOT for a sale of the Hornell-Corry line to Buffalo & Pittsburgh, with the understanding that B&P would abandon it and pay Conrail 75% of the net liquidation value. Even then, the appointed protectors of the Conrail monopoly, like the occupants of Hitler's bunker, remained faithful to the company's objectives. Still advising STW, I played a role in blocking this case of corporate vandalism.
At all times it was possible to rationalize such behavior by pointing to the lack of business on former EL lines--the western outlet having been abandoned, the remaining local customers knowing full well that Conrail wanted them gone too. It took WNYP a good couple of years to overcome the snake-bit feeling that these customers still felt in 2001.
The assumption of normal business practice does not apply in this case.
And no, it's not pointless to debate what we lost, and for what reason.
WDB