CSX Acquisition of Pan Am Railways

What an absolute joke. They obviously are just looking to kick the can down the road or get them to withdraw so they can deal with the big tamale.

I don't think so. Reading through the entire rejection notice, it's clear that what the STB is saying is very simple - "To CSX and PAR - you tried to pass off what was largely the same application you filed for a minor transaction as something sufficient for a significant one. Take a look at these examples of applications filed for significant transactions and follow one of them." I don't think the STB is looking to kick this down the road. They're just making it clear that there are certain standards that need to be met, and that the board isn't going to ignore those standards, whatever may have been the case under the previous administration.

You wait and see.

I hate to bring this up but is it possible that national politics is intervening at the STB by attempting to thwart Tim Mellon's sale of Pan Am? Mellon was a large donor to Trump.

I don't see how. Four of the five members of the board, including the current chairman, were appointed to the board by Trump.

• Martin J. Oberman — Board Chairman — appointed by President Trump
• Patrick J. Fuchs — appointed by President Trump
• Ann D. Begeman — appointed by President Obama
• Michelle A. Schultz — appointed by President Trump
• Robert E. Primus — appointed by President Trump

Yes, that is a non-issue.

My interpretation, and take it for what it's worth, is that reading through the decision there is only really one other transaction of similar stature in which to compare and that is the CP-DME back in 2009. If that serves as the 'standard,' which the STB says it doesn't per se, then it may not be exactly clear what the STB was looking for from a CSX perspective (well, the perspective of their lawyers), which they somewhat acknowledge in the decision and are offering to provide guidance. In that case, I'd say the STB is trying to work with CSX to get this moving along, and CSX has said they will re-file.

I do find it interesting that STB called CSX on the traffic growth, whereas CSX says they don't expect significant traffic growth but then mention reasons for acquisition are traffic growth (in a nut shell). And clearly they expect something of substance, with access to new markets in Maine and potentially the container port in Saint John...

All-in-all, a delay surely but not a dealbreaker. Also, it seems there was turnover end of the year at the law firm CSX uses to arrange STB filings (there is a STB filling about this end of December) so perhaps, and maybe I'm grasping, the lack of experience with STB matters is another issue. In that case I say, fire the lawyers.

MEC407 wrote: ↑Mon May 03, 2021 11:32 am

bostontrainguy wrote: ↑Mon May 03, 2021 7:29 am Is this the only time a railroad seeking a merger is not talking about how they are going to improve freight service for their customers and the region but instead is saying we want the railroad but we aren't going to improve anything for anyone. So give us the railroad but don't expect anything good to come out of it.

That's not what CSX has said at all. In fact, they've said the opposite of that, both in the official STB filings and in their statements to the media.

Seems the STB is pondering the same thing I did about this rather vague plan to improve rail service in New England.

Here is what the STB actually wrote in their rejection notice:

STB wrote:A key difference between the applications for “minor” and “significant” transactions is the requirement for applicants in “significant” transactions to include a Market Analysis that “describe[s] the impacts of the proposed transaction—both adverse and beneficial—on inter-and intramodal competition with respect to freight surface transportation in the regions affected and on the provision of essential services by applicants and other carriers.” 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(a). As part of the analysis, Applicants “must identify and address relevant markets and issues.” Id. The Market Analysis also “should reflect the consolidated company’s marketing plan and existing and potential competitive alternatives (inter- as well as intramodal).” Id. Applicants may present evidence on “city pairs, interregional movements, movements through a point, or other factors; a particular commodity, group of commodities, or other commodity factor that would be significantly affected by the transaction; or other effects of the transaction (such as on a particular type of service offered).” Id. Although § 1180.7(c) gives applicants in “significant” transactions “the greatest leeway to develop the best evidence on the impacts of each individual transaction” and applicants “are free to choose the type(s) and format,” the regulation also makes clear that applicants “must provide supporting data.” 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(c). The regulation further provides a list that is “neither limiting nor all-inclusive” of the types of such supporting data applicants may provide, including “current and projected traffic flows; data underlying sales forecasts or marketing goals; interchange data; market share analysis; and/or shipper surveys.” Id.

