Northeast Regional 188 - Accident In Philadelphia

Noel Weaver wrote: As for signals, they generally meant the same thing but not always, the railroad industry at least in the US still does not have a universal rule book so what is something on the NS for example might not be the same on CSX. Another thing some railroads use route signals and some railroads use speed signals, part of being qualified is KNOWING exactly what any signal indication will allow you to do. The difference - a route signal tells you where you are going and it is up to you to know how fast you can go while a speed signal tells you how fast you can go and it is up to you to know where you are going. In either case an error or misjudgment can be very serious if you mess it up.
Noel Weaver

And speed signals only denote the speed of the Switches or Crossovers which they are protecting. Speed signals do not 'protect' permanent slow orders. Speed signals denote the condition of the blocks ahead. A CLEAR indication indicates that same condition of the blocks into 150 MPH territory as it does 30 MPH territory if no switches or crossovers are being traversed.

ExCon90 wrote:Something occurred to me about the FRA requirement to install speed signs, and I'd be interested in what present-day engineers (I guess all the enginemen have retired by now) think about it. How practical is it to have a wayside sign for a reduction to 50mph in 125-mph territory? It seems to me that at 125mph that would be almost a blink-and-you'll-miss-it situation. The engineer will still have to be up to date on the special instructions--will a wayside sign contribute much? I suspect that politicians tend to think in terms of highway driving.

This would be a case of Amtrak simply adding more signs to the ones they already have in place.... that's about all.

mmi16 wrote:And speed signals only denote the speed of the Switches or Crossovers which they are protecting.

No. Speed signals can also be used to define a speed for a signal block.

mmi16 wrote:Speed signals do not 'protect' permanent slow orders. Speed signals denote the condition of the blocks ahead. A CLEAR indication indicates that same condition of the blocks into 150 MPH territory as it does 30 MPH territory if no switches or crossovers are being traversed.

If one wants to enforce a speed "CLEAR" would be a bad choice. "APPROACH LIMITED" would be a better choice if limited speed is desired, "APPROACH MEDIUM" if medium speed is desired. There are several aspects that require immediate reduction to limited or medium in preparation for the next signal.

A railroad that presents "CLEAR" to a train crossing through a 30 MPH crossover on track with a higher MAS is not using speed signalling. "MEDIUM CLEAR" or a more restricting signal should be used. And if one is lined up 1to 1 at an interlocking and receives a "MEDIUM CLEAR" the speed signaled limit still applies (until clear of interlocking).

You signal aspect debaters are missing the point. Does anyone really think that the railroads would be required to install colored light signals at every curve where there's a permanent speed restriction? Right after requiring the billions spent on PTC? Speed signs (or speed signals) can be be any fixed signal that conveys the needed information. Fixed signals are not just CPL or search-lights or colored light signals - they are also switch targets, whistleposts, stop signs, etc. Speed lmit signs would be a more modern version of something along the lines of what you see in the center of the picture here.
Can you say back to the future?

My question is how effective does FRA think these are going to be? They might be helpful for training engineers new to a territory, but there are too many variables (placement distance vs. train size vs. speeds involved) to make them anything more than an occasional reminder of the physical characteristics. Passenger trains would benefit somewhat, but not 12,000 ton freight trains.

G.

How do you post speed signs when the allowed speeds are different for different track ? Those speed signs on NEC CAT hangers are not easy to read. As well Acelas and regionals have different speeds.

Speed limit signs are exactly as you describe (on most RR's ...) ...

Yellow diagonal shaped signs with the speed printed on them.

The reverse side of the sign is blank green colored.

This is for a train with someone riding the tail end to call up to the head end, and let them know when the aft end of the train is clear of the speed restriction.

With one side at end end of the speed restrction, the first sign encountered (on the right side of the RoW) has the yellow sign facing the train. And indicates the start of the restrction.

The second sign encountered faces AWAY from the train, and is located on the LEFT side of the RoW. This is the sign a train coming the opposite way will see, indicating the start of their restrction.

The observer in the back of the train would see the back of this sign (the green side) and call to the head end clear of restriction.

Never mind the fact that RR's done use observers in the rear of trains anymore ... but they still do the signs that way.

Today engineers have car counters to let them know when the back end reaches the clearance point.

Now, I never worked in PRR-ish cab signal territory, but I always felt like the usage of coded cab signals to "enforce" certain civil speed restrictions is kind of kludgy and counterintuitive.

