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Discussion relating to the Penn Central, up until its 1976 inclusion in Conrail. Visit the Penn Central Railroad Historical Society for more information.

Moderator: JJMDiMunno

 #1538163  by Allen Hazen
 
BR&P, three posts and abut a half dozen years ago, said:
"NYC used the IBM system, with punchcards ..."
There might be an interesting story for a historian of business or technology to follow up on there: this might have been one of the longest relationships of a supplier and customer in the history of the computer business! New York Central was one of "IBM's" FIRST customers. Famously, one of Hermann Hollerith's first customers for his punched card and card reading machine business was the U.S. Census Bureau, to help process the data -- unprecedented amount of data, both because the country was growing and, I think, because the Census Bureau was asking more questions -- from the 1890 Federal census. But one of the first commercial customers was ... the New York Central Railroad! Hollerith's company eventually (around 1920) changed its name to International Business Machines, and gradually advanced its technology, allowing its machines to process the data on punched cards in increasingly complex ways, getting into what we recognize as electronic computers after WW II. If the New York Central was a steady customer -- applying Hollerith/IBM technology to more and more aspects of their business and obtaining better and better machines to do it with -- up to the time of the PC merger, we would have close to an 80 year relationship between the two companies.
 #1562523  by urr304
 
PRR then PC had a clerk at the Greenville [PA] depot for several years processing car loadings from interchange with B&LE at the nearby Shenango Yard. Each car from a B&LE train [either PRR or B&LE cars] of ore for Sharon and Youngstown destinations had a punch card from B&LE, the clerk picked up the stack of cards from the B&LE yard office, went to the PRR depot in Greenville, he fed the cards in to his punching termnal, it had a premade PRR tape of destination material, the trains consists tape was generated then fed into transmitter to Philadelphia before the train would be accepted for further movement on the PRR/PC pending car/air brake clearance. He would reverse procedure to make up a deck of cards to drop off to B&LE. A paper consist list was also printed and posted. I was just a neighbor kid, and helped with feeding the tape and posting consists.

The also kept the station opened for a few years until data links were established. In fact station had been closed for a number of years before they needed the computer information to Philadelphia, only had a signal maintainer based there and freight portion as leased warehouse.
 #1595229  by JimBoylan
 
Various books on the PennCentral bankruptcy mention that the usual railroad reorganization in earlier years was to shed debt obligations, often by converting it to stock in the reorganized company. The railroad was making money on its operations, but not enough to also pay interest and principal on its past borrowings. Exceptions, like the Colorado Midland in 1918 and the New York, Ontario & Western in 1957, were abandoned and liquidated. But the NorthEast roads were losing money on operations, yet their abandonments would have serious negative effects on the public economy.
 #1595772  by BR&P
 
Allen Hazen wrote:BR&P, three posts and abut a half dozen years ago, said:
"NYC used the IBM system, with punchcards ..."

If the New York Central was a steady customer -- applying Hollerith/IBM technology to more and more aspects of their business and obtaining better and better machines to do it with -- up to the time of the PC merger, we would have close to an 80 year relationship between the two companies.
Absolutely they did, the punchcard system lasted to the end of NYC, through Penn Central, and was still in use with various modifications on Conrail in September 1979. How long after that it was in use I can't say.

And this thread borders on the humorous - Alan, in 2020, responds to a post I made in 2014. Over 2 years later, I'm finally replying to his. :P
 #1596284  by Fishrrman
 
BR&P:
"Absolutely they did, the punchcard system lasted to the end of NYC, through Penn Central, and was still in use with various modifications on Conrail in September 1979. How long after that it was in use I can't say."

Seems to me they were still using the punchcards when I worked at the Croton West Yard (NY) in the early 1980's.

The conductors would take those cards (blanks without any punches) and make notes with them.

I got in the same habit (good for copying speed restrictions and hanging them in front of you on the engine). I think I might still have a few of them up in the attic...
 #1617432  by urr304
 
I guess denial would be the closest reason for failures of Penn Central. Egos blinded almost all of the participants. Both Board of Directors were populated by too many 'yes' men who went along with the 'railroad' members [just keep the dividends coming]. Though NYC had more attentive BofD members, they were overshadowed by first Robert Young then Alfred Perlman. PRR did have a more collectival BofD but non-railroad majority were influenced by the railroad minority. There was a lot of cross membeship with other BofD's; Saunders was on several BofD's.

Bevan should have taken an offer early in the 1960s to go to a very high position with a Philadelphia bank, but the Railroad was the BIG time along the Main Line communities. Bevan had a lot of personal faults, he was a control freak to the extent that all accounting and finance was handled if it was a secret war project. Then there was the insider trading and the investment club; insider trading was illegal then but didn't get prosecuted much until 1980s. His communications with Saunders were minimal; Bevan believed he should have been the top dog all along. Bevan had his troubles with some of the PRR echelon too; he defintely thought that PRR's sales v.p. gave away too much [something it appears he and Perlman were in agreement]. Even though he had the best handle on the financial side, he had much less operating experience than even Saunders whose claim was his time at N&W.