Here, the Applicants provided a Market Analysis (Exhibit 12), with supporting verified statements of Mr. Sean Pelkey, Dr. David Reishus, and Dr. William Huneke. (Appl.,
Exs. 12 & 22.) However, the Board finds that the Market Analysis and supporting verified statements do not sufficiently describe “the impacts of the proposed transaction—both adverse and beneficial—on inter-and intramodal competition,” nor do they meet the other specific requirements for a Market Analysis, including the requirement for supporting data.16 Because the Market Analysis is incomplete, the Application will be rejected. Although Applicants are given leeway on the type of evidence to present in support of their Market Analysis in “significant” transactions, 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(a) and (c), the Market Analysis provided by Applicants here does not contain information sufficient for the Board to assess the impacts of the proposed transaction. Moreover, the Market Analysis contains far less information and analysis than what was provided in Canadian Pacific Railway—Control—Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad (CP-DM&E), Docket No. FD 35081, the only other “significant” transaction that has been reviewed by the Board. While this decision refers to the CP-DM&E Market Analysis as a point of comparison to help explain why the Applicants’ Market Analysis in this proceeding is deficient, the Board is not suggesting that the market analysis in CP-DM&E is the only sufficient way to present the analysis.

Relevant Markets. Section 1180.7(a) requires that merger applicants “identify and address relevant markets and issues” as part of the Market Analysis. 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(a). Here, the Applicants’ “Description of the Relevant Markets” section merely provides a general geographic overview of the current PAR System and PAS lines and where they connect with CSXT and other carriers. (Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 2-4.) While Applicants provide some data on the amount of traffic moved by the PAR System and PAS broken out by commodity, (id. at 4-5), there is nothing further regarding how this traffic relates to the broader transportation market for these commodities in the New England region. For example, the Market Analysis states that paper products accounted for 33% of PAR Systems’ 50,000 carloads in 2019, (id.), but it does not provide any data on the volumes of paper products moved by CSXT or how the combined volumes of the consolidated company would fit within the broader transportation market for paper products in the New England region. Additionally, Applicants provide only limited information on commodity volumes for PAS. (Compare Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 4-5, with Prefiling Notice, V.S. Williams 9-11 & V.S. Foot 3-7, Oct. 5, 2007, CP- DM&E, FD 35081 (using Waybill data to create lists of commodities carried by applicants based on volume, comparing lists to identify commodities where there is overlap, and addressing why competition for those commodities would not be impacted).)

Marketing Plan and Existing/Potential Competitive Alternatives. The Market Analysis also “should reflect the consolidated company’s marketing plan and existing and potential competitive alternatives (inter- as well as intramodal).” 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(a). As the regulation explains, Applicants may present evidence on “city pairs, interregional movements, movements through a point, or other factors; a particular commodity, group of commodities, or other commodity factor that would be significantly affected by the transaction; or other effects of the transaction (such as on a particular type of service offered).” Id.

a. Marketing Plan.
Applicants present no evidence for any of the listed items regarding the consolidated company’s marketing plan. In fact, the only discussion of a marketing plan occurs in Mr. Pelkey’s verified statement, in which he asserts that shippers of pulp and paper products and chemical and energy-related imports “will now have greater opportunities” as a result of the single-line service efficiencies that would result from the Merger Transaction. However, the verified statement provides no examples or data to support this assertion. (Appl., Ex. 12, V.S. Pelkey 8.) Mr. Pelkey also mentions that the PAR System connects to four ports, including the port of Saint John (through a haulage arrangement with the Eastern Maine Railway and New Brunswick Southern Railway), and claims that shippers located on the consolidated company will thus have greater access to the inbound and outbound traffic using these ports. (Id. at 8-9.) But no additional detail is provided, such as the impact that improved service to these ports could have on traffic patterns or volumes.

