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Discussion related to commuter rail and transit operators in California past and present including Los Angeles Metrolink and Metro Subway and Light Rail, San Diego Coaster, Sprinter and MTS Trolley, Altamont Commuter Express (Stockton), Caltrain and MUNI (San Francisco), Sacramento RTD Light Rail, and others...

Moderator: lensovet

 #1500351  by lpetrich
 
They aren't giving up yet. Response at CA HSR site: Governor Newsom pledged to finish the Central-Valley part and get some trains going there.
Importantly, he also reaffirmed our commitment to complete the environmental work statewide, to meet our “bookend” investments in the Bay Area and Los Angeles and to pursue additional federal and private funding for future project expansion.
 #1500365  by Hawaiitiki
 
What a disaster. And the economy in the US is strong right now, proving how disasterously this was executed. Disturbingly, China has likely opened up 3000 to 4000 MILES of true High Speed rail since construction was started in California...in a stagnant Chinese economy. I really thought this would finally break the seal on America's first true "built from scratch" true high speed rail system. (Not diesel trains running on freight rail with myriad grade crossings or Acela trains running on infrastructure built during the administration of Ulysses S. Grant!(not kidding)) Lets hope Texas Central will pull through!

Side note, can the billions of federally committed funding be redirected to the Gateway Tunnel so we can at least have a silver lining here?
 #1500387  by electricron
 
Ridgefielder wrote:Will the state just shift the San Joaquins off the BNSF and onto the new alignment from Merced to Bakersfield?
Interesting question, where we can speculate forever over. It might even deserve its own thread.

Now that they will not be completing the line to either megalopis (is that a word because my spell checker likes it) anytime soon, I do not see CHSR buying new state of the art HSR train sets soon. Will they even hang catenaries over the brand new tracks? Will they hang catenaries over the existing corridors needed to run the trains all the way to San Jose?
If they are not going to do “both”, they are going to need a dual diesel-electrical power trains (like a Stadler FLIRT DMU/EMU setup). If they are not going to do any electrification, they are going to need diesel powered units hopefully capable of 125 mph. If they are going to do “both”, they should buy electric power trains, either with Siemens Sprinters locomotives or with EMU style trains (like an EMU only FLIRT).
There is just too many possibilities out there to speculate with certainly. But a quick way to save money now to finish construction of what has already been started is to cancel catenary installation in the valley. If that’s costing Caltrain a $billion for 50 miles of double track, imagine the $billions that can be saved over 150 miles of double track.
 #1500388  by Arlington
 
megalopolis is the word you're looking for.

I"m hoping that what CAHSR gets is:
-Caltrain Electrification
-The central alignment
-Some kind of electrification connecting them

and a reboot on the order of Massachusett's reboot of its Green Line Extension which fixed all kinds of contracting and cost-inflation ridiculousness (and cut costs from 3billion-and-skyrocketing to $2.3b and locked in). It took the threat of cancellation to get everyone focused on fighting contractor bloat (in a way that never seems to happen on NY MTA projects...)
 #1500390  by eolesen
 
gokeefe wrote:California is committed ... They're going to fund it themselves if they have to ...
That didn't age well....

Maybe they should ask the Japanese to fund it...
 #1500396  by Arlington
 
Worth reading in full: California HSR: Seven Deadly Mistakes
Here are the mistakes (my summary) see the full article
Worst Practice #1: Legally defining project parameters in ways that can never be changed. (using a Ballot Prop)
Worst Practice #2: Using different types of dollars for your cost estimate and your pay-for. (un-inflated vs current $)
Worst Practice #3: Relying on non-existent, hypothetical funding sources for the bulk of your capital costs. (said Feds would pay)
Worst Practice #4: Appropriating funds with a short deadline for greenfield projects and untried technologies.
Worst Practice #5: Committing federal dollars for construction of a project that is clearly not ready for construction.
Worst Practice #6: Committing federal dollars for anything less than an operable segment of a new system. (stranded in CV; not tying at SF or LA)
Worst Practice #7: Allowing the state to spend all the federal dollars first. (no state skin in the game)
I think 6 is the grossest error. Theoretically, they were making it un-cancellable by building an unusable segment first.

Starting with a 125mph diesel system, or growing from Caltrain outward would have been possible in 6 if they hadn't so constrained the project in 1 (minimum required speed)
 #1500409  by The EGE
 
I'll add a #8: complete mismanagement of design (and thus costs). Much like the aforementioned GLX, a large part of CAHSR's budget issues was contractors designing the most expensive system possible - in some cases making it actively worse than a cheaper system - in order to bilk more money from the state and the feds. (Unlike the GLX, where some items like faregates had possibly legitimate tradeoffs that added cost but also potential benefit, CAHSR seemed to have only bad design choices). As an example, many of the stations have been designed to be particularly wide and force vertical circulation to/from all platforms - with cross-platform transfers to local/intercity services explicitly disallowed. The result is super-expensive 240-foot-wide palaces with huge land acquisition and construction costs that are less convenient for passengers than better-designed cheaper stations.
 #1500484  by djlong
 
I just did a little research. Adjusting for foreign currency and km/mi conversions, the most expensive line of France's TGV system cost $35M/mile. Some of their older lines cost one seventh of that. France has mountains and valley and rivers to deal with as well (Google "The Alps").

At $35M/mile, 400 miles of HSR should cost a little over $14B.

WHERE THE HELL DOES THIS $77B NUMBER COME FROM?
 #1500630  by Ridgefielder
 
djlong wrote:I just did a little research. Adjusting for foreign currency and km/mi conversions, the most expensive line of France's TGV system cost $35M/mile. Some of their older lines cost one seventh of that. France has mountains and valley and rivers to deal with as well (Google "The Alps").

At $35M/mile, 400 miles of HSR should cost a little over $14B.

WHERE THE HELL DOES THIS $77B NUMBER COME FROM?
Megan McArdle over at the Washington Post had a good piece about this. Key point:
Read any essay bemoaning the cost of American infrastructure — say Brian Rosenthal’s 2017 behemoth for the New York Times — and don’t just gawk at the inflated numbers; ask yourself why U.S. infrastructure projects use so many consultants, so many union featherbedders and so on.

Answer: They are there to fend off future lawsuits, or to smooth compliance with some other level of government’s regulatory bodies, or to appease some powerful lobby. And because these infrastructure projects involve so many different governments, none of whom has final authority over the project, there are a lot of lobbies that must be appeased.

Other countries have crony capitalism, of course, but the downside of our highly decentralized government, which pushes a lot of power down to smaller, more locally responsive governments, is that almost anyone can get a few cronies together and grab some politician’s ear.
Link to the full column here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions ... 6a2207f06c
 #1500666  by gokeefe
 
Read the piece above carefully ... Anyone blaming American labor unions for making infrastructure more expensive than Europe knows nothing about labor unions in Europe.

The price issues are related to greater distance, lower ridership and perhaps most of all the differences in regulatory requirements for track structures.
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