Derailment= East Palestine Ohio

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion, but yours works too.

Do not be mislead by the statements or silence of government authorities.

NTSB reports “When train 32N passed the next HBD, at [Salem] MP 69.01, the bearing’s recorded temperature was 103°F above ambient.”

Sudden burn-off of roller bearings is a well-known phenomenon. Taken at face value, the 103°F statement is plausible and seems to exonerate NS — the bad bearing was still well below the generally accepted alarm threshold of 190-200°F as it passed the Salem HBD. A roller bearing can go from good-to-bad in just 5-10 miles.

The 2/23/23 NTSB report acknowledges surveillance camera images from 3760 Boardman St. in New Waterford, about 4.5 miles west of the point of derailment. But the report omits any mention of the Fresh Mark and Butech Bliss videos at Salem.

Both cameras in Salem clearly show the failing, incandescent bearing was 800-1200°F, far above NS’ 170°F alarm threshold as it passed the Salem HBD, 20 miles and 24 minutes west of the derailment site. Like the Zapruder Film, the Fresh Mark color image is particularly helpful in understanding the evolution of this accident.

What NTSB can/should immediately state is that the Salem HBD failed to produce an alarm message for the failing bearing. The Fresh Mark image proves the failing bearing was detectable at Salem. Had the Salem HBD functioned as intended, the train would have safely stopped at least 18-19 miles west of East Palestine.

Going forward, the sole focus of investigation should be on whether or not 1) somebody deliberately mis-adjusted the Salem HBD calibration or otherwise disabled the system to reduce false stops, or 2) the HBD equipment at this location is unsuitable for its intended purpose due to weather, truck design, track condition, etc.

Actually, BLEVE means "Get 5 miles away before even looking back..."

farecard wrote: ↑Thu Mar 16, 2023 1:50 am Actually, BLEVE means "Get 5 miles away before even looking back..."

BLEVE qualifies for Maxim 3: An ordnance technician at a dead run outranks everybody.

Taxpayer1 wrote: ↑Wed Mar 15, 2023 9:31 pmNTSB reports “When train 32N passed the next HBD, at [Salem] MP 69.01, the bearing’s recorded temperature was 103°F above ambient.”
Taken at face value, the 103°F statement is plausible and seems to exonerate NS — the bad bearing was still well below the generally accepted alarm threshold of 190-200°F as it passed the Salem HBD.

Please clarify, is "the generally accepted alarm threshold" above Zero or above ambient temperature?

The NS alarm thresholds have been measured versus AMBIENT temperature, which at the time of this derailment was reportedly 10 degrees above zero.

Your introduction of the term "generally accepted" would reasonably apply prior to discovery of the circumstances of the East Palestine derailment.

A thorough review of ALL "standards" and practices applicable to inspection and management of roller bearings is now under scrutiny across government (FRA, NTSB) and industry (AAR). My use of the term "standards" (in quotes) speaks to the practice (to date) that effectively leaves the policies and practices and their governing standards to the individual railroads with respect to HBDs.

The NTSB's preliminary report (available online) indicates the HBD's involved were apparently managed in accordance with NS' applicable standards.

While this Journal article was prompted by East Palestine, it appears to have applicability to the entire industry. Therefore I am submitting to the General Discussion Forum, and submitted here as information only:

https://www.railroad.net/media-circus-time-t175275.html

WAMU's 1A covered the aftereffects:

https://wamu.org/story/23/04/05/the-sta ... palestine/

I learned of this material privately, but when reviewing such, do not lose sight that the source cannot be considered "recognized":

https://therealnews.com/a-carmans-persp ... as-a-whole

The article noted by GBN is relevant and useful as a narrative, to illustrate the ill effects of PSR upon customer service and operating practices and, although I can neither confirm nor refute the data cited in this article, I do believe the article effectively captures the story of single-minded pursuit of PSR-driven Operating Ratio and its consequence over recent years.

For the record, I am retired from Conrail, and receive a monthly pension, funded in part by Norfolk Southern. I therefore have a vested interest in NS' long-term success.

CEO Alan Shaw was appointed in December 2021 and the East Palestine derailment happened on his watch, which I regard as a tragic irony.

I highly recommend the Railway Age article of December 8, 2022 "A Franchise Built for Growth", detailing Shaw's vision to restore the QUALITY OF CUSTOMER SERVICE as the PRIMARY element to drive future growth. This is the right course.

It's time to turn the page on PSR and I believe Alan Shaw and his organization have the ability to do so, as they reform their practices, working with urgency and taking care to maintain good faith with the East Palestine stakeholders.

Reviewing May TRAINS, I find conflict between Bill Stephens the Reporter, and Bill Stephens, the Columnist.

First the report where Mr. Stephens notes what I have held at these pages, "East Palestine OH appears to be on a trajectory to join Megantic and Chatsworth as locations that changed railroading's regulatory landscapc."

Again, as one who has followed industry affairs for the past seventy years, I hold same.

Now I'm not sure what "deadline" TRAINS places on its columnists, it really seems juxtaposed that Mr. Stephens is praising NS CEO Alan Shaw for stating service comes before PSR and the holy grail of the Operating Ratio:

"Shaw has made it crystal clear that cost cutting has reached the bumper posts - and that the future is tied to better service".

I'm afraid there are a "couple" of E Palestine parties in interest that will strongly disagree - and could well have the Judiciary holding same.

This article, appearing in today's Journal, reports that life today at Paulsboro NJ (roundly opposite Chester PA), on Conrail (SA) is "normal" after a 2012 derailment incident involving HAZMAT.

Fair Use:

A train derailment in Paulsboro, N.J., briefly hurt local businesses and property values, but residents say the town is humming today

According to this Wiki article, the operator was NS.

GBN - The November 30, 2012 Paulsboro, NJ derailment had a discussion at the New Jersey Railfan Forum:
derailment-at-paulsboro-t117063.html
9 pages - 123 posts - November 30, 2012 to July 30, 2014

I remembered the incident - and this topic - since I was visiting relatives in the Philadelphia area for the
Thanksgiving 2012 holiday weekend and recall the local media coverage at that time...

In the aftermath of the EP derailment now about nine weeks ago past incidents involving HAZMAT cargo on
freight trains are being brought back to light by various media sources...
This was a Conrail Shared Assets/CSX freight train that derailed in Paulsboro, NJ...MACTRAXX

Mr. MACTRAX, I'll accept your statement that the operator at the Paulsboro incident was Chessie and not Topper.

Oh well what's new; time for a little fact checking of one more Wiki article.

Gilbert B Norman wrote: ↑Wed Apr 12, 2023 7:05 pm Mr. MACTRAX, I'll accept your statement that the operator at the Paulsboro incident was Chessie and not Topper.

Oh well what's new; time for a little fact checking of one more Wiki article.

GBN: Don't take my word for it - we can just look through and read the topic...
The CSAO freight train was identified as WPCA11 with two CSX SD40-2 locomotives 8817-8830
(From Chuchubob on 12/18/2012 - Page 7)
As we know there were no significant bridges at or near the EP derailment site area in comparison...
MACTRAXX