Passengers stranded on MARC train for hours

BTW I would like some credit for previously casting doubt on the reports that the crews kept the side and doors closed and also that even open they wouldn't get much air into the cars. I won't comment on the general disorganized behavior of the passengers, but in the 21st century it is more than a little sexist to claim that women are somehow entitled to preferential treatment in these sorts of situations. The idea that women are somehow weaker and in need of protection by males is Victorian era BS that has no place in modern society. Priority treatment should be reserved for anyone with a valid medical need, not "women and children."

The train was a victim of extreme bad luck with failure piled upon failure and getting stuck in a place where passengers could not be easily evacuated off of the rail vehicle due to the RoW running in a fenced in urban corridor with no shelter or shade.

Finally, at the 70th post of this thread, we start receiving some reasons why this incident occurred. It wasn't necessarily 90 degree heat after all, but possibly low catenary voltage. When will Amtrak repair or replace the D.C. substation? Why hasn't Amtrak repaired or replaced the D.C. substation?

There is no substation in DC any more. The Capitol South Substation was decommissioned years ago when the feeder cables in the Capitol Hill tunnels went bad and was recently demolished completely. Today two feeder cables run from the Landover Substation to the switchyard next to the old REA building.

Yes the problem with modern computer controlled technologies is that they cannot be fixed except by replacing discrete failed components. There are also the implicit craft wars where the techs won't want to give away the keys to their kingdoms out of fears of losing importance or having the non-techs folks completely cock up the works when trying to fix something (which is not completely unfounded). Building idiot proof computer systems that can allow idiots to debug complex problems is extremely difficult. I design prototype IT systems and even when working with people with IT in their title we have to make step by step brain dead style instruction manuals just for regular operation. Trying to teach troubleshooting is damn near impossible so the best you can hope for is to programme in various levels of failover that can be easily activated in the field to prevent denial of service situations.

I am sure that whomever did the HHP-8 software basically made a simple user interface for the train crew that covered standard operational conditions and an extremely basic, yet powerful interface for the shop techs that would fix the universe of failure modes. The problem is if you simply allow train crews to plug into the shop interface they'll probably set the locomotive on fire because that interface has no protections that would for example prevent full voltage catenary power to be applied directly to the traction components. It would be great if the train crew had a nice intermediate level maintenance mode where they could try to fix or isolate the problem, but how much NRE do you think Bombardier is going to put into the computer system for an order of 25 custom locomotives? One could assume that MARC or Amtrak would ask for a software patch so the crew could recover from a low voltage situation, but they'd probably get hit with a $500k bill to develop and test such a patch and who has the sort of up front budget for that?

Uhm Mike I mentioned that back on the first page since I was an eyewitness to what was going down, so there

Jersey_Mike wrote: One could assume that MARC or Amtrak would ask for a software patch so the crew could recover from a low voltage situation, but they'd probably get hit with a $500k bill to develop and test such a patch and who has the sort of up front budget for that?

I was thinking along the exact same lines. The cost of that patch (even if it's well over $500k) will look quite cheap in retrospect if a few more stranded trains cause Amtrak to lose the MARC operations contract...

Apparently a similar event (passengers stranded on train on hot day with no AC) happened in Germany: http://www.thelocal.de/national/20100712-28439.html

a lott different, train was not stranded, but two ICE's with rear set with High voltage failure was used in passenger service anyway.
So passengers got in and were stuck till next express stop

addressing comments on how Amtrak always handles these situations badly; I would say that's a bit of an exaggeration.

The same could be said for clean-up crews on the highway after a bad accident, etc.

I was in an almost similar situation a few years ago when an AEM7 died just outside of sunnyside yard. Fortunately the engineer was able to make it out of the east river tunnels (thank God and God bless him) and he was able to clear the entire train from the tunnel (I was in the last car). Initially they were going to tow the train back to NYP by coupling up a loco at the end of the train but then a decision was made to take that locomotive and lash it up front in front of the dead locomotive. We may have lost no more than an hour and a half but the train double headed the rest of the way to Boston.

