Major derailment @ Spuyten Duyvil

[Dieter]

The Union now has the fodder to make a case to reinstate a second person in the cab of a train. I'm sure a lot of operators at this stage would prefer to work alone but in the interest of "Safety First", as we have seen all too often, anything can happen.

An aircraft with anything from a handful of people to well over 200 passengers has two trained and licensed operators in the cockpit. It seems that trains carrying up to 1000 people should have the same safeguard.

[Amtrak7]

100% service resumes tomorrow. Second track restored.

[ExCon90]

Having two people in the cab is no assurance against collisions. In the MARC collision with the Capitol Limited at Georgetown Jct. the engineer and conductor were both in the control cab of the MARC train when it ran by the Stop signal and sideswiped the Capitol. (The Capitol was crossing over from the "wrong line" to the normal westbound track to overtake a standing westbound coal train; a politician who appeared on the scene later demanded "What was that freight train doing there???" -- sigh...) Anyway, my question is about opinions I have heard expressed that since the fireman is outranked by the engineer, and may not even be qualified yet as an engineer, and is often younger, he may feel some reluctance to question something the engineer does or doesn't do. Since we have some engineers on here, active and retired, with long experience, what would you say is the likelihood that a fireman, noticing that the engineer doesn't seem to be reducing speed in accordance with a signal indication or upcoming speed restriction, would decide not to risk having his head bitten off and just shut up and keep his head down?

[25Hz]

Having two people in the cab is no assurance against collisions. In the MARC collision with the Capitol Limited at Georgetown Jct. the engineer and conductor were both in the control cab of the MARC train when it ran by the Stop signal and sideswiped the Capitol. (The Capitol was crossing over from the "wrong line" to the normal westbound track to overtake a standing westbound coal train; a politician who appeared on the scene later demanded "What was that freight train doing there???" -- sigh...) Anyway, my question is about opinions I have heard expressed that since the fireman is outranked by the engineer, and may not even be qualified yet as an engineer, and is often younger, he may feel some reluctance to question something the engineer does or doesn't do. Since we have some engineers on here, active and retired, with long experience, what would you say is the likelihood that a fireman, noticing that the engineer doesn't seem to be reducing speed in accordance with a signal indication or upcoming speed restriction, would decide not to risk having his head bitten off and just shut up and keep his head down?

In the VIA aldershot incident there were THREE engineers in the cab... Just goes to show you that theory is bunk. Like i said few pages back, hours worked in a week and shift changes during a work week need to be addressed, even if it means hiring on more engineers. Safety first, second, and third.

[R36 Combine Coach]

CT Governor Malloy has issued a letter in response. He notes the State of Connecticut will offer full support in assistance and points the need to focus on "several key aspects" of the relationship between MTA, Metro-North and CT.

[Tommy Meehan]

From the perspective of the railroad employees actually engaged in activities at the scene, I wager that among the last things things they would want is the a senior officer at the scene perceivable as looking over their shoulder, even from a distance...

First, I think the criticism was about Permut not showing up when Cuomo and Prendergast did on Sunday morning when they addressed the public. At that point there were hundreds of first-responders still on the scene and the wreck recovery had not even begun. Once the clean up starts I would think employees would expect senior management may show up and probably not be too concerned about it. You're aware Thomas Prendergast was there? I wouldn't be surprised if Permut did go to the scene at some point over the past few days. The criticism is that he has not stepped up the way you would expect a CEO to do.

As for an announcement conveying Metro-North's concern and regrets carrying a risk of increasing their legal liability, that is a step most companies do routinely when something like this happens. I don't think there's any question that Permut should have done that. Even the statement that was linked by the MTA Chairman saying, "This is a trying time for all of us," seemed to fall far short of the mark. For all of us? All of us didn't have a train jump a curve and kill four people. Only Metro-North did that. I was in business for many years. If there's accident and the company and the officers sincerely regret it and are determined to make sure nothing like it happens again, the guys at the top need to say that.

