Derailment= East Palestine Ohio

NYCRRson wrote: ↑Wed Feb 22, 2023 9:11 pm To all the pseudo electrical engineers posting here about "Let's just add power over Ethernet and microprocessors on every rail car... " "It will only be $20 per axle...."

I don't recall ever discussing the price per axle. And I'm not a pseudo electrical engineer; I am a real one.

You have no idea of the complexity of converting the current USA rail car fleet from pneumatic braking to electro-pneumatic braking....

I'm not sure how you can read my mind from so far away. I've never said it would be an easy conversion. But how long did the conversion to required roller bearings take? Seat belts/airbags in autos? [I can recall all the howls from Detroit...) TPMS?

I'd start with HHFT cars and locomotives for same. They'd need to be at the head of the consist, with following cars using existing system, or require all HHFT cars be in all-ECP trains. (I can hear the PSR screams already.)

I will never be convinced that applying all the brakes instantaneously (ECP) after a bearing/axle burns off near the front of the train will reduce the damages from a derailment very much,,,

I've not said that it would. What would is temp sensors on each wheel, linked to the ECP. on each car. When it overheats, it reports the alarm, and maybe directly instigates a controlled immediate stop.

But PSR brings up many limitations of the "old way" of doing things. I've been reading https://www.railwayage.com/wp-content/u ... er-3.0.pdf
Management of In-Train Forces:
Challenges and Directions
and find it enlightening.

MACTRAXX wrote: ↑Wed Feb 22, 2023 9:05 pm I remember that some Herzog rail equipment such as hopper cars have solar panels placed on one end -
Does anyone know what power is provided for and used on cars equipped?

The Herzog hoppers that are so equipped have remotely controlled hydraulic hopper doors. The remote control extends to relying on GPS and inertial guidance systems to allow automatic ballast placement and using other sensors to monitor the amount of ballast that has exited a particular hopper chute without an operator present. See's Herzog's overview.

This may sharpen the focus on PSR practices..... Does anyone know if the Sandusky derailment discussed was investigated by NTSB and/or FRA?

https://www.propublica.org/article/norf ... derailment


A Norfolk Southern Policy Lets Officials Order Crews to ignore Safety Alerts

In October, months before the East Palestine derailment, the company also directed a train to keep moving with an overheated wheel that caused it to
derail miles later in Sandusky, Ohio.
....
The policy applies specifically to the company's Wayside Detector Help Desk, which monitors data from the track-side sensors. Workers on the desk can tell crews to disregard an alert when "information is available confirming it is safe to proceed" and to continue no faster than 30 miles per hour to the next track-side sensor, which is often miles away. The company's rulebook did not specify what such information might be, and company officials did not respond to questions about the policy.
========

I'd heard a rumor earlier that the EP crew was directed to continue despite the Wayside alert, but did not give it credence at the time, without evidence.

Preliminary Report: February 23, 2023

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pag ... MR005.aspx

On the Fort Wayne Line of the Keystone Division, NS has equipped their rail network with HBD systems to assess the temperature conditions of wheel bearings while en route. The function of the HBD is to detect overheated bearings and provide audible real-time warnings to train crews. Train 32N passed three HBD systems on its trip before the derailment. At MP 79.9, the suspect bearing from the 23rd car had a recorded temperature of 38°F above ambient temperature. When train 32N passed the next HBD, at MP 69.01, the bearing’s recorded temperature was 103°F above ambient. The third HBD, at MP 49.81, recorded the suspect bearing’s temperature at 253°F above ambient. NS has established the following HBD alarm thresholds (above ambient temperature) and criteria for bearings:

​Between 170°F and 200°F, warm bearing (non-critical); stop and inspect
A difference between bearings on the same axle greater than or equal to 115°F (non-critical); stop and inspect
Greater than 200°F (critical); set out railcar

The NTSB’s investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on the wheelset and bearing; tank car design and derailment damage; a review of the accident response, including the venting and burning of the vinyl chloride; railcar design and maintenance procedures and practices; NS use of wayside defect detectors; and NS railcar inspection practices.

Why not just say all cars built after x date has to have the new braking system. That along with mandatory retirement of cars from being interchanged after what is it 50 years? Would get you a slow but easier way to upgrade the braking system.

QB 52.32 wrote: ↑Thu Feb 23, 2023 10:54 am Train 32N passed three HBD systems on its trip before the derailment. At MP 79.9, the suspect bearing from the 23rd car had a recorded temperature of 38°F above ambient temperature. When train 32N passed the next HBD, at MP 69.01, the bearing’s recorded temperature was 103°F above ambient. The third HBD, at MP 49.81, recorded the suspect bearing’s temperature at 253°F above ambient.

So the HBT shown at Salem on the map in post #1616086, must be at 69.01...correct?

NTSB at the podium

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NN6gjWT7dI

Train was 2x1 with DPU at position 109

Next up at NTSB - pushing for real-time bearing monitoring via some remote control center.

Red Wing wrote: ↑Thu Feb 23, 2023 11:09 am Why not just say all cars built after x date has to have the new braking system. That along with mandatory retirement of cars from being interchanged after what is it 50 years? Would get you a slow but easier way to upgrade the braking system.

The new braking system won't be any good without a trainline connection and equipment on the locomotives able to support it.

I'd think we'd see cabooses added back to trains carrying hazmats before we'd see new braking implemented.

Roscoe P. Coaltrain wrote: ↑Thu Feb 23, 2023 5:54 pm NTSB at the podium

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NN6gjWT7dI

Worth watching, She does not pull her punches......

Everyone - Interesting findings from the NTSB about the probable cause of the EP derailment -
Identifying the covered hopper car with the defective axle and bearings at position in train #23
became a fast-developing problem for the train crew taking note to the extreme temperature rise.
Cars #23 to #73 were involved in the NS derailment and fire at Mile 49 (from Pittsburgh)

I agree that this press conference shows that the NTSB is the BEST at what they do...MACTRAXX
(reason for edit: text change)

farecard wrote:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NN6gjWT7dI

Worth watching, She does not pull her punches......

Well spoken, articulate, and seems to know her subject well. The media always try to extract speculation and conclusions, she didn't fall for that. I was impressed.

Let us get back to the meat of the report: That a wheel bearing was failing and three separate detectors reported a "getting hotter" trend.

My questions here (based on the report):

• Why isn't there a Hot Bearing Detector around MP 59? (Could of seen the above-170F warm bearing warning and had the train stop)
• Isn't there a system that the HBD's report not only over radio (the audio report) but electronically to a central system that can detect the trend and report to dispatch?
• Did this train start it's run at the NS Conway Yard? Or further back?
• What inspection records are there on this train about this consist at the yard of origin?

From Hilton Suites Boca Raton--

Two hotbox detectors warned of a problem - and neither the Train Crew nor Train Dispatcher took any action?

What am I overlooking? Enquiring mind wants to know.

What I heard was that the temperatures at the first two detectors did not exceed the threshold of concern. At the third detector (close to the crash site) the threshold was exceeded, the crew began to brake, but it was too late. Sounds like a bad policy choice