Amtrak 91 - CSX Collision Cayce, SC - 2/4/18

MACTRAXX wrote:Everyone:

I have been also following this topic from the beginning - this for the most part has been a very
indepth discussion about what happened here - what actually shocked me the most is how the
Amfleet Two Cafe car was bent in a V shape in this wreck. Was it the weight and momentum of
the cars behind in particular that caused this to happen?

Something that no one has mentioned is the overhead bridge above the wreck site - none of the
Amtrak cars made contact with the bridge abutment when they derailed am I right?

I recall that there have been derailments under overhead bridges which has caused a collapse
making a bad situation even worse. Thankfully nothing of that sort happened here...

MACTRAXX

The Viewliners look heavier and more robust than the amtubes. A combination of weight and momentum probably caused it to buckle, but that sort of damage is still odd given that the cafe car was mid-train. I doubt the Amfleets meet current FRA strength requirements, so it is of some concern.

And yes, had a bridge abutment been taken out this could have been way worse.

MCL1981 wrote:Where does it say that? The NORAC I'm reading doesn't say non-interlocked facing point switches at all.

401. OPERATING IN NON-SIGNALED DCS
TERRITORY
b. Approaching Home Signals, Controlled Point
Signals, and Signals at the Beginning of ABS
Territory
Trains must approach home signals, controlled
point signals, and signals at the beginning of ABS
territory prepared to stop, unless a distant signal is
in service. If a train is delayed after passing a
distant signal, it must approach the home signal or
controlled point signal prepared to stop.

The CSX Rules I'm reading only require stopping to check a facing point switch during a signal outage for spring switches.

So, I don't see where the Amtrak crew broke any rule.

It’s an Amtrak tailored special instruction, wouldn’t be found in a regular Norac.

An earlier post claims that CSX now has their own rule book instead of NORAC.
(A Vice-president at my own road TYBR even wanted the rule letters and numbers to be different so we wouldn't be a training school for employees who wanted to get hired elsewhere!)

CSX units are AC4400CW 130 and 36

JimBoylan wrote:An earlier post claims that CSX now has their own rule book instead of NORAC.
(A Vice-president at my own road TYBR even wanted the rule letters and numbers to be different so we wouldn't be a training school for employees who wanted to get hired elsewhere!)

Yes CSX has its own animal which is geared towards them operating freight. The NORAC reference was only made to clarify original confusion as to the Amtrak crew being partially at fault for the wreck.

D40LF wrote:The Viewliners look heavier and more robust than the amtubes. A combination of weight and momentum probably caused it to buckle, but that sort of damage is still odd given that the cafe car was mid-train. I doubt the Amfleets meet current FRA strength requirements, so it is of some concern.

And yes, had a bridge abutment been taken out this could have been way worse.

They should still meet the 800,000 lb crush strength requirement, unless they have sustained enough fatigue damage over the years to significantly reduce that.

Some important info clarified at NTSB presser tonight.
1) The CSX crew indeed did release their authority over the track back to the dispatcher.
2) The Amtrak train was not speeding and the EDR indicated that emergency braking was executed before the collision.

This certainly suggests that the CSX personnel made an error and that the Amtrak did not simply blow through without authority. The question remains did the Amtrak crew follow the proper procedures or not when passing through and do they share some of the fault or is this all on the CSX crew?

pumpers wrote:This sounds a lot like that other South Carolina accident about 10 years ago, where a mainline freight went into a siding left open, rupturing some chemical tanks in the siding and leading to the death of about 10 people. Also CSX IIRC. (I apologize if this was noted already earlier in the thread and I missed it. )

That was the accident that led to Emergency Order 24, and the requirement for Switch Awareness forms.

Or, rather, it was the straw that broke the camel's back, as the last of a string of similar accidents, that forced the EO.

The facts that will come out of this investigation will be interesting including :

1) the CSX crew's forms ...
2) the radio calls to the dispatcher confirming the positioning of the switch
3) any information available from the signal shacks (just because the CTC is offline doesn't mean the signal shacks stop recording)

What happened is clear : the switch was line, locked, and Amtrak drove straight into an unavoidable collision.

The ONLY saving grace in all of this is the signal maintenance forced a reduction of the MAS to 59mph, and that reduced the energies of the collision considerably.

