Oil train disaster in Lac-Mégantic, Québec 07-06-2013

What would be the effect of heating the air in the brake system, due to fire? (The pressure would increase at one end of the "pipe").

As of a month ago there were only two railroads, in Canada, allowed to operate with one man crews, MMA and the Quebec, North Shore and labrador RR. The Quebec North Shore and Labrador Railway is a Canadian regional railway that stretches 414 kilometres (257 mi) through the wilderness of northeastern Quebec and western Labrador. It connects Labrador City, Labrador, with the port of Sept-Îles, Quebec, on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River. QNSL is owned by the Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOC). There was an article on this ore hauler, I believe in the Feb 2012 issue of Trains magazine. This railroad has no connection with any other railroads.

Regardless of what any of us might think of the downside of one man crews, and especially since the release of new regulations forbidding this practice, in Canada, on this kind of train, it is important to understand that MMA was operating the train that devastated this little town, with the express permission of the government of Canada....at that time! Since the accident the Canadian government has come under heavy criticism from many places, for allowing that particular practice, and for being lackadaisical in general, towards operations of the railroads in Canada. Considering the latest NEW regulations to emerge from the government, one could conclude that they were responding, at least in part, to the political criticism that government received, after the disaster!

IMHO the black box contains much, or maybe most, of the factual info about what really happened here. According to posts by several railroad employees above, the black box would record information regarding air brake events (one would presume both application and release) against the actual time they occurred, throttle settings and any movement of the train, again, against the time of the event occurring. Therefore, if the company regulations were followed, and the hand brakes actually tested, that should be noted in the recorded data in that device. The time the engineer stopped the train should be noted. If he set some handbrakes, on some of the tank cars, then he would have likely tested them, as required. If so, there should be an interval of time, required to go out and actually set the hand brakes, followed by a release of the train air brakes, then throttling up of the engine, then any movement, or none, duly noted, again all of this recorded by the chronological timing of each event. If he set any handbrakes, and did the required test, this info should be in the black box, and is undoubedly known to authorities as we speak. If the trains airbrakes were accidently, or purposely released, after the engineer left the train, the timing of that event should be a matter of record in the data. If that happened, there would be no way to tell who did so, but comparing the time it happened, against who would have been in/around the power units at that time, should be able to be worked out to a large extent! I understand it takes time to complete these investigations, but it seems that a number of folks, privy to the info contained in the black box, already likely have some idea of what really happened.

There is a vast liability for the damages from this disaster, one could suspect maybe hundreds of millions of dollars perhaps. There is certainly the possibility that anyone who might be a responsible party to this event happening, might be motivated to do whatever possible, in order to deflect some or all of that liability upon the others. This would of course include all that we have read in the various media, from all of the parties involved.

One can speculate greatly about how long it will take get to the truth behind the disaster, and what it might take to get there!

SRM

It remains to be seen on exactky what information has been obtained from the "black box".
How well has the black box, sensors, etc been maintained on that lead locomotive? The
fire chief stated that the locomotive was shut down. Did that include shutting off all the
electrical power or just using the emergency fuel cut off? If the main electrical switch was
"pulled", the black box was likely shut down, so no information would be recorded when the
runaway began. Questions. Questions.

Dick H wrote:If the main electrical switch was "pulled", the black box was likely shut down, so no information would be recorded when the runaway began. Questions. Questions.

Dick,

Practically by definition any "event recorder" has to have its own independent source of power in order to run its internal clock, let alone any other sensors.

There was both mechanical and human error here, hindsight is always 20-20 they say. They have been parking trains at Nantes for years and without any issues. There was the fire and then the probable fact that not enough hand brakes were engaged to prevent the train from moving. There is no certainty that a two man crew would have made a difference. I am sure this engineer didnt change anything that night that he had not been doing for years and without any problems, only this time there was a locomotive fire, and the train was carrying oil. If the train was anything but an oil train, the devastation would have been significantly less and recovery would have been very likely.

So what happens now? MM&A declares bankruptcy at the point when the pressure becomes too great. Irving gets East-Millinocket to Brownville Junction, the State buys the Searspoint branch and appoints Irving as the operator. Another short line takes over St Jean to Lac Megantic. The Moosehead sub gets scrapped because it carries mostly overhead loads that can be diverted elsewhere, the scrap value of the Moosehead is significant and more valuable than any potential on line traffic it can generate by itself. Life goes on but the wounds take a long time to heal, perhaps even a couple of generations.