I know my example in no way compares to being stranded in a crowded MARC train for two hours in the heat with no AC but in terms of handling stranded trains, I trust Amtrak does everything in its power with the resources it has available.

mlrr wrote:addressing comments on how Amtrak always handles these situations badly; I would say that's a bit of an exaggeration.

Yes I would agree with that, in fact I'd say it's a gross exaggeration.

There are two points concerning MARC 538 I'd like to mention.

One, some passengers said no doors were opened, some passengers said they were opened and then closed, all passengers seemed to agree the open doors did little to reduce the heat in the cars.

Two, a video feed from a Washington DC TV station (from a helicopter I think) showed the train was actually in a pretty good spot to be evacuated (as was eventually done, at the direction of EMS crews I think). The train was stopped alongside what looked like an asphalt path, in a wide and open area away from the tracks.

At any rate, the train was evacuated and that didn't seem to create any undue problems. It just wasn't evacuated soon enough to have prevented a lot of the suffering the passengers endured due to the extreme heat in the cars.

What I'd like to know is, after MARC and Amtrak resisted evacuating the train for an hour or more, why was it finally evacuated?

Was that at the insistence of EMS?

Tommy Meehan wrote:What I'd like to know is, after MARC and Amtrak resisted evacuating the train for an hour or more, why was it finally evacuated?

Was that at the insistence of EMS?

yes or those folks would still be on there imho

Maryland's Final Report on this incident has finally been published.
http://mta.maryland.gov/train_538_incid ... report.pdf

The chronology of events related to the Train 538 incident:
6:13 p.m. MARC Train 538 departs Washington Union Station
6:20 p.m. Train 538 Engineer tells Centralized Electrification and Traffic Control (CETC)
that MARC Train 538 is stopped.
6:30 p.m. Train 538 Engineer is unable to restart the train.
6:35 p.m. Mid Atlantic Commuter Control Center calls K Tower (a dispatch control
center in Washington, D.C. responsible for train dispatch up until New York Avenue) for
a road‐qualified engineer to take a diesel engine to MARC Train 538.
6:40 p.m. K Tower representative informs the Mid Atlantic Commuter Control Center
that an engine is being prepared for dispatch to the incident site.
7:17 p.m. Amtrak rescue engine arrives in proximity to the incident and is waiting on the
Conductor of MARC train 538.
7:30 p.m. Amtrak rescue engine is coupled to the rear of train 538.
7:40 p.m. Train 538 Engineer tells the Amtrak rescue engine that the parking brake
cannot be released.
7:45 p.m. Amtrak personnel arrive with diagnostic laptop.
7:55 p.m. MARC train 538 staff tell CETC that the parking brake is now released.
8:15 p.m. On‐site Amtrak personnel calls Commuter Operations and says that train 538
engine is up and running. Passengers are reported to be off of the train and the Amtrak
Police, as well as other emergency responders, are also on the scene.
8:15 p.m. Train 442 arrives next to train 538 to transfer passengers. There are still 100
remaining passengers on train 538.
8:51 p.m. Train 442 departs.
9:18 p.m. Train 538 moves north to New Carrollton Station to detrain the remaining
passengers onto train 544.
9:43 p.m. Train 538 moves south to Washington Union Station.
10 p.m. Train 538 arrives back at Union Station.

