1986 VIA Crash Hinton, Alberta

kmillard wrote:I believe that now, the Via train would probaly be stopped once a freight blew a signal and came off the siding back onto the main line.

There is nothing in place on Canada's railways that could automatically stop a train if a signal was blown. Even today, the only line of defense in a case such as this is the alertness of the onboard crews.

Ken V wrote:

kmillard wrote:I believe that now, the Via train would probaly be stopped once a freight blew a signal and came off the siding back onto the main line.

There is nothing in place on Canada's railways that could automatically stop a train if a signal was blown. Even today, the only line of defense in a case such as this is the alertness of the onboard crews.

True, and trains passing stop signals is still happening in Canada and the US, like last years crash in southern California. But, there are better alertness switches today on locomotives that can't be fooled by placing a lunch box atop the switch.

I believe that now, the Via train would probaly be stopped once a freight blew a signal and came off the siding back onto the main line.

There is nothing in place on Canada's railways that could automatically stop a train if a signal was blown. Even today, the only line of defense in a case such as this is the alertness of the onboard crews.

Such a system would be beneficial in many ways, but I don't think it could have made much difference in the Hinton collision - at least not with regard to the stop signal that Train 413 passed. The trains were visible from each other 19 seconds before impact. Train 413 ran the switch 18 seconds before impact, at which point the signal for Train 4 changed from red/green/red (limited clear, 45 mph) to stop. By then, the trains were so close (and moving at a combined 110 mph) that no brake application on either train could have made a significant difference.

But, there are better alertness switches today on locomotives that can't be fooled by placing a lunch box atop the switch.

That's exactly what the Hinton collision report emphasized, and in fact it's probably a major reason for the move away from the "deadman's pedal".

trainiac wrote:signal for Train 4 changed from red/green/red (limited clear, 45 mph) to stop

So, that means the switch was lined for the Super Continental to take the "siding"* while the CN freight held the main.

* it's actually not a siding at Dalehurst but the start/end of an 11.2 mile section of double track

So, that means the switch was lined for the Super Continental to take the "siding"* while the CN freight held the main.

Correct - it was an 11-mile section of double track and the diverging routes were different at each end, but the switch was set for the diverging route for Train 4 at the west end of the double-track section, where the collision occurred. It was something like this:

trainiac wrote:Train 413 ran the switch 18 seconds before impact, at which point the signal for Train 4 changed from red/green/red (limited clear, 45 mph) to stop.

Or, as that signal aspect is known today in Canada: "Limited to Clear"

Edited to eliminate an erroneous statement regarding positive train control

Silverliner II wrote:

trainiac wrote:Train 413 ran the switch 18 seconds before impact, at which point the signal for Train 4 changed from red/green/red (limited clear, 45 mph) to stop.

Or, as that signal aspect is known today in Canada: "Limited to Clear"

With only 18 seconds involved from 413 violating the Stop Signal till impact with VIA #4....no cab signal or positive train control system in the world would have prevented that collision. Not at the speeds both trains were going....

I disagree, PTC should have started slowing the freight train down (speed controls) much sooner at earlier signals before PTC would have enforced a stop at the last signal.

Although a crash may have still occurred, the severity of the crash would be greatly diminished at a far lower speed.

Mandatory RSC in Canada was a direct result of this accident. I also don't think any brake application on the part of the Super would have made any difference, given the time frame and speed at which things took place..even the shock the crew would have had when seeing the freight coming at them would have effected that.

.missthealcos. wrote:Mandatory RSC in Canada was a direct result of this accident. I also don't think any brake application on the part of the Super would have made any difference, given the time frame and speed at which things took place..even the shock the crew would have had when seeing the freight coming at them would have effected that.

My point is, the freight train would not have been going 50 mph, but more likely 35 mph if not slower if at an earlier signal, the train had been slowed by PTC. Therefore, at the stop signal when PTC would have applied the brakes, the freight train would have stopped much sooner.

In the accident that actually happen, the freight train was going 50 mph and never slowed.

My point is, the freight train would not have been going 50 mph, but more likely 35 mph if not slower if at an earlier signal, the train had been slowed by PTC. Therefore, at the stop signal when PTC would have applied the brakes, the freight train would have stopped much sooner.

In the accident that actually happen, the freight train was going 50 mph and never slowed.

It's quite possible that PTC could have averted the collision entirely, or at least rendered it less severe. Had Train 413 been moving at 35 mph instead of 60 mph in the double-tracked section, it may have reached the single track after VIA 4 had already passed - even if Train 413 had not been stopped by that point.

However, keep in mind that this was 1986. PTC as we presently know it did not exist - I don't think the term "Positive Train Control" had even been coined until a 1994 FRA report.

trainiac wrote:

My point is, the freight train would not have been going 50 mph, but more likely 35 mph if not slower if at an earlier signal, the train had been slowed by PTC. Therefore, at the stop signal when PTC would have applied the brakes, the freight train would have stopped much sooner.

In the accident that actually happen, the freight train was going 50 mph and never slowed.

It's quite possible that PTC could have averted the collision entirely, or at least rendered it less severe. Had Train 413 been moving at 35 mph instead of 60 mph in the double-tracked section, it may have reached the single track after VIA 4 had already passed - even if Train 413 had not been stopped by that point.

However, keep in mind that this was 1986. PTC as we presently know it did not exist - I don't think the term "Positive Train Control" had even been coined until a 1994 FRA report.

It wasn't till after I got to work and was having an argument with the cab signals on my locomotive that I realized that point about PTC, and that makes that portion of my post erroneous and moot (went back to erase that portion). But it does bring up the point that cab signals....even cab signals without speed control protection in this case...may have prevented the accident.

In the area I work, we have lines where there is cab signal territory with an overlaid speed enforcement. In the case of a code change causing the cabs to drop to a more restrictive signal, the engineer not only has to acknowledge the change, but has to reduce the train speed within a certain time dictated by the aspect, or get a penalty brake application that stops the train.

I also work over some cab signal territory without speed enforcement. In a case like that, in theory, an engineer can acknowledge a cab signal change and keep going at full speed. However, even with that system, if a code change is not acknowledged, a penalty brake application will occur.

In the case of Train 413, if even cab signals with no speed enforcement was in place, and assuming the head-end crew was already incapacitated when passing the distant signal, the unacknowledged cab signal change would have initiated a penalty brake application and stopped the train.

So many "what-ifs" that nobody can do a thing about now.....

Silverliner II wrote:So many "what-ifs" that nobody can do a thing about now.....

True, we can't do anything about what happen in the past. The past is history. But, these new signal technologies that are available today can and should be used to prevent similar accidents from happening in the future, and the costs aren't that high, they are affordable..

Will the new technoloogies be fool-proof? I doubt it. But I think we all agree that today's signal technology could have prevented a similar accident.