b. Existing/Potential Competitive Alternatives.
Applicants’ Market Analysis also provides limited evidence on the “existing and potential competitive alternatives.” Applicants claim that because this is predominantly an end-to-end merger, “there are very few areas where there is even a potential for a reduction in direct competition between CSXT and PAR System.” (Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 6.) The Market Analysis claims that there are only four potential shippers served by both CSXT and PAR System— three located in Everett, Mass., and one in Boston. (Id.) However, Applicants do not disclose the methodology used to determine that these are the only such shippers. See 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(a) (“Applicants . . . must demonstrate both the relevance of the markets and issues analyzed and the validity of their methodology.”) In fact, Applicants appear to identify only active 2-to-1 shippers, rather than 2-to-1 stations. Importantly, a station can have many shippers beyond those who are actively using rail service. (Compare Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Reishus 20-21, with Prefiling Notice, V.S. Williams 6-8, 11-19, Oct. 5, 2007, CP-DM&E, FD 35081 (identifying all stations served by both merging parties using the Official Railway Station List and then using Waybill data to assess the competitive impact at each individual station).) In any event, Applicants provide little, if any, specific information on the 2-to-1 shippers they do identify. Applicants state that there will be no competitive harm to dual-served shippers because “CSXT has committed to provide the option of switching service to connect these shippers to PAS which then connects to the rest of the U.S. rail network.” (Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 6.) To allow the Board to make a determination about the adequacy of Applicants’ proposed means of addressing the potential for competitive harm, more information is needed regarding these shippers’ current service and how Applicants determined that competition would not be affected at other, undisclosed 2-to-1 stations.

In addition, as a result of the Merger and Related Transactions, both carriers operating on the Knowledge Corridor between East Northfield, Mass. and White River Junction, Vt.—B&E (operating on behalf of PAS) and New England Central Railroad (NECR)17—would be under the control of GWI. The Market Analysis and verified statements indicate that there are two shippers that are currently served by both carriers. (Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 10.) However, Applicants do not explain how they identified that these are the only two affected shippers, nor identify the shippers, what commodities they ship, or the amount of traffic they ship.18 Applicants’ failure to include this information is noteworthy, given that the Board specifically identified the potential impact on these 2-to-1 shippers as an example of why it classified this transaction as “significant,” Decision No. 1, slip op. at 10 (noting that the “significant” process “would provide the Board with the additional information and time needed to develop a more comprehensive record so that the Board may analyze the competitive concerns identified here.”). Yet the verified statements include only slightly more explanation than was provided in the original versions submitted with the “minor” transaction application, and the Market Analysis merely summarizes information found in other parts of the Application.

Impacts of the Merger on Inter- and Intramodal Competition. The Market Analysis must include a description of the impacts of the proposed transaction—“both adverse and beneficial”— on inter- and intramodal competition. 49 C.F.R § 1180.7(a); see also 49 C.F.R. § 1180.8(b) (stating that the Operating Plan “should make clear the gains in service, operating efficiencies, and other benefits anticipated from the merger”). However, the Market Analysis contains little information on the impact the Merger Transaction would have on other carriers, including whether the transactions would impact traffic flows or the amount of traffic that is interchanged with these carriers.19 For example, it appears the Merger Transaction would provide CSXT with a competitive routing alternative to Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) to and from the Port of Saint John.20 Applicants, however, fail to address what impact the Merger Transaction would have on traffic patterns to and from the port, other than an assertion that improved service “will provide new opportunities for rail shippers to access overseas markets.” (Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Pelkey 8-9.) Even if Applicants believe that there would be no impact on traffic flows, they fail to provide any evidence to support this assertion. (Compare Appl., Ex. 12, Ex. 22, V.S. Pelkey 8-9, with Prefiling Notice, V.S. Williams 19-28, Oct. 5, 2007, CP-DM&E, FD 35081 (assessing the competitive impact of the proposed transaction on all 14 connecting short line carriers, including their ability to interchange traffic with non-applicant carriers and the potential for diverting traffic).)