Saunders did have to his credit the take over of the Virginia and the groundwork for the taking over of the NKP, Wabash and P&WV. Saunders, for a lawyer, seemed to give away too much in negotiations with labor and government.

Perlman had the most widespread experience as I have mentioned, but he had trouble controlling expenses surprisingly, most noted was what became Perlman Yard [Selkirk]. Bevan's group tabulated costs overruns of $8+ million, at least 30% higher than budget.

Then there was the M497 project in 1966, which the PRR from Saunders on down thought as a gimmick; especially in light of what PRR and what became DOT were working on [Metroliner]. Just to poke in the eye, M497 still holds the North American speed record in spite of the amount of money that has been spent and the now second generation of Acela [or whatever]. Of course, having a 40 some mile tangent helps.

The general consensus was that minimal preparation would be needed for the merger other than renumbering locomotives [PRR's were chaotic at best with only the electrics, J1, Q2 numbered in order]. Even though there was a planning group, it seems little was accomplished or lain down, even rule books and employee timetables reflect that. Like too much elsewhere, the merger was to hit the ground and grow organically by itself. The only thing I saw was that in the PC ett's they actually had line maps; NYC had very detailed maps, PRR did not have maps before merger.

As noted, in many articles, Perlman was to be in charge of operations and Bevan was in charge of the check book and Saunders was supposed to control those two.

Overlooked, is the role James Symes had. After all, he was the prime architect of the merger. Perhaps with different characters his vision would have worked better. I think he could have been influenced by the merger of PRR proper [Lines East] and PRR Lines West operations that happened early in his career. Maybe he thought the same could be accomplished in 1960s with control from Philadelphia. Even that 1920 grouping had its problems especially in Pittsburgh; they had three major yards [ for PRR, Fort Wayne and Panhandle] that wasn't started to be controlled until Conway became the main yard and expanded in 1950s.

Symes' dream of a single entity [Railroad] for the Northeast did not come about until shortly before his death in a nursing home with the 1976 formation of Conrail.

That still took billions of dollars some of which was politically wasted until they brought in a man from the Southern [L. Stanley Crane] and assistance from the Staggers Act. Of course, after all of that, NS and CSX split pretty much as what should have occurred in the 1960s.

NYC had its experience with mergers and acquisitions too. Look at what happened in 1914 when they formally took over the LS&MS. That ensured that they would do differently the Big Four and Michigan Central. They had some control challenges too. No one seemed to look back to see what happened before.

A lot is said about operating philosophies differences, but it depended on which line you were dealing with. On the NYC igroup, one of the former NYC employees said when rerouting some of the van trains onto C&P in Cleveland they were delayed by ore traffic and told the ore traffic built the line. That was true of the C&P, but if my acquaintance from NYC had been dealing with someone on the Fort Wayne, he probably would have probably agreement on the van trains. C&P did not get into priority traffic until Conrail.

But there were too many outside factors that could not be controlled: regulation, general business climate of the Northeast. For example, I believe only five steel mills sites are left that CSX and NS serve that were once on PRR and NYC. How many automotive assembly and supplier plants are missing since the 1960s [not railroad served but all four of the rubber plants I was employed are gone]? And you can write volumes about how regulation went well beyond what was needed and stayed too long, not allowing railroads to adjust.

Have to go now.
 #1617530  by Allen Hazen
 
Sorry, I don't have much substantive to add, but I heartily endorse the recommendation of "The Men Who Loved Trains", by Rush Loving, Jr. Not sure if it is still officially in print (it was published by Indiana University Press), but Amazon claims it is available in both Kindle and dead-tree.
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Re: Red v. Green. In 1969 (I'm fairly sure) I talked to the crew of a way freight near New Haven, Ct. The crew were ex-New Haven men, but by then (I think PC took over NYNHHRR at the beginning of 1969) were answering to Penn Central people. They were very aware of which of their new bosses were Red and which Green.
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General comment: merging large railroads is not easy, and under-preparation common: look at what happened when Union Pacific took over Southern Pacific. Despite the fairly recent history of Penn Central to alert them to potential problems!
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 #1617755  by ExCon90
 
They didn't even learn from their own experience with the C&NW merger. By all accounts the UP-C&NW service was running like a Swiss watch until UP took over the whole show, including moving dispatchers from Chicago to Omaha (most of whom declined the move), and service deteriorated quickly until UP management learned what C&NW people could have told them.