Rockford Incident and PTC?

[Gilbert B Norman]

http://www.rrstar.com/news/x931198448/R ... derailment

While obviously no conclusions can be drawn until the NTSB completes their investigation and their report is released next year, it will be interesting to learn if the provision under RSIA '08 calling for installation of Positive Train Control on any line over which HAZMAT is handled, would have avoided or minimized this incident.

Enquiring mind wants to know; but one thing I do know is that PTC would have had no impact whatever at Weyauwega.

[BR&P]

Positive Train Control is designed to keep two trains from running into each other. In both Rockford and Weyauwega, a single train derailed.

Perhaps a flawed analogy, but divided highways and brake lights are designed to prevent vehicle collisions. If a car runs off the road by itself and hits a tree, the aforementioned safety devices have no bearing on the results.

[Gilbert B Norman]

It would appear that Mr. BRP and I are on the same page; here are now two major HAZMAT incidents occurring in the Midwest (and both involving the Canadian National whether in actuality or by succession) and PTC would not do a durned thing to prevent them.

However, I have learned that at Weyauwega, there was confusion as to where the incident actually occurred thus delaying response time. PTC, with its capacity to globally position a train, would have minimized that.

But the fact remains that RSIA '08, which mandated that PTC be installed not only on lines over which passenger trains are operated but also where trains handling HAZMAT are operated as well, was born from when a passenger train went bump with another train resulting in fatalities. Passenger Engineer negligence has clearly been established. Congress in knee jerk fashion passed legislation and with about four months left in office, President Bush signed it. While it is one thing to have a PTC system where passenger trains are operated in any volume (there is always the public trough to pay for that), it is something else to place upon the investor owned Class I rail system the burden of equipping all lines handling HAZMAT to be equipped with PTC, when two incidents can be cited in which no benefit from PTC would arise.

Legislative bodies do have their way of the knee jerk reaction; i wonder what will come up with as a result of Rockford (escape lanes at highway X-ings)?

[BR&P]

The Weyauwega incident resulted in an immediate fire of large proportions. The local fire department had no confusion on where it was. I am not sure about the confusion you speak of - could that have been RR HQ that was confused? It has been many years since then and I have forgotten details of the first response. (I did not arrive in WI until that evening).

I agree that there seems to be a knee-jerk reaction to any serious incident. As long as mechanical things break and humans make mistakes, incidents will happen no matter how many laws, regulations and restrictions are passed. I am not suggesting we should not strive for improvement, but the concept of "common sense" seems to have gone out the window long ago.

[Gilbert B Norman]

Mr. BRP, I consider my source to be informed, however, anyone can be mistaken - myself included.

However, if as you note there was no confusion by first responders where the Weyauwega incident occurred, then there goes the only "shred" that PTC could have minimized in any way the gravity of such.

[BR&P]

It has been over 13 years (March 4, 1996) since the incident so memory does not recall everything. Also, I was involved in claims administration helping displaced residents and subsequently settling compensation so the precise details of the initial few hours were not something I was directly involved with.

As I said, I do not recall issues of confusion in the initial response, but it is possible a) there were some and I did not learn of them or b) I knew at the time but have forgotten. There WAS initial adjustment in the response - the local fire department responded but soon decided against a direct all-out attack on the fire. The limits of the evacuation were expanded as the situation developed. Ultimately somewhere about 2000 people were evacuated, and the fire was not extinguished for roughly two weeks. Still, the overall result was very positive - there were no deaths or serious injuries, the long process of bringing the fire under control prevented a BLEVE, and while obviously it was an event nobody wanted, it COULD have been many, many times worse.

I might add as an off-topic note that the Wisconsin Central people were extremely responsible and professional. At no time was there any attempt to "trim costs" or cut corners in taking care of the people affected by the wreck. Their approach was "what's right?" rather than "what can we get by with?" And on the other side of the coin, the people of Weyauwega were overwhelmingly patient and honest. There were only a couple incidents of attempted fraud, and one of those was a couple who allegedly heard of the wreck on the news, drove from VIRGINIA to Wisconsin, then attempted to collect assistance as "evacuees".

