I, too, have had that nagging thought of the potential of seeing the kind of fire evidenced by lineside video either by looking back or in the engineer's rearview mirror, ~2500' to the rear at 8:54 pm, no precipitation and while I didn't consider this among the curves, note there are at least a few places preceding the derailment of tangent appearing to exceed that length and that the NTSB is not considering this line of investigation.
From Railway Age:
NS issued the following statement on the preliminary report:
https://www.railwayage.com/freight/clas ... erailment/
Fair Use:
“The company’s wayside detectors on its network trigger an alarm at a temperature threshold that is among the lowest in the rail industry.
In terms of ECP braking, important to note that a 2016 GAO report identified the cost v. benefit returns over a 20-year period earning about a quarter of today's savings accounts. Even US DOT acknowledged that "the expected costs of ECP brakes are significantly higher than the expected benefits". To a capital-intense industry with a 2021 10.37% cost of capital, even within the range of variability, that return falls far short and especially if on the one hand it becomes required but on the other, pursuit of benefits are stymied or not providing a meaningful addition to marketplace competitive advantage. In this regard, how would even-longer/heavier trains be viewed by labor and regulators and of competitive value in the marketplace?
Based upon the GAO, DOT and AAR numbers, projected out to the entire equipment fleet, order of magnitude might be ~$20 billion, up against PTC which cost ~$15 billion with the industry picking up $11.5 billion and consequently pursuing benefit from its imposition with reduced on-board crew members and to/toward automation.