Oil train disaster in Lac-Mégantic, Québec 07-06-2013

classification? didn't think of that when i posted that irving would be drawn in. the group is now semi- complete lacking world rail,the oil broker and the well operator. these folk should stop ducking and weaving and get about the various tasks. their payments now will be far less than jury awards plus they can circumscribe the exposure. leaving it hanging will lead to qualified opinions on their audits and a dry-up of third party financing.
i frankly do not believe the attorney's claim on new mm&a financing. the uncertainty is huge, returns minimal.
lastly, what of the train , i presume empties , that is parked to the east. will the car owners arrange a non- mm&a move? you can't make this stuff up. ken patrick

I re-read this entire thread over the last few days, and wanted to make a few comments on some issues previously discussed, and some that weren't brought up at all. I'm going to focus on the mechancial (and some operational) aspects, not much at all on the contract/liability/legal aspects.

Early in the discussion, someone mentioned (or asked if?) that tankcars have flat ends. This is not true of most tankcars these days, especially the DOT 111 cars. They have dished ends which are welded to the rest of the shell. As 'pressure vessels' they have to be certified to a specific design pressure, in this case, 100 psig. They are equipped with relief valves which are set to open at 75 psig. This protects the integrety of the shell from a pressure rupture, *NOT* a puncture rupture. Other tank cars that are designed to hold a pressurized commodity will have more stringent design specs.

So, imagine one of the cars in the 'pile-up' portion of the wreck which remained structurally intact and was sitting next to a ruptured car whose contents have caught fire. The ambient heat will eventually raise the pressure in the intact car above the relief valve setting, which will release the now-pressurized crude in aerosol form. Once this cloud gets ignited, you essentially have a fuel-air bomb, because the greatly increased surface area of the crude will ignite extremely rapidly. I've only seen this theory posted one place, on the Trains Mag website, I believe, but this would answer the question of "Why did the crude oil 'explode' if it's not an explosive material?'

In order to keep this post *somewhat* short, I'll add my second comment separately...

I was also looking more closely at the aerial pictures of the derailment (I learned from an old railroader that they never said 'wreck', 'accident', etc to the press/public. It was *always* a 'Derailment'.) and it seems that the first 11 cars (including the idler boxcar) escaped the worst of the pileup, as did the last 9 or so cars. That left me wondering two things: 1) The TSB should be able to determine *fairly* easily if these cars had handbrakes applied, since there should be GIANT flat spots from the sliding wheels of cars w/applied brakes that were going 60+ mph before they derailed. The wheelsets seemed to have escaped the worst of the fire, so inspecting them should have happened early in the process. However, if the hand brakes were applied so that they just 'touched' the wheels instead of being 'cranked down', would the wheels still be free to rotate?

I can't imagine that the Transporation Test Center in Pueblo has ever done any testing of cars traveling 60 mph with the handbrakes applied, so question 2) gets into some train dynamics issues which are probably not well understood. If the first 16 cars (4 locos, the RCC caboose, idler car and 10 tank cars) had handbrakes applied and then later started rolling, the slack action between them should be somewhat reduced when they started moving i.e. they're not as close together as the remaining tank cars (w/no brakes) since the slack would've all run in on those cars as they headed downgrade. So, would there be a force discontinuity between the rear coupler of the last braked car and the front coupler of the first unbraked car or would the weight of the unbraked portion be sufficient to compress the slack in the rest of the consist?

Could that discontinuity be the reason why the first 16 cars made it through the 10 mph curve (which is probably safe up to 30 mph, at least in an engineering sense) and the pile-up started with the 17th (approx) car? The dispersion pattern of these cars seems to support this hypotheses (the idler car was still half on the main track, while the 16th car was flung way down the wye lead). This would also explain how the power separated and kept rolling through town...if the idler car were pulled backwards by the derailment and only broke a knuckle (or pulled a drawbar) on the last loco (or the front of the boxcar...), the locos would be free to keep on going.