[Gilbert B Norman]

First Mr. BR&P, while I have no knowledge whether you are in the railroad industry, insurance industry, Public Safety, or some other capacity, you apparently have first hand knowledge of Weyauwega. I'll gladly defer to you with regards to the timeliness of the Public Safety response.

Having spent eleven years of my "post-college" working life in the railroad industry, I know all too well of injustices (some of my railroad career was in Labor Relations) that can occur from speculation as to the cause of an incident prior to release of information by the NTSB or a complete investigation "on the property". Accordingly, I will not be party to any speculations that seem to have a way of moving forth on the internet, and I sincerely hope others here will hold same.

However, as one can readily surmise, I am quite skeptical with regards to any benefit the Class I railroad industry will receive from installation of Positive Train Control over lines that handle HAZMAT. The two incidents noted here would not have been mitigated in any manner had PTC been active. If anyone knows of a HAZMAT incident they believe could have been avoided had PTC been active where such occurred , would they please step forth?

While the personal injury and physical damage costs of Rockford, as well as of course in the case with Weyauwega, will be severe (the uninsured portion of Weyauwega claims may have contributed to Wisconsin Central's demise, but that IS speculation on my part), but so will the costs of PTC as mandated by RSIA '08. Who will pay for the latter; all shippers (higher freight rates) or only those shipping HAZMAT. If the latter, which classes (not all of them go boom with equal ferocity)? But on the other hand, shippers will also pay the higher insurance premiums that surely will result.

Finally, a word on Wisconsin Central; I realize some of our younger readers here may not even know of this road. Basically, it was the former SOO line after the MILW (my road) became the SOO. WC was a class act, and some of my MILW colleagues, competent guys AFAIC, went to work for them (I left and opened my own CPA practice).

[BR&P]

I confess ignorance on the specifics of the PTC provisions of the reg. Did not read details on that portion - presumably there are volume or speed thresholds which trigger the requirements? It would seem impractical to apply the same requirements to both a UP main line and a shortline which hauls a couple cars of HAZMAT fertilizer each spring at 10 MPH. Then again, knowing how some of these regulatory things get out of hand nothing surprises me anymore.

Re the post-mortem of Weyauwega. As mentioned there may have been issues at the start which I did not hear about so I'm not saying your source was wrong. Actually I would be interested - merely from a curiosity standpoint - what the issues were. But while nothing is ever perfect, I believe many consider Weyauwega to be in most respects a textbook response. It WAS frustrating to the evacuees not knowing how long it would continue. But in the end, the product from the burning cars was flared off, the fire was put out without further explosion, and injury was avoided.

As an interesting note, roughly a week into the evacuation the National Guard brought in armored vehicles and took some residents to their homes for a very few minutes to rescue pets which had been left behind in the initial evacuation.

[NellieBly]

FRA has just issued rules for the implementation of PTC. It will be required on about 65,000 route miles of railroad (essentially the portion of the Class I network that is now signaled, although the overlap is not exact). PTC will essentially eliminate "human factors" accidents, but I would not expect it to have any impact whatever on accidents resulting from poor track conditions, washouts, and the like. In any case, a fairly exhaustive study of "PTC-preventable accidents" by FRA using 20 years of data demonstrated conclusively that improvements in safety will not pay for the cost of PTC.

That having been said, I have two responses to Mr. Norman's comments about "investor owned" railroads having to bear the costs of PTC. First, in the 1920s the ICC required all Class I railroads to equip one division each with automatic train stop technology. Railroads had to bear the cost. So there is a clear legal precedent. FRA has the legal authority to compel the railroads to install PTC, and there is nothing in law required that the railroads be compensated for any costs incurred.

