Over at another site, far more into advocacy than are we around here, I noted the following posting:
What I learned is that ATSF was quite concerned about was the 1919 CUSCO Agreement regarding access by tenants, i.e. Alton, could prove costly.
That Agreement required a tenant to pay their allocated by wheelage cost of their operations. It also required a tenant to pay their allocated cost of the Debt Service but did not allow them to participate in the ancillary income. This income could be significant with the Ground Lease for 10, 120, 222, and 306 S. Riverside Plaza. Even though Section 4.4 of the May 1, 1971 Agreement between Amtrak and the Roads called for payment of the entire cost of accessing Jointly Owned Terminals, ATSF was concerned that Amtrak would consider such to be Unconscionable and, in the Amtrak way, "see 'em in the Courthouse".
Somebody placed their bets and said to sign up; Amtrak did honor Section 4.4 but one of Amtrak's first priorities was to "get out of those barns" resulting in quick exits from Cincinatti, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Richmond - mostly to unattractive Amshacks. How LAUPT escaped such an exit is unknown to me.
There was also an operational concern as well; the shoes needed to activate the then-existing ATS would not clear into CUS. OLne alternative was to continue operating into Dearborn, but then the 4.4 concerns noted would also be in play. What was decided was to add/remove these shoes at Ft. Madison (Shopton) and restrict the trains to 79mph across Illinois.
Turning now to both the D&RGW and SRY, there was a measuring period comprising 1969 which would determine the cost for each road to join up. In both cases, self-help enabled these roads to significantly reduce their passenger train losses between the measuring period and A-Day Eve. Therefore, their "bang for the buck" would be reduced.
In the case of the D&RGW, the CZ was Daily during the measuring period; tri Weekly on A-Day Eve. The SRY had reduced or eliminated numerous trains, including The Crescent (Amtrak of course, resurrected the name for what was The Southerner).
So in short, I don't think "Corporate Pride", as the advocacy community likes to think, was that much of a factor; rather it was "dollars and cents".
Finally, there was one major road that was in the "almost didn't" but for a different reason: the SCL was, by some "cookie jar" measurement, making $$$ on their Silver and Champion trains. I learned that "the lights burned late at 500 Water St" including their CEO participating in the evaluations. However, there the concern was that Amtrak could break the connection at Richmond (RF&P was still an independent road back then) and "that would be the ballgame". So of course, they too signed up.
I've heard numerous of times that the Santa Fe considered to run the Super Chief/El Capitan and the Grand Canyon well after 1971. However, I really haven't found anything that wasn't speculative about the Santa Fe not joining Amtrak. Has anyone found anything that seems this belief is legitimate? If so why? My understanding is the Rio Grande did so due to fear of congestion on the Moffett Route, did the Santa Fe go to this philosophy or was it more like the Southern's use of prestige?Allow me from my perspective that "I was there" on A-Day holding a lowly non-Agreement position with a Class I, to offer my views on such.
What I learned is that ATSF was quite concerned about was the 1919 CUSCO Agreement regarding access by tenants, i.e. Alton, could prove costly.
That Agreement required a tenant to pay their allocated by wheelage cost of their operations. It also required a tenant to pay their allocated cost of the Debt Service but did not allow them to participate in the ancillary income. This income could be significant with the Ground Lease for 10, 120, 222, and 306 S. Riverside Plaza. Even though Section 4.4 of the May 1, 1971 Agreement between Amtrak and the Roads called for payment of the entire cost of accessing Jointly Owned Terminals, ATSF was concerned that Amtrak would consider such to be Unconscionable and, in the Amtrak way, "see 'em in the Courthouse".
Somebody placed their bets and said to sign up; Amtrak did honor Section 4.4 but one of Amtrak's first priorities was to "get out of those barns" resulting in quick exits from Cincinatti, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Richmond - mostly to unattractive Amshacks. How LAUPT escaped such an exit is unknown to me.
There was also an operational concern as well; the shoes needed to activate the then-existing ATS would not clear into CUS. OLne alternative was to continue operating into Dearborn, but then the 4.4 concerns noted would also be in play. What was decided was to add/remove these shoes at Ft. Madison (Shopton) and restrict the trains to 79mph across Illinois.
Turning now to both the D&RGW and SRY, there was a measuring period comprising 1969 which would determine the cost for each road to join up. In both cases, self-help enabled these roads to significantly reduce their passenger train losses between the measuring period and A-Day Eve. Therefore, their "bang for the buck" would be reduced.
In the case of the D&RGW, the CZ was Daily during the measuring period; tri Weekly on A-Day Eve. The SRY had reduced or eliminated numerous trains, including The Crescent (Amtrak of course, resurrected the name for what was The Southerner).
So in short, I don't think "Corporate Pride", as the advocacy community likes to think, was that much of a factor; rather it was "dollars and cents".
Finally, there was one major road that was in the "almost didn't" but for a different reason: the SCL was, by some "cookie jar" measurement, making $$$ on their Silver and Champion trains. I learned that "the lights burned late at 500 Water St" including their CEO participating in the evaluations. However, there the concern was that Amtrak could break the connection at Richmond (RF&P was still an independent road back then) and "that would be the ballgame". So of course, they too signed up.
