National Corridors Initiative - Destination Freedom - March 25, 2013
High-Speed Passenger Rail: Considering Where the US Has Come From and Where the World Is Going
"Why has America been slow in adopting fast passenger trains?"
The authors, Anthony Perl and Andrew Goetz, conclude that it's been due to various institutional biases. Intercity railroading was developed by private companies, though often with loans and grants from governments. But in the late 19th and early 20th cy., they made a lot of enemies, which caused a lot of support for regulation and government flat-road building. But the railroads were not nationalized, unlike the railroads in most other countries, and for the most part, they did not participate in the sort of government-financed development that urban-transit systems, flat roads, and airports have had.
But times are changing. The US population is becoming more and more urban, and more and more interested in alternatives to cars.
The authors identify four waves of high-speed-rail development
First Wave: HSR was developed to serve a single corridor of 300-350 miles anchored by two mega cities. Tokyo and Osaka in Japan. However, Japan has since developed a nation-spanning HSR network.
Second Wave: HSR was developed as both a trunk line and interconnected branch lines along conventional tracks, thus multiplying the origins and destinations that could be served. France and Germany, for the most part, though other nations have followed.
Third Wave: HSR was designated as Europe’s preferred continental high-speed transportation option. The European Union has supported international integration, and has funded various international links. European HSR development continues at a slow but steady pace, much like the US Interstate highways.
Fourth Wave: HSR has been adopted as a primary link between many of China’s major cities, covering routes up to 1,000 miles long. The Chinese network is huge, with almost as much trackage as Spain, France, and Japan combined, with more on the way.
The authors then turn to the question of US HSR development. The intercity-railroad companies have gone in the opposite direction from HSR, focusing on heavy freight, leaving only the Northeast Corridor for HSR. The FRA's three-tier approach they think is a bit on the complicated side. That's "emerging", 90 - 110 mph on existing tracks, "regional", 110 - 150 on existing and/or dedicated tracks, and "express", > 150 mph on dedicated tracks -- much like HSR elsewhere.
They then consider what can be transferred to the US of experience elsewhere in the world. It's either more or less relevant, or easier or harder to transfer. Of their classification, anything requiring separate trackage is high in experience relevance, since it will be built from scratch. However, anything using existing trackage is low in experience relevance, because of track-design and ownership and regulatory differences. Their ease-of-transfer classification is more difficult to interpret, however. A few dedicated high-speed lines they rate high, while a massive system and using existing trackage they rate low.
So one concludes that experience from existing systems will transfer poorly to US systems, except for dedicated-track projects like the California HSR system.
High-Speed Passenger Rail: Considering Where the US Has Come From and Where the World Is Going
"Why has America been slow in adopting fast passenger trains?"
The authors, Anthony Perl and Andrew Goetz, conclude that it's been due to various institutional biases. Intercity railroading was developed by private companies, though often with loans and grants from governments. But in the late 19th and early 20th cy., they made a lot of enemies, which caused a lot of support for regulation and government flat-road building. But the railroads were not nationalized, unlike the railroads in most other countries, and for the most part, they did not participate in the sort of government-financed development that urban-transit systems, flat roads, and airports have had.
But times are changing. The US population is becoming more and more urban, and more and more interested in alternatives to cars.
The authors identify four waves of high-speed-rail development
First Wave: HSR was developed to serve a single corridor of 300-350 miles anchored by two mega cities. Tokyo and Osaka in Japan. However, Japan has since developed a nation-spanning HSR network.
Second Wave: HSR was developed as both a trunk line and interconnected branch lines along conventional tracks, thus multiplying the origins and destinations that could be served. France and Germany, for the most part, though other nations have followed.
Third Wave: HSR was designated as Europe’s preferred continental high-speed transportation option. The European Union has supported international integration, and has funded various international links. European HSR development continues at a slow but steady pace, much like the US Interstate highways.
Fourth Wave: HSR has been adopted as a primary link between many of China’s major cities, covering routes up to 1,000 miles long. The Chinese network is huge, with almost as much trackage as Spain, France, and Japan combined, with more on the way.
The authors then turn to the question of US HSR development. The intercity-railroad companies have gone in the opposite direction from HSR, focusing on heavy freight, leaving only the Northeast Corridor for HSR. The FRA's three-tier approach they think is a bit on the complicated side. That's "emerging", 90 - 110 mph on existing tracks, "regional", 110 - 150 on existing and/or dedicated tracks, and "express", > 150 mph on dedicated tracks -- much like HSR elsewhere.
They then consider what can be transferred to the US of experience elsewhere in the world. It's either more or less relevant, or easier or harder to transfer. Of their classification, anything requiring separate trackage is high in experience relevance, since it will be built from scratch. However, anything using existing trackage is low in experience relevance, because of track-design and ownership and regulatory differences. Their ease-of-transfer classification is more difficult to interpret, however. A few dedicated high-speed lines they rate high, while a massive system and using existing trackage they rate low.
So one concludes that experience from existing systems will transfer poorly to US systems, except for dedicated-track projects like the California HSR system.
