Also, in a nutshell, what is CSX’s goal in this acquisition?
...the CSX aquisition has been discussed in great length. The widely accepted answer is: they felt it was a once in a lifetime opportunity to acquire a profitable railroad that operated a hell of a lot of trackage in a region that already connected to their network.
The answer they won't state on the record is that after the railroad was "right sized" by PSR, they are effectively looking at growth because they have excess capacity (in terms of railcar utilization, trackage/yard and locomotive). The tough nut to crack will be getting the people to do it.
Pursuing growth is a primary reason CSX adopted Hunter Harrison's PSR principals in the first place, effectively through greater efficiency and service reliability, and on the record, not so much an off-the-record secondary consequence.
Without PSR doubtful CSX woulda/coulda made this acquisition, even with available excess operational capacity and the risk of 1 of the 2 Canadian Class 1's, already operating under Harrison's PSR principals, acquiring PAR.
After CSX signaling strategic hemming-and-hawing about whether to stay or leave New England and in light of the benefits of PSR, potential Canadian threat, and increasing freight rail reduction/re-location pressure on their ex-Conrail franchise extending out to Springfield MA, in a nutshell there's a range of possibilities justifying this acquisition in pursuit of financially-healthy and sustainable growth.
Taking this into consideration beyond what is publicly said or even rumored provides a framework when anticipating short-, mid- and long-range ownership, capital investment, other Class 1, market, and operational possibilities in their acquisition of Pan Am and half of Pan Am Southern.
In the greater PSR-cost/benefit and Wall-Street-cult-of-the-operating-ratio-hamstringing debates this acquisition and that of trucker Quality Carriers by CSX provides an important consideration.