But there's a second part. I've spent a considerable part of my career looking at the costs and benefits of PTC. Here are my conclusions regarding cost. The 65,000 miles of existing conventional signals on the Class I network are currently being replaced at a rate that indicates they will be completely renewed over about a 20 year period. The cost of this replacement (which will leave the current functionality unchanged) will be about $9 billion (data is taken from railroad R-1 reports to STB).

The cost of PTC is estimated at about $4.5 billion. However, if PTC is installed, significant parts of the existing signal system (all the intermediate signals, for example) will not need to be replaced. They can be removed. Signals and other equipment at interlockings and ends of controlled sidings will have to be renewed, of course. The total cost of PTC plus replacement of those signal system components that will still be required with PTC will be around $7.5 billion ($4.5 billion for PTC, where most of the equipment is on locomotives or in the control center, plus about $3 billion for wayside equipment that will have to remain). Thus the *net* cost to the industry of PTC will be a savings of about $1.5 billion over simply renewing the conventional signal system.

And of course PTC will provide greatly enhanced functionality. In addition to eliminating human factors accidents, the real-time train position data produced by PTC will yield a number of economic benefits to the railroad industry. I previously estimated those benefits to be in the range of $2 billion per year.

But that's...just my opinion, even if I did say it in a report to Congress.

[icgsteve]

Interesting enough I grew up in a house that is overlooking this site, which is kinda scary.

I think that the primary result of this derailment and burn will be increasing pressure to end ethanol. It has from the very beginning been a claim of ethanol critics that this everything would happen, because ethanol can not be piped as gasoline and other fuels are, so this dangerous stuff is either going to move long distances by rail or road. Ethanol never made sense in my opinion, at least not made from a highly valuable crop like corn, and this has been born out. Not only was corn based ethanol a major reason for the run up of all grain prices, but science has also shown that corn based ethanol is not very environmentally friendly. Now that we are beginning to see horrific explosions, where people dies because of ethanol, the push to end government supports (and thus the industry because without support the financial numbers do not work) will be on. I don't think that there are any rail safety measures that can make ethanol trains reasonably safe.

[GWoodle]

On a Accuweather report, the weather person reported very heavy rain at the time of the incident that would have reduced visibility to 1/4 mile or less. Not sure how much of this applies to a train crew.

Local reports also indicate folks saw the train "hydroplane", speculating if the heavy rain would cause ponding on the rail, similar to what one may expect if you were driving. The unfortunate fatality & injuries happened to be in a car waiting to cross the track. Not sure how close they were.

No doubt we need to wait to hear the rest of the story. Hopefully, the fires are out by now?

[Nasadowsk]

In any case, a fairly exhaustive study of "PTC-preventable accidents" by FRA using 20 years of data demonstrated conclusively that improvements in safety will not pay for the cost of PTC.

Ok, I'm gonna go fold a tin foil hat, put it on, and say:

"Well, of COURSE the FRA's study says it's not worth it - the Class Is would freak out if they did, and the last thing the FRA wants to do is upset the industry."

That said, I have a hard time believing the FRA's study was unbiased - the rest of the world apparently thinks some form of PTC is worth it, and let's face it, determining it's not worth it means you don't have to attack the sticky issue of getting a dozen railroads to agree on a single standard

That having been said, I have two responses to Mr. Norman's comments about "investor owned" railroads having to bear the costs of PTC. First, in the 1920s the ICC required all Class I railroads to equip one division each with automatic train stop technology. Railroads had to bear the cost. So there is a clear legal precedent. FRA has the legal authority to compel the railroads to install PTC, and there is nothing in law required that the railroads be compensated for any costs incurred.

There's beyond plenty of precedent - Airliners have to bear the cost of A/Ds, nuke plants have to bear the cost of upgrades (The new rules after TMI-2 and Browns Ferry 1 closed a number of older, smaller nukes), etc etc etc. Railroads aren't unique in this regard. In fact, if anything, they're unique in that the regulating agency's used implementation cost as an excuse to drag their feet on the issue. It'd be like a post-TMI NRC letting Dresden 1 keep on running without an emergency cooling system*, arguing that the installation cost exceeded the benefit of preventing that small risk** of Illinois becoming uninhabitable.