If this is true, and more importantly, PROVABLE in a court of Law, could it help corroborate the engineer's claim about handbrake application?

I wonder if any of the high-tech operational software programs that the Big Boys use would allow a simulation like this? You'd need to have the track profile to input, but that info should be readily available....

Any large holes in my theory that I haven't noticed???? One thing I can think of is 'What was the slack condition of the last 60 cars when they stopped at Nantes? How much of the slack wound <typo that I missed-this should have read 'would'> 'rebound' after the train came to a stop on a descending grade? The dynamic behavior of the oil inside the cars (sloshing) is another big unknown (to me), but it's probably been modeled somewhere at some time.... <Added on 9/12- Thinking about this a little more, would the conditions after the initial stop change after the brake test? I'm thinking that they might, since *all* the airbrakes were still applied before the handbrakes were applied on the head end cars. The engineer would've released the train brakes while doing the brake test, so the slack on the train should've run in during a successful test.....Time to google 'Freight Train Dynamic Behavior', I guess...>

About the alleged misclassification. If true, DOT hazmat laws state that tendering a shipment that is misclassified, mislabled, etc. may result in a fine of up to $25,000 per violation per day. A tank car has four placards and a bill of lading that ID's the product with a "proper shipping name", etc. That's five violations * 72 cars * X days on the road. Transport Canada has similar fines, I'm sure.

That said, the alleged violations should be put in perspective. This is a "packing group" (PG) issue. Flammable liquids are classified in one of three PG's based on their boiling point and flash point, PGI being the most dangerous. In this case, the crude was supposedly a PGII, but labeled as a PGIII. The operative word here is "packing". The primary use of PG's is to determine the appropriate and approved packaging for shipment. (In this case, a tank car.) I have a hard time believing these cars were not PGII-compatible. If these were your typical 30K DOT-111 tanks, they are approved for both PGIII and PGII flammable liquids. (Many crude cars were formerly in ethanol service, a PGII material.) My take is that, if proven, this certainly gives the authorities more ammo for applying civil penalties, but the mislabling neither contributed to the accident, nor did it affect the subsequent emergency response efforts as has been implied in the press.

Cowford wrote: My take is that, if proven, this certainly gives the authorities more ammo for applying civil penalties, but the mislabling neither contributed to the accident, nor did it affect the subsequent emergency response efforts as has been implied in the press.

I agree completely. Whichever packing group, as a conductor/engineer it would have made little difference - it's all hazmat and handled accordingly.

KEN PATRICK wrote:classification? didn't think of that when i posted that irving would be drawn in.

How is this Irving's fault? They certainly didn't placard the cars. If you know otherwise, please cite where you read this. Otherwise it is pure speculation or an attempt to smear them with fabrications.

mwhite wrote:How is this Irving's fault? They certainly didn't placard the cars. If you know otherwise, please cite where you read this. Otherwise it is pure speculation or an attempt to smear them with fabrications.

I believe Mr. Patrick was referring to this line in the news article I posted:

The Portland Press Herald wrote:Authorities said proper classification of the oil’s flammability was the responsibility of Irving Oil, the company purchasing the oil.

If so, I am surprised but stand corrected.

RDG467 wrote:It seems that the first 11 cars (including the idler boxcar) escaped the worst of the pileup, as did the last 9 or so cars. 1) The TSB should be able to determine *fairly* easily if these cars had handbrakes applied, since there should be GIANT flat spots from the sliding wheels of cars w/applied brakes that were going 60+ mph before they derailed. The wheelsets seemed to have escaped the worst of the fire, so inspecting them should have happened early in the process. However, if the hand brakes were applied so that they just 'touched' the wheels instead of being 'cranked down', would the wheels still be free to rotate?