Several factors contributing to the incident, and proposed corrected actions.
1> Failure of critical components on the HHP-8 electric locomotive.
CA = Address conditions that place additional strain on electronic components with the engine compartment, utilize protect locomotives where practicable, reduce length of trainsets.
2> Failure of Amtrak to effectively communicate accurate and timely information to MARC management throughout the duration of the incident.
CA = Establish lines of communication with senior Amtrak operations staff
3> Failure of Amtrak personnel on-site to focus on the well being of the passengers as they attempted to resolve mechanical issues with the locomotive.
CA = Provide additional training for train crews in incident management, dispatch additional Amtrak managers to the scene.
4> Failure of MARC management to gauge the seriousness of the situation and respond aggressively when it became apparent the situation was deteriorating.
CA = Dispatch MTA personnel to the scene when a train is disable and passenger comfort and convenience is at risk.
5> Failure of the train crew to effectively communicate with passengers throughout the duration of the incident.
CA = Provide additional training for train crews in emergency communication procedures, extend MTA Transit Information Center (TIC) hours to cover MARC service hours.
6> Failure of Amtrak and MARC to request assistance from local emergency responders.
CA = Request Amtrak to review protocols for dispatching additional Amtrak Police and local responders, dispatch additional Amtrak personnel to the scene, dispatch MARC personnel to the scene when a train is disabled and passenger comfort and convenience is at risk, utilize other MDOT resources.

6:40 p.m. K Tower representative informs the Mid Atlantic Commuter Control Center
that an engine is being prepared for dispatch to the incident site.
7:17 p.m. Amtrak rescue engine arrives in proximity to the incident and is waiting on the
Conductor of MARC train 538.
7:30 p.m. Amtrak rescue engine is coupled to the rear of train 538.
7:40 p.m. Train 538 Engineer tells the Amtrak rescue engine that the parking brake
cannot be released.

A chronology later in the document states that the rescue locomotive departed Washington at 7:00, which seems to fit the timeline (20 minutes to get ready, 17 minutes to make the trip).

The report doesn't answer the burning question of why the rescue locomotive didn't begin supplying HEP for the train - A/C could have been restored and the PA system would have been operable, so crowd control wouldn't have been as major an issue as it turned out to be.

I was glad to see that MARC is considering running shorter trains more frequently to reduce the load on the locomotives. More departures = more flexability for commuters, which is a good thing.

Curiously absent is any mention of replacing the electric motors with the new models that Amtrak has ordered.

HokieNav wrote:The report doesn't answer the burning question of why the rescue locomotive didn't begin supplying HEP for the train - A/C could have been restored and the PA system would have been operable, so crowd control wouldn't have been as major an issue as it turned out to be.

The rescue locomotive could have been a switcher, not equipped with HEP. It doesn't appear the chronology gives engine numbers, so no way to tell....

Silverliner II wrote: The rescue locomotive could have been a switcher, not equipped with HEP. It doesn't appear the chronology gives engine numbers, so no way to tell....

If it was a switcher without HEP, Amtrak would have sent the wrong locomotive.

electricron wrote:

Silverliner II wrote: The rescue locomotive could have been a switcher, not equipped with HEP. It doesn't appear the chronology gives engine numbers, so no way to tell....

If it was a switcher without HEP, Amtrak would have sent the wrong locomotive.

Ahhh, it was just a speculative thought. I sat through a MARC breakdown back in July of 1992 for about two hours. I was on a DC-bound train that had just left New Carrollton when the locomotive suddenly quit taking power. Nothing they could do would resolve the problem. They didn't evacuate us; they sent a Pumpkin* up from Ivy City to tow us the rest of the way in. I am surprised they didn't simply have the one Amtrak train that came in behind us couple on and shove us in instead.


*for some who may not know, the Pumpkins were Amtrak's fleet of now-retired GP7's and GP9's used in work train service, painted pumpkin orange, hence their nickname. A few made it into the platinum mist with black roof scheme, which I personally referred to as "Silver Pumpkins"...

electricron wrote:

Silverliner II wrote: The rescue locomotive could have been a switcher, not equipped with HEP. It doesn't appear the chronology gives engine numbers, so no way to tell....

If it was a switcher without HEP, Amtrak would have sent the wrong locomotive.

If it was a matter of sending a non HEP Loco out and rescuing the train or waiting possibly for hours for an HEP equipped loco to become available, what would you rather have?

"We're going dark"
"roger that"