As for benefits of the proposed Merger Transaction, Applicants’ witness Mr. Pelkey asserts that competition will be enhanced through conversion of joint-line traffic to single-line service. (See Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Pelkey 4 (“Single-line service will reduce switching and interchange, will eliminate the need to coordinate a hand-off between separate rail carriers, will result in a savings in transit times, and will reduce the chance of unexpected problems in the physical interchange of traffic between two independent carriers.”).) However, Applicants state that they are “not able to quantify the benefits in terms of cost savings or increases in net revenue at this time.” (Appl. 19.) The Board finds this explanation insufficient. Although benefits cannot be calculated with absolute precision at this time, Applicants do not even provide basic information, such as how much traffic would be converted to single-line service, a figure that is readily available through examination of Applicants’ own traffic data. Applicants also state that the Merger Transaction will provide “increased opportunities to convert traffic from truck to rail and remove that traffic from congested highways.” (Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Pelkey 2.) However, no supporting data on the anticipated amount or benefits of truck-to-rail conversions is provided. Although the Board’s regulations give Applicants leeway on how to present their Market Analysis, “applicants shall submit impact analyses . . . describing the impacts of the proposed transaction—both adverse and beneficial —on inter-and intramodal competition,” 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(a), and “must provide supporting data,” 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(c). For the reasons given above, Applicants have not met those requirements here.

Applicants also state that “CSXT expects that rail traffic will increase organically over time as CSXT integrates the existing CSXT and PAR System networks, implements its operating model, and makes capital improvements, but CSXT does not expect significant traffic increases to occur in the next few years.” (Appl. 19.) Again, Applicants do not explain what data (e.g., shipper surveys, forecast modeling) they used to arrive at such a conclusion. Such a conclusion also seems to contradict other statements in the Application. As noted, Mr. Pelkey’s verified statement asserts that certain shippers will have expanded marketing opportunities. (Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Pelkey 8-9.) If so, one would expect some growth in traffic volume. Pelkey also states that “[f]rom 2017 to 2019, the PAR System significantly increased growth in carloads and revenues and managed to attract new customers and expand existing business.” (Appl. Ex. 22, V.S. Pelkey 7.) Although the pandemic caused traffic volumes for most rail carriers to decrease in 2020, Applicants provide no evidence that growth would not resume this upward trend from 2021 onward. Even if Applicants reason there will be no traffic growth, they have not explained how they arrived at this conclusion.

Applicants also include a verified statement from Dr. Huneke that states that the two settlement agreements reached between CSXT, NSR, and GWI “will ultimately produce a stronger rail network that enhances competition among railroads and with other transportation modes.” (Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Huneke 3.) Dr. Huneke specifically notes aspects of the Merger and Related Transactions that he asserts will preserve, if not enhance, competition, including: the fact that B&E will be required to set rates that are competitively neutral; that NSR will be able to double-stack intermodal trains by avoiding the Hoosac Tunnel; and that the volume cap on the number cars that can move via trackage rights through Ayer will be lifted. (Id. Ex. 22, V.S. Huneke 4-6.) While it appears that these actions on their face may be beneficial, little to no evidence is provided to support these claims. For example, by lifting the volume cap on the Ayer trackage rights, the Applicants presumably anticipate that more intermodal traffic will flow through Ayer. But no evidence is provided on how this will affect traffic patterns or, more broadly, the impact this could have on the transportation market for intermodal service in the region. (Compare Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 14, with Appl., Suppl. V.S. Williams 4-19, Dec. 5, 2007, CP-DM&E, FD 35081 (using Waybill data and a “50/10” volume screen to identify 42 routes where competition could be impacted and then individually analyzing each route to determine if traffic on these routes would still have competitive options).) Additionally, while there may be operating efficiencies by diverting NSR’s intermodal and automotive trains and avoiding the Hoosac Tunnel, Applicants fail to address the financial and other impact such a loss of traffic would have on PAS.21

