Bureau of Safety conclusion.
During the investigation of the accident the rear home and distant signals were tested and carefully examined. They were found to be in good condition and working freely. The track circuits were shunted and the signals assumed the stop position properly. The screw release in the tower controlling the circuits on track 1 was tested, and its average time of operation was about 1 minute. The operation of the signals from the tower was noted and the indicators checked with the position of the signal. The mechanical locking between the home signal and the back-up dwarf signal on track 1 was checked and found correct. As the approach locking had taken effect at the time train No. 17 was waiting for the helper, it was necessary to operate time screw release in order to throw the switches to let the helper engine out upon the main track from the middle track, where it was standing. By the circuit arrangement, the home signal could not be restored until time rear home had assumed the caution position.
Nothing was discovered which could in any way have prevented the proper operation of the signals at the time train No. 11 approached South Byron, while the testimony indicates that the signals functioned properly when train No. 17 arrived at that point, and they were found to show the proper indication when members of the train crews of the two trains looked at them immediately after the accident. In view of the evidence developed in connection with the investigation, it is believed that Engineman Friedley of train No. 11 did not see the block-signal indications. Notwithstanding his failure to see thesesignals, had Engineman Friedley taken proper precautions to bring his train under control at the time he himself says he saw the flagman’s lanterns, instead of allowing his train to approach them rapidly without any application of the air brakes being made, this accident would not have occurred. Engineman Friedley’s failure to see the markers of train No. 17 until after he had passed the flagman’s lanterns can not be explained. By careful observations made at night on January 16, with the conditions which existed at the time of the accident duplicated as nearly as possible, it was found to be impossible to look through the “peep hole” or clear-vision window in the front cab window and see the lanterns on the ground without seeing the markers of the train. In fact, Engineman Friedley's failure to apply the brakes until his engine exploded time torpedo arouses a strong suspicion that he had fallen asleep for a brief period, or else his attention was in some manner distracted from observance of the signals. The evidence also indicates that 7 minutes elapsed between the time train No. 17 stopped at South Byron and the time of the collision, train No. 11 being 6 miles distant when train No. 17 stopped. If Flagman Groves is correct in his statement that he saw the headlight of train No. 11 as soon as he started back to flag, it is apparent that he was delayed 2 or 3 minutes in starting. There is also a question as to whether he went back as far as he could have gone in the time at his disposal. At the hearing he stated that he was back 25 passenger-car lengths when train No. 11 passed him, but other witnesses estimate the distance to have been much less, and at a subsequent hearing Flagman Groves modified his original statement to the extent of saying that when train No. 11 stopped after the collision its rear end was only 4 car lengths beyond him. His statement that he lighted a fusee before train No. 11 passed him is disputed, and the weight of evidence is that such was not the case.
This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Friedley of train No. 11 properly to observe and be governed by automatic block signal indications. A contributing cause was the failure of Flagman Groves to go back a sufficient distance properly to protect his train, and to display lighted fusees as required by rule.