Thank you Messrs. Litz and Sigma, for answering the question I asked over at the Rail Safety topic, presently with Global "pinning":

Rules requiring two Rules Qualified persons to be "on the engine" when operating through "suspended signal" territory is sadly supported by evidential matter. Not yet disclosed is whether the Rule permitting normal speed, i.e. <61 mph, through such territory or that "speed not to exceed stopping short of any obstruction", or however it's worded nowadays, applied.

Some may say "Yeah, Amtrak’s off the hook", but to those who hold such, lest we not forget that there were two men on that engine, Rules Qualified, and operating that train in accordance with those Rules, who paid the ultimate price for simply doing their jobs.

The print and talk abounding in recognized media suggesting Amtrak address it's safety culture might be amended to read "Yäger's disciples".

the trainguy wrote: Wouldn't they have left the lock off or have left the shackle in place ,but not locked, knowing that as soon as their train had cleared the switch once into the siding that they would have had to throw it back to it's normal position and then lock it?

Rules forbid this.

Anytime you move the switch, you lock it in place.

lordsigma12345 wrote:Some important info clarified at NTSB presser tonight.
1) The CSX crew indeed did release their authority over the track back to the dispatcher.
2) The Amtrak train was not speeding and the EDR indicated that emergency braking was executed before the collision.

This certainly suggests that the CSX personnel made an error and that the Amtrak did not simply blow through without authority. The question remains did the Amtrak crew follow the proper procedures or not when passing through and do they share some of the fault or is this all on the CSX crew?

Part of moving that switch (per the Switch Awareness rules) requires the crew confirm the positioning of the switch with the dispatcher.

You're literally supposed to state "Switch is lined and locked to the main" (or something similar) to the Dispatcher, who then confirms and reads back to you this information. All on radio (or phone), and all recorded.

I'd be very interested to find out if the 1) information includes this switch positioning confirmation.

justalurker66 wrote: Apparently a switch left locked lining a train into an occupied siding?
A signal suspension in place that removed any alert from the signalling system (restricting signals into that block) that would have warned the engineer?

One rule that was apparently not broken was the speed (unless MAS was slower) ---
300.5 The following speeds must not be exceeded:
b. 59 MPH for passenger trains operating within the limits of a signal suspension or against the current of traffic

(And as a supporter of PTC I'll agree that PTC would not have helped if it also would be suspended along with the signal system.)

So here's a question ... is PTC implemented on manually thrown switches?

In other words, if the switch isn't under CTC control, is PTC aware of it (and its position)?

Latest data is the emergency brake was applied 3 seconds before impact. Impact speed 50 mph.

Brakes probably started to apply to the front of the train and the brakes were probably not fully effective on the Viewliners yet. So the cafe car was stuck between the front of the train with some effective brakes and the Viewliners with little to no brakes yet. Like two train wrecks in one.

Ironically the signals were out of service because they were installing PTC equipment, so one could argue that PTC enabled this accident.

For the record I am not against PTC, but it will not cure all ills and solve all problems.

Sad tragedy.

Again Condolences to all involved and hoping for speedy recoveries for all.

litz wrote:

justalurker66 wrote: Apparently a switch left locked lining a train into an occupied siding?
A signal suspension in place that removed any alert from the signalling system (restricting signals into that block) that would have warned the engineer?

One rule that was apparently not broken was the speed (unless MAS was slower) ---
300.5 The following speeds must not be exceeded:
b. 59 MPH for passenger trains operating within the limits of a signal suspension or against the current of traffic

(And as a supporter of PTC I'll agree that PTC would not have helped if it also would be suspended along with the signal system.)

So here's a question ... is PTC implemented on manually thrown switches?

In other words, if the switch isn't under CTC control, is PTC aware of it (and its position)?

The cause of the Signal Suspension was to install equipment that will support PTC. Had not CSX been trying to implement PTC on this segment of track this particular incident would not have happened as the signals would not have been suspended. Thus we have the first two deaths caused by PTC.

JimBoylan wrote:An earlier post claims that CSX now has their own rule book instead of NORAC.
(A Vice-president at my own road TYBR even wanted the rule letters and numbers to be different so we wouldn't be a training school for employees who wanted to get hired elsewhere!)

CSX has had their own book of rules since approximately 1988 - it gets revised and reformatted about every three years since the original CSX Rule Book was published. Some Books have been near pocket size and other formats are 3 ring binders - and all possible formats in between.