Other important information needed to assess the impact on inter- and intramodal competition is not provided in the Application. In the Market Analysis, Applicants state that B&E, as operator of PAS, will commit to providing VTR with service that is the same as or better than that provided today. (Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 11; see also Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Pelkey 16.) They also state that B&E will not share with any other GWI-controlled rail carriers any information regarding rate divisions from connecting railroads that B&E becomes aware of as a result of operating PAS. (Appl., Ex. 12, Market Analysis 11.) However, the specific terms of such commitments are not provided. Without additional details, the Board cannot assess whether these commitments would sufficiently preserve competition as the Applicants claim.

Supporting Data. Although 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(c) provides that applicants in a “significant” transaction are given leeway to develop the “best evidence” on the impact of the transaction, it also states that “parties must provide supporting data.” See also id. (“As a general guideline, applicants shall provide supporting data . . . .”) The regulation further suggests a list of such data that applicants may choose to include: “current and projected traffic flows; data underlying sales forecasts or marketing goals; interchange data; market share analysis; and/or shipper surveys.” 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(c). Applicants are not required to present all this supporting data, but here they have presented almost none and have not submitted alternative information that would otherwise satisfy the informational requirements concerning the impact of the transaction. As noted, there is little evidence on current or projected traffic flows. The only evidence of current traffic flows appears to be in Applicants’ density charts, which shows the projected gross tons per segment, and the only evidence of projected traffic flows concerns the rerouting of NSR traffic between Rotterdam Junction and Ayer. But Applicants do not support their assertion that there would otherwise be no change in traffic flows or explain how they reached such a conclusion. In addition, Applicants provide no sales forecasts or marketing goals (much less data underlying forecasts or goals) or market share analysis. While Applicants do provide some interchange data, specifically, a table that shows the number of cars interchanged at each gateway, (see Appl., Ex. 22, V.S. Reishus 11-12), they present no evidence on how these figures would change post-transaction. Applicants also do not provide evidence of shipper surveys or other relevant analysis, though they include letters of support from some shippers. The lack of this particular supporting data may not have been deficient had Applicants provided other forms of supporting data. But Applicants have not done so.

Conclusion. Given the numerous deficiencies described above, the Board cannot properly analyze the competitive effects of the proposed Merger and Related Transactions, including those discussed in Decision No. 1. The Board therefore finds the Application is incomplete and must be rejected. See 49 U.S.C. § 11325(a) (“if the application is incomplete, the Board shall reject it by the end of [the 30-day] period.”). The regulations provide merger applicants with leeway on the types of evidence to present in the Market Analysis, but here the Market Analysis is too vague and the supporting evidence too scant to tell the Board, or interested parties, much about the impacts of the proposed Merger and Related Transactions, which could reshape rail transportation throughout New England. In the interest of fairness and transparency to the public, it is important that the Board be able to consider the full range of information required in its regulations for “significant” transaction applications. The Board’s decision to reject the Application should not be read as an indication of how the Board might ultimately assess and weigh the benefits and any impacts on competition after development of a more complete record, should Applicants decide to submit a revised application.