A recent Trains Magazine photo show men inspecting the handbrake wheel and chain on the idler boxcar.

mwhite wrote:How is this Irving's fault? They certainly didn't placard the cars. If you know otherwise, please cite where you read this. Otherwise it is pure speculation or an attempt to smear them with fabrications.

In the United States Code of Federal Regulations Title 49, part 172, sup part 508:

Title 49 - Transportation Volume: 2 Date: 2012-10-01 Original Date: 2012-10-01Title: Section 172.508 - Placarding and affixing placards: Rail.
Title 49 - Transportation. Subtitle B - Other Regulations Relating to Transportation. CHAPTER I - PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. SUBCHAPTER C - HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATIONS. PART 172 - HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY PLANS. Subpart F - Placarding. 172.508
Placarding and affixing placards: Rail.
(a) Each person offering a hazardous material for transportation by rail shall affix to the rail car containing the material, the placards specified by this subpart. Placards displayed on motor vehicles, transport containers, or portable tanks may be used to satisfy this requirement, if the placards otherwise conform to the provisions of this subpart.
(b) No rail carrier may accept a rail car containing a hazardous material for transportation unless the placards for the hazardous material are affixed thereto as required by this subpart.

Did Irving offer the oil transportation by rail, or was it World Fuel?

JimBoylan wrote:Did Irving offer the oil transportation by rail, or was it World Fuel?

This is what I was attempting to get at. Irving neither shipped the oil nor loaded the cars nor had ownership of the cars or contents. Like I said, if I am wrong I am willing to admit it. And I'm not sure I'd rely on a reporter from the PPH for accuracy on a topic such as this. There are posters here who have far more experience and knowledge that I'm sure can clarify this issue.

JimBoylan wrote:

RDG467 wrote:It seems that the first 11 cars (including the idler boxcar) escaped the worst of the pileup, as did the last 9 or so cars. 1) The TSB should be able to determine *fairly* easily if these cars had handbrakes applied, since there should be GIANT flat spots from the sliding wheels of cars w/applied brakes that were going 60+ mph before they derailed. The wheelsets seemed to have escaped the worst of the fire, so inspecting them should have happened early in the process. However, if the hand brakes were applied so that they just 'touched' the wheels instead of being 'cranked down', would the wheels still be free to rotate?

A recent Trains Magazine photo show men inspecting the handbrake wheel and chain on the idler boxcar.

I'll have to go look for that picture- I haven't been on that site for a few days.

The articles indicate that Irving was the importer of record so is, therefore, responsible for hazmat communication compliance. I don't know Cdn import rules, but that does not sound right... on many levels. Perhaps the govt. is grasping at straws.

Who actually, physically placarded the cars? SOO employees?

The story regarding improper placarding of the crude appears to be gaining traction. The Wall Street Journal has now reporterd on such today:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... 54360.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Brief passage:

• The board said it had written to North American regulators asking them to review labeling guidelines for the shipment of dangerous goods. U.S. regulators have been tightening safety standards they apply to rail-tank cars and their use. The findings could also raise more questions of negligence and liability for companies that were involved in shipping the oil from North Dakota's Bakken region into Canada.
  
  The announcement answers a question experts have asked about one of North America's most fatal derailments in decades: How did crude oil, which typically has a high flash point, ignite and explode as it did in Quebec. But it leaves many questions unanswered, not least the exact contents of the cargo and whether correct labeling would have stopped an accident investigators say appears to have started when the brakes on the unattended train were released, sending the Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Inc.-operated train careening into the small town.

From this material, it would appear that crude is placarded 1267 level 3 and there is no provision to label it as level 2. But alas, the last time I was near any of this stuff , beyond being a railfan observer, was when the controlling document was named Graziano's Tariff.

If there proves to be any foundation to these assertions, the chain of liability may well extend beyond that of the MM&A/C; Mr. Patrick may have the last laugh around here after all.

Does the siding at Nantes have derails? Were there two freights at this location the night of the accident, with the oil train on the main?