Say, why would you drop an "Approach" on a guy who is obviously running on a Clear, just to enforce 30mph? A true Approach indication has more meat to it than just the speed. The engineer will know that the "be prepared to stop" part might not apply because he knows the code drop will release well before where he knows the next signal to be. Or... what if it doesn't? One of the main things about being a good engineer is being able to keep track of your entire surrounding railroad (not just what is happening on YOUR train), and being able to tailor your running in such a way that you will best "fit in", keep moving, and keep the dispatcher (and passengers) happy. I would DEFINITELY want to know whether I was running on a REAL approach (i.e. train ahead or not lined up), or just a phony one. That would make a huge difference in the way I handled things.

Oh, also, being required to take a huge wad of air at each and every cab drop is a really dumb and wasteful practice. If it's what you need to be prepared, then fine. But that should be up to the engineer (or up to "real" PTC), not just up to some arbitrary rule.

This cab drop practice seems to have gotten so carried away that the rules people had to write a whole separate chapter on cab signal conformance/non-comformance, and special instructions, to stipulate just what exactly counts as what, and where.

This all seems very silly to me. If you aren't a veteran to the territory, you're gonna get confused real quick. Why should a signal be defined as meaning a certain thing, and then the "same" signal suddenly redefined to mean something else, just because? To keep up, a fellow just has to resort to practice and memorization... you know, like we already do in route signaling territory. Totally defeats the purpose of having speed signals at all. I feel like this could encourage some guys to run just by the speed, and not by the rule.

In the past, technical limitations contributed to the reason... the old cab signal boxes could only display four aspects. But today, with modern technology (ACSES is "pretty close"), there should be no reason why cab aspects and speed readouts couldn't be 100% relevant 100% of the time, except for system failure.

I guess if I had a few qualifying trips on the "Cahrrider", I might disagree? It just seems to me that a lot of what is in place is only there because "something happened there" and "it has to be"

justalurker66 wrote:

mmi16 wrote:And speed signals only denote the speed of the Switches or Crossovers which they are protecting.

No. Speed signals can also be used to define a speed for a signal block.

mmi16 wrote:Speed signals do not 'protect' permanent slow orders. Speed signals denote the condition of the blocks ahead. A CLEAR indication indicates that same condition of the blocks into 150 MPH territory as it does 30 MPH territory if no switches or crossovers are being traversed.

If one wants to enforce a speed "CLEAR" would be a bad choice. "APPROACH LIMITED" would be a better choice if limited speed is desired, "APPROACH MEDIUM" if medium speed is desired. There are several aspects that require immediate reduction to limited or medium in preparation for the next signal.

A railroad that presents "CLEAR" to a train crossing through a 30 MPH crossover on track with a higher MAS is not using speed signalling. "MEDIUM CLEAR" or a more restricting signal should be used. And if one is lined up 1to 1 at an interlocking and receives a "MEDIUM CLEAR" the speed signaled limit still applies (until clear of interlocking).

Signals are placed for braking distance for trains ahead - not to regulate speeds on curves between signals. The 'speed' signals denote speeds over switches and crossovers. Limited, Medium and Slow are speed options that can be displayed on my carrier and the speeds apply to the 'special trackwork' (switches and crossovers) for which they protect. A indication permitting Limited speed will not be used to traverse a crossover requiring slow speed. Permanent speeds vary over the course of a sub-division - signals DO NOT enforce the varying Permanent speeds.

I am not implying this happned, but is it possible to hack the controls of a new highly computerized motor? There's been a lot of press about hacking the controls of a car and airliner lately. Nobody has addressed this issue and I think it's a variable in this day and age that needs to be eliminated along with all the others.

A cybersecurity consultant told the FBI he hacked into computer systems aboard airliners up to 20 times and managed to control an aircraft engine during a flight, according to federal court documents.... "He stated that he thereby caused one of the airplane engines to climb resulting in a lateral or sideways movement of the plane during one of these flights," the document says.

http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/17/us/fbi-ha ... r-systems/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"These are kids who have never dealt with these architectures," says Sonalker, who described what the student did as "script-kiddy" stuff – low-level, relatively easy hacks.
"Witnessing a kid who isn't even old enough to drive hack into vehicle was a real eye-opener for us," said Dr. Andrew Brown, Delphi's chief technologist.

http://jalopnik.com/how-a-14-year-old-h ... 1686620075" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

uhh while we are at it, the Kenyans are taking over US government, Obama is invading Texas, and Kennedy was shot by FBI , really !!!!

mmi16 wrote:A indication permitting Limited speed will not be used to traverse a crossover requiring slow speed. Permanent speeds vary over the course of a sub-division - signals DO NOT enforce the varying Permanent speeds.