A friend and I were talking last night at work about the crash and the circumstances around it. A question that I have had for a while now, and I haven't seen it mentioned anywhere, is what is the deal with the remote control caboose that was behind the loco? Are (were) they using one man crews to drill these trains as well? Or where they just one man jobs over the road? To me, that remote control equipment is a huge variable that I haven't seen mentioned pretty much at all. If they are 1 man road jobs, what does the caboose do, and why is it inbewteen the locos and not behind all the locos, where I would think it would be?

I dunno if the brakes bled off or if something else lead to a release, I know they can that quick, but that is really quick for cars that are relatively new, and in relatively good shape. Its not like we are talking about a 200 car mixed freight with beat up 40 year old boxcars and covered hoppers and flatcars or something like that where you might expect a cranky control valve.

The cars have no event recorder, the only way to tell if the handbrakes were on a car are by visual inspection or actually testing the wheel/lever. The locos are supposed to record just about everything including the engineer farting, and each loco should have a recorder, so there should be plenty of info about the state of the locos and what was done in teh minutes before it started to move, and the time while it was moving.

I would be curious as to the state of the cars at the hind end of the train that the engineer moved with the trackmobile. Were those brakes released or where they in emergency? They should have definitely been in emergency at that point, as its quite obvious that the brake pipe was lost during the crash. But if they were in release, that would be quite interesting as to the state of charge of the train and if it had any air left in it at all when it crashed.....

Jtgshu wrote:The cars have no event recorder, the only way to tell if the handbrakes were on a car are by visual inspection or actually testing the wheel/lever. The locos are supposed to record just about everything including the engineer farting, and each loco should have a recorder, so there should be plenty of info about the state of the locos and what was done in teh minutes before it started to move, and the time while it was moving

While that is true, on the surface, there may be a way to tell if any handbrakes were set, and that could be discerned by data contained in the black box. If Engineer Harding set any handbrakes at all, and did the required hand brake test, the data should indicate that, by, as the professionals have stated above, recording the air brake release, and the throttling up of the engine.....and no movement of the train.....then the application of the airbrakes afterward. If it is verified by data from the black box, that the hand brake testing, required by regulations, was actually done, that should be proof that Harding did apply handbrakes sufficient to hold the train.........at the moment in time the test was actually done!

I suspect that the data contained in the black box, will show that either some handbrakes were applied.....and actually tested.......or none of that was done. Either the test was done....or it wasn't......there does not appear to be any other options, it has to be one possibility or the other, if there is that kind of data available to the investigators.

SRM

sandyriverman wrote:

Jtgshu wrote:The cars have no event recorder, the only way to tell if the handbrakes were on a car are by visual inspection or actually testing the wheel/lever. The locos are supposed to record just about everything including the engineer farting, and each loco should have a recorder, so there should be plenty of info about the state of the locos and what was done in teh minutes before it started to move, and the time while it was moving

While that is true, on the surface, there may be a way to tell if any handbrakes were set, and that could be discerned by data contained in the black box. If Engineer Harding set any handbrakes at all, and did the required hand brake test, the data should indicate that, by, as the professionals have stated above, recording the air brake release, and the throttling up of the engine.....and no movement of the train.....then the application of the airbrakes afterward. If it is verified by data from the black box, that the hand brake testing, required by regulations, was actually done, that should be proof that Harding did apply handbrakes sufficient to hold the train.........at the moment in time the test was actually done!

I suspect that the data contained in the black box, will show that either some handbrakes were applied.....and actually tested.......or none of that was done. Either the test was done....or it wasn't......there does not appear to be any other options, it has to be one possibility or the other, if there is that kind of data available to the investigators.

SRM

absolutely and thanks for clarifying that, I should have been clearer. But my point is that there is nothing but any remaining physical evidence to show if any cars that crashed actually had hand brakes on. The event recorder will not show for example, 10 cars had hand brakes set. I think some people might have been thinking that, that the recorder would show how many cars actually had hand brakes set. They won't. But as you stated, It would show pulling for power and the hand brake test, which would indirectly show that there were sufficient handbrakes set at