Railroad Forums
DutchRailnut wrote:The cars can not be operated from Back end, the car only has one operating station.Are you sure? My understanding, from TriMet, is that they do have a cab in the rear of the car.
DutchRailnut wrote:By 3 trains they may not neccesary mean 3 different train sets, it could be same train set making two round trips with other set doing middle trip.Here's a link to the schedule.
DutchRailnut wrote:no mention of their demise on their website:The Colorado Railcar website is almost unbelievably amateurish by now, and certainly doesn't exude confidence in their products. Now, the $64,000 question is whether it's holding the place for a new de-Raderized website, or for a website marked "this site for sale".
http://www.americanorientexpress.com/
It makes me wonder how Colorado Railcar is doing, they are parent company of Grand Luxe as I recall.
Their website is down to minimum info, no big bragging stories of DMU anymore Etc.
http://www.coloradorailcar.com/dmuhome.htm
mxdata wrote:Has anyone ever seen any kind of a report published on the CRC DMU that burned at Pueblo? Seems very strange that an incident like that, during testing at a public funded facility, would hardly get any mention at all, particularly since there is an obvious safety issue involved.All I've heard is that it was some type of a "refueling accident".
The contractor for the trains on the WES line, which is slated to run from Beaverton to Wilsonville on Portland & Western tracks, has been "financially distressed," according to TriMet.
"When we got the third DMU, the last vehicle in September, our engineers looked at it and said (it) needs lot of work. We can't have it ready," Fetsch said.http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/sto ... 2545219500
Fetsch said the agency is paying more than the original value of the contract to get the trains in service.
Since then TriMet has stepped in and spent about $3 million over the budgeted amount for the railcars in order to ensure that the cars would be completed.
According to TriMet spokeswoman Mary Fetsch, TriMet was going through CRM’s financial records in January when officials realized the railcar company was not paying its suppliers.
TriMet stepped in and began paying suppliers directly and then sent TriMet staff to the manufacturing plant in Fort Lupton, Colo., to ensure that the DMUs were being constructed.
TriMet is paying for five engineers from CRM and an engineering consultant to oversee the final manufacturing of the DMU.
According to Fetsch, TriMet paid suppliers directly for railcar parts and took on overseeing the manufacturing to ensure that it would get the cars.http://www.djcoregon.com/articleDetail. ... il-opening
The project was supposed to open this fall (Sept., actually, which everyone sort of forgot about), but now it won't open until Feb. 2. One of the reasons is because the company responsible for delivering the rail cars, Colorado Railcar Manufacturing, has been "financially distressed and six months behind schedule," according to TriMet.
An internal memo dated Feb. 23, 2005, from TriMet warning there was “some level of risk” in doing business with Colorado Railcar Manufacturing. By late 2007, TriMet was worried enough about Colorado Rail’s financial situation the agency hired Conrad Myers, a Portland forensic accountant, to investigate the company’s finances. His reports painted a picture of a company fast running out of cash.The Marlboro Unlimited Debacle:
Tom Rader’s track record
Details about Tom Rader’s troubles running two other projects are chronicled in publicly available documents — Philip Morris documents posted online and court and securities filings related to Rader’s problems with a Florida company. TriMet officials said they knew of Rader’s past and it was not a “major concern.”
The Philip Morris debacle
Rattlesnake salad, lobster bisque and buffalo chili were on the lunch menu in 1995 as Rader hosted his customers from Philip Morris, the cigarette company. Rader was a gifted salesman, and Philip Morris the year before handed his company, Rader Railcar Inc., a $28 million contract to build one of the most luxurious trains to ride the American rails. Within months of that high-toned lunch, Philip Morris was suffering financial indigestion from its dealings with Rader. The project was behind schedule and costs were mounting by the millions.
Time after time, Philip Morris executives trekked to Colorado to investigate the problems. They described in reports their concerns with the lack of controls, inadequate engineering and ever-escalating costs. The company finally forced Rader to hire an outside project monitor. It wasn’t enough, as a brutally frank internal memo reported a year later. Rader and his executives “don’t know how to supervise people; results in much of rework; engineering also stinks,” the memo said.
Evaluating manufacturing flaws, another tobacco executive wrote of Rader’s operation that there was a “fine line between stupidity and dishonesty and I think we’re right on it.” By the spring of 1997, the $28 million train had become a $70 million train, and costs continued to mount. Philip Morris finally stopped the project, ordering Rader to cut the unfinished train into scrap.
Call it Debacle II
As the Philip Morris deal unraveled, Rader had other problems. He had set up a second company called Rader Railcar II. This business took over work unrelated to the Philip Morris project, including a $10 million contract with a Florida company. The contract was with First American Railways, a company Rader helped found. The company went public, raising millions to buy Rader’s train cars. Work quickly fell behind schedule.
“He ran out of money,” said Ray Monteleone, former president of First American Railways. “We had to feed him hand-to-mouth.” Monteleone sent officials to Colorado to monitor the books and help manage affairs. “We had to run his company to get those cars delivered,” Monteleone said. It wasn’t enough. The company reported to shareholders that Rader Railcar II missed one schedule and then an amended one for delivery of the cars.
Rader Railcar II still owed Florida three cars when it announced in November 1997 that it was shutting down. The firm blamed tardy payments from the Florida operation. That was news to First American, which fired back that not only had Rader Railcar II been paid on time, it had received advance payments as well. In 1998, First American Railways went bankrupt, blaming the late delivery of the cars for slow business.
— Les Zaitz