And in an example of that: A portion of one of the subdivisions I work on use Medium Speed aspects for crossovers where the speed is 10mph. It's a special instruction in the subdivision timetable. And the signals on that segment are not capable of displaying Slow speed aspect.
Again by timetable special instruction, another section of a line I run on requires freight trains to operate at Medium Speed through an interlocking that displays signals allowing Limited Speed on crossovers that are good for 45mph.

DutchRailnut wrote:uhh while we are at it, the Kenyans are taking over US government, Obama is invading Texas, and Kennedy was shot by FBI , really !!!!

While extremely unlikely in this case, remotely hacking an ACS-64 is not a ridiculous idea. The locomotive's diagnostics system constantly reports its status to Amtrak headquarters, which is a possible vector for hacking. There's no reason to believe that Siemens was any smarter about network security than Boeing, medical device makers, or any number of other companies have proven to be.

it would still have shown on event recorder and there is still a panic button in cab that shuts entire locomotive down.
believe me, we would have known by now.

mmi16 wrote:Signals are placed for braking distance for trains ahead - not to regulate speeds on curves between signals. The 'speed' signals denote speeds over switches and crossovers. Limited, Medium and Slow are speed options that can be displayed on my carrier and the speeds apply to the 'special trackwork' (switches and crossovers) for which they protect. A indication permitting Limited speed will not be used to traverse a crossover requiring slow speed. Permanent speeds vary over the course of a sub-division - signals DO NOT enforce the varying Permanent speeds.

So there is no aspect displayed by your carrier that requires an immediate speed reduction? There are speed based aspects available. If your carrier does not use any aspect that would require an immediate reduction I'd be surprised.

Some carriers do use speed based signals for permanent speeds. One of the more famous locations is approaching CP 421 in Elkhart, IN. Norfolk Southern (former Conrail) signals are designed to not give a signal better than Medium Clear. This helps alert engineers to keep the speed down through the curve ... even if they are on a non-diverging route. Theoretically the signals could display "Clear" and have the engineers rely only on the timetable. But they don't. The signals are designed to help the engineer. It is not a bad idea.

DutchRailnut wrote:it would still have shown on event recorder and there is still a panic button in cab that shuts entire locomotive down.
believe me, we would have known by now.

Not necessarily. To quote Scotty from "Star Trek: The Search for Spock"

The more they overthink the plumbing, the easier it is to stop up the drain.

Very typically in many computerized systems (especially ones not necessarily designed from the ground up to be secure) there's nothing special about logging and a skilled hacker very commonly will alter the logs to hide their traces.

Now, I know nothing about the panic button, but if, like is unfortunately too common in some systems it is tied into the computer and causes the computer to initiate a shut-down, that too can be hacked to do something other than a shutdown. This is where you want to seriously consider a button that physically cuts the system so there's really only one failure mode.

From what I've read and my background, I suspect the FAA and others are really downplaying the state of the art in airliner cases. Of course some of us said this 5+ years ago (or whenever the first articles discussing the lack of an airgap on the 787's systems was first brought to light.)

The problem with computer security is the hacker only needs to be right once, the folks protecting the systems have to be right every single time.

Now, fortunately most hackers won't go after SCADA and SCADA type systems because there's not much money there. (They'd rather hack and get your passwords and CC# ).
Unfortunately, the folks who DO target SCADA systems are state and major non-state players who aren't in it for the money (and have a LOT of money to back them).
An example of this is the Stuxnet virus, which was designed to target a very specific target that was airgapped.

I'll point out that Stuxnet is a minimum of 5 years old at this point and there's a LOT of evidence the state of the art in attacks has gone well past this now.

So, if it was a kiddie-script hacker, it's unlikely they'd have made it in, and if they did, you're right, there would almost certainly leave behind evidence.
However, the lack of evidence does not necessarily mean anything either.

That all said, I HIGHLY doubt that this particular incident was computer related and agree that at this time there is ZERO evidence to support such a leap. That said, don't be surprised if sometime in the next decade we see a state or non-state player attack on parts of our transportation infrastructure.