To ensure that any revised application contains all the necessary information, the Board will provide the Applicants with additional guidance. Although applicants have leeway on what evidence to present, Applicants are advised to:
• Provide additional detail on the impacts the transactions would have on the rail transportation market in New England, particularly for customers on the PAR System and PAS. Given that the rail carriers that are parties to the Merger and Related Transactions—CSXT, PAR/PAS, NSR, and GWI’s subsidiaries—make up a significant portion of the New England rail market, Applicants are advised to estimate the size of the New England rail market and changes in concentration likely to result from the transaction.
• Provide more detailed information on how the transactions would affect the major commodity groups on the PAR System and PAS.
• Provide additional explanation on what the state of inter- and intramodal competition would be following the transactions, including carriers that would compete with the consolidated company’s expanded offering.
• Employ and explain a methodology for identifying 2-to-1 shippers and stations and, at a minimum, list all of the freight stations (by Standard Point Location Code) that are served by both CSXT and PAR Systems or PAS, or by PAS and NECR, and identify the commodities and volumes shipped.
• Quantify the amount of traffic that would benefit from the single-line service and discuss the impact such service would have on particular markets and commodities.

Additional materials that may be helpful include: density tables (or maps) that include segment miles;22 regional maps of the parts of CSXT’s system that are adjacent to the lines being acquired; underlying workpapers relied on in the verified statements; and copies of the most recent versions of any agreements (including amendments and supplements) that are referenced in the Merger Transaction agreements, such as the “LLC Agreement” or the “JV Transaction Agreements” that are referred to in the NSR Settlement Agreement.23

Additional Clarifications. The Board has also identified what appear to be minor discrepancies, errors, or ambiguities in the Application and Related Transactions filings. The Board has separately identified these because they, by themselves, would not have been grounds for rejecting the Application but nonetheless should be addressed upon refiling of any revised application.

First, in the Corporate Chart of Systems included with the Application, Vermont & Maine, which is a subsidiary of B&M, is not shown. (Appl., Ex. 11.) In addition, CSX’s Corporate Chart lists CSX as a partial owner of DOCP Holdings, Inc., which controls several carriers, and CRR Holdings LLC, which includes CSX’s interests in Consolidated Rail Corporation and Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company. (Id. Ex. 11.) However, these interests are not listed under CSX’s intra-corporate or financial relationships. (Appl. 37-39.) CSX also mentions its 35% interest in P&L Transportation Inc. and its railroad subsidiaries and lists these interests in its Corporate Chart, (Appl. 39; id. Ex. 11), but does not list the Midway Southern Railway under its intra-corporate or financial relationships. (Appl. 37-39.) Accordingly, Applicants should correct or clarify these discrepancies in a revised application.

Second, the Application does not address potential changes at PAS’s East Deerfield yard. According to Applicants’ labor impact statement, the loss of jobs resulting from B&E taking over operations from Springfield Terminal will primarily occur at East Deerfield. (Appl., Ex. 1.) The loss of jobs indicates that CSXT may have plans to make changes to the yard, consistent with similar actions it has taken as part of its implementation of Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR). See Letter from James M. Foot, President & Chief Executive Officer, CSXT, to STB 1 (Jan. 3, 2018) (noting that one aspect of PSR involves “the conversion of certain hump yards to flat switching and strategic adjustments to other facilities.”) Accordingly, a future application should address if there are intentions to modify operations at this (or any other) yard.

Third, the Board has identified some traffic that Applicants may have failed to include in their Operations Service Map, (Appl., Ex. 1.), or the list of PAS road trains provided in their Operating Plan, (Appl., Ex. 1 & Ex. 13, Operating Plan 5-7). Specifically, the Board is aware that Granite Shore Power’s Merrimack Station, located at Bow, N.H., has two coal-fired steam units, which are served by Boston & Maine (a PAR Railroad), yet this train service is not included among the list of PAS or PAR trains.24 In addition, the traffic volume for these shipments may be missing from Applicants’ density charts. Applicants should include information about any “as needed” revenue trains (coal or otherwise) in a revised application.

Fourth, in its notice, SMS states that “SMS is discontinuing its common carrier local service and common carrier overhead trackage rights over the Line. However, SMS will continue to utilize overhead operating rights over the Line for the sole purpose of interchanging with NSR.” (SMS Notice 3 n.4, AB 1312X.) As SMS would be discontinuing service over the line—including its overhead trackage rights—it is unclear what traffic there would be for it to continue interchanging with NSR. Accordingly, SMS should clarify this statement in a supplemental filing.