The cost of PTC is estimated at about $4.5 billion. However, if PTC is installed, significant parts of the existing signal system (all the intermediate signals, for example) will not need to be replaced. They can be removed. Signals and other equipment at interlockings and ends of controlled sidings will have to be renewed, of course. The total cost of PTC plus replacement of those signal system components that will still be required with PTC will be around $7.5 billion ($4.5 billion for PTC, where most of the equipment is on locomotives or in the control center, plus about $3 billion for wayside equipment that will have to remain). Thus the *net* cost to the industry of PTC will be a savings of about $1.5 billion over simply renewing the conventional signal system.

It depends on the system implemented, and whatever cost scaling happens. Which is why I think ETCS would be a decent choice, though the industry fears anything with 'European' in its name. but creating an instant huge scale market for an international standard would push prices down a lot, IMHO. And, from a technical standpoint, I'm not convinced GPS-based systems can do the job - I see the desire to use GPS here more of a hammer/nail thing than a practical one.

And of course PTC will provide greatly enhanced functionality. In addition to eliminating human factors accidents, the real-time train position data produced by PTC will yield a number of economic benefits to the railroad industry. I previously estimated those benefits to be in the range of $2 billion per year.

Which begs the question - what's the cost of the average human factors accident?

But that's...just my opinion, even if I did say it in a report to Congress.

Congress never listens to reasoning. We'd be a lot better off if they did...

*I'm guessing here, actually, that it never had one. What I've read says 'no' on it, Indian Point 1, Humbolt Bay, and Big Rock (Shippingport I don't think did either, but it was basically on the way out by '79 anyway), though it WAS a feature at Yankee Rowe and SONGS-1, both of which were first generation nukes also. Or it might have had a limited one, I know sodium pentaborate injection, a big feature in GE BWRs, was used on it.

**I'm not aware of any GE BWR that ever had a LOCA.

[JimBoylan]

And, from a technical standpoint, I'm not convinced GPS-based systems can do the job.

How does GPS handle potential collisions on multiple track railroads?
As for Rockford, does PTC include interconnected rain gauges that an ordinary signal system can't use?

[David Benton]

another improvement that could help ,electronic braking systems .
I think some improvemnt in signallinhg over the last 50 years is not too much to ask for .

[HoggerKen]

Interesting enough I grew up in a house that is overlooking this site, which is kinda scary.

I think that the primary result of this derailment and burn will be increasing pressure to end ethanol. It has from the very beginning been a claim of ethanol critics that this everything would happen, because ethanol can not be piped as gasoline and other fuels are, so this dangerous stuff is either going to move long distances by rail or road. Ethanol never made sense in my opinion, at least not made from a highly valuable crop like corn, and this has been born out. Not only was corn based ethanol a major reason for the run up of all grain prices, but science has also shown that corn based ethanol is not very environmentally friendly. Now that we are beginning to see horrific explosions, where people dies because of ethanol, the push to end government supports (and thus the industry because without support the financial numbers do not work) will be on. I don't think that there are any rail safety measures that can make ethanol trains reasonably safe.

I know this thread is a few months old, but I feel the need to respond. Ethanol trains move in great numbers now a days. We have three loads running though our area today going east. We have not had a single incident with the derailment or fire of an ethanol tank since we first started in 2001. Prior to that, ADM had been moving units to Arizona with absolutely no incidents. My job is moving ethanol every day, pulling, shoving, and kicking loads of it. It is no different than any other commodity as far as safety.

You can count on you hand the number of propane incidents in the last few decades despite the volume that moves by rail. Yet, people have died from propane, anhydrous Ammonia, chlorine, and other chemicals. Should we ban those as well?

As for the arguement against the industry, we could go on forever on the merits, or lack there of. But you have to consider the source of some of the "science" and in particular, the methodology of the research versus today's advanced standards in processing. The "Food for Fuel" debate is also a white elephant.