The only thing I can think is, this year it's just been one thing after another and maybe Permut is just burned out. Maybe the reason he is keeping a low profile is that he's already been told privately he's going to be leaving.

[Tommy Meehan]

100% service resumes tomorrow. Second track restored.

That's good to hear. That's Track 2 back in service? I understand CSX has also gotten the okay to start service. There is supposed to be a monster-sized freight heading south around 8 PM, symboled B750, from C-H.

[scoostraw]

In the VIA aldershot incident there were THREE engineers in the cab... Just goes to show you that theory is bunk.

Right. And we'll never know exactly what happened because they all died.

I agree that a second (or third) crew member can become a distraction. But in this case, distraction might be exactly what was needed.

I can't help but wonder if an alerter (instead of a simple deadman pedal) might have prevented this accident.

[25Hz]

In the VIA aldershot incident there were THREE engineers in the cab... Just goes to show you that theory is bunk.

Right. And we'll never know exactly what happened because they all died.

I agree that a second (or third) crew member can become a distraction. But in this case, distraction might be exactly what was needed.

I can't help but wonder if an alerter (instead of a simple deadman pedal) might have prevented this accident.

A simple free fix here would be to put the CR up in the head end before the speed restriction vs after getting into manhattan.

[scoostraw]

A simple free fix here would be to put the CR up in the head end before the speed restriction vs after getting into manhattan.

Yup that would work.

[justalurker66]

Or maybe seeing a headlight coming "at" you is less of an attention grabber for a train crew member as they experience it all the time (the train in the incident you're talking about, if I'm reading it correctly, should have been, what, six feet off the one side more or less?).

Hopefully an oncoming headlight is a LOT more than six feet off center. 15ft-20ft would put it on another track ... but I agree that it is hard to tell what track a distant light is on in multi-track territory - and by the time it was determined it was the same track as the train one is in it would be too late to stop. (On tangent track the opposing light should drift toward the track the train is on ... but any curve could confuse the perception.)


What would be the cost difference to implement ATC w/speed control now and PTC w/full control later? Is PTC close enough to ATC that the railroads might as well go all the way?

[Denver Dude]

Does anyone know the status of locomotive 225?

[BenH]

hcobin - where is the source of the news article you just posted?

To close this point out, here's a link to the NTSB's press release:

NTSB Relieves Rail Union of Party Status in Metro-North Train Derailment Investigation
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2013/131203b.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Public Affairs
December 3, 2013

[Head-end View]

Re: alerters and 2nd crew-member in cab: First, I've read that among engineers, acknowledging the alerter can become such a reflex action that engineers have been known to do it properly even when in less than a fully alert state. Second, in the infamous case of a CNJ commuter train that went off an open drawbridge over Newark bay circa 1958, there were 2 persons in the cab, so that's no solution either.

But here's a possible solution that I don't think anyone has mentioned. The New York City Subway and PATH systems both use a type of track circuit and signals to enforce speed reductions when approaching locations like this. Known as "station-timers" and "grade timers" they will dump the train if it passes the signal over the specified speed approaching the hazardous location. They put in a lot more of these in the years following the Union Square/Lexington Ave. derailment. I don't know of any commuter railroads that have this set-up, but is there any reason why this couldn't be used? And this system has been around a lot longer than "Positive Train Control".

[RearOfSignal]

But here's a possible solution that I don't think anyone has mentioned. The New York City Subway and PATH systems both use a type of track circuit and signals to enforce speed reductions when approaching locations like this. Known as "station-timers" and "grade timers" they will dump the train if it passes the signal over the specified speed approaching the hazardous location. They put in a lot more of these in the years following the Union Square/Lexington Ave. derailment. I don't know of any commuter railroads that have this set-up, but is there any reason why this couldn't be used? And this system has been around a lot longer than "Positive Train Control".

The problem with a subway vs a railroad in that situation is that not all railroad trains operate at the same speed over the same track. Secondly subway trains typically don't pass platforms, so station timing would be inefficient for express trains on a local track.