Lastly, according to its petition, B&E is the same entity as Pittsburg & Shawmut Railroad, LLC (P&S), an existing Class III carrier. According to B&E, the business name Berkshire & Eastern Railroad would be used only for P&S’s operations of PAS lines. However, the system map included with the petition is for the Buffalo & Pittsburgh Railroad, Inc. (BPRR).
(B&E Amended Pet., Ex. B, FD 36475 (Sub-No. 5).) The Board has previously stated that P&S is a wholly owned subsidiary of BPRR that was formed to acquire from BPRR the physical rail line assets of the former Pittsburg & Shawmut Railroad, Inc. See Pittsburg & Shawmut R.R.— Acquis. Exemption—Buffalo & Pittsburgh R.R., FD 34449 (STB served Jan. 22, 2004). That notice further states that “BPRR will retain the operating authority over the lines and P&S will have a residual common carrier obligation.” (Id. at 2.) This statement, along with the BPRR map, suggests that P&S is not an active rail carrier.25 Accordingly, B&E should clarify its relationship with P&S and BPRR and which of these entities will be providing rail service as PAS’s operating carrier.

Mr. Maine Central, I think it is just time, albeit with the lawyers taximeters ticking, needed to resolve this matter, but I sure think whoever Chessie retained, ought to have their license yanked.

I further hold that any concerns expressed here that Timmy is a Trumpist weighed in this Decision are unfounded. After all, who appointed four of the five Board members (the Chairman, previously a Trump member, was confirmed with Joe @ 1600)?

In a letter filed with STB Friday 5/28/21, CSX states it expects to re-submit application to acquire Pan Am enhanced with market data, etc, as required by STB by July 1, 2021.

In the letter, CSX also reminds the STB that there are benefits galore to many constituencies and thus the proposed acquisition has garnered much enthusiasm in the region:

There is strong public support throughout New England for the Proposed Transaction, as evidenced by the 78 support letters filed by state and federal legislators, local officials and customers alike. Shippers and local communities recognize that the Proposed Transaction will create new efficiencies and market opportunities for rail customers as CSX integrates the PAR System into CSXT’s national rail network, bringing CSXT’s customer-centric operations, robust safety culture and premier operating model to shippers and industries served by the PAR System...

...With the resources of a Class I railroad, CSXT will invest in safety and infrastructure along the PAR System, upgrading main line and yard trackage in accordance with CSXT standards. For example, CSXT will upgrade much of the PAR System’s main line track from 10-mph to 25-mph standards, and CSXT will further harden the infrastructure along the Wachusett Reservoir in Massachusetts, which will be upgraded to FRA Class 3 standards. New England customers, communities and passenger operations stand to benefit tremendously from the fluidity resulting from these infrastructure upgrades along with CSX’s service and reliability. The end-to-end CSXT-PAR combination will connect the New England rail network into the I-95 corridor, creating single line access, enabling improved competition with trucks for the conversion of more freight to rail.

https://dcms-external.s3.amazonaws.com/ ... 302427.pdf

Looks like those occasional derailments in Lawrence yard are going to come to a grinding halt.

I get the STB is just doing their job requesting more information but the frustrating part is that anyone who has been following or in this industry for any meaningful time period is asking the same question, "how could someone not want this outfit gone yesterday?"

johnpbarlow wrote: ↑Sat May 29, 2021 5:55 am In a letter filed with STB Friday 5/28/21, CSX states it expects to re-submit application to acquire Pan Am enhanced with market data, etc, as required by STB by July 1, 2021.

Those lawyers better have their meters "high sticked".

The funny part of it all is really it’s VRS’ fault, otherwise this would probably have gone by as a minor transaction as intended (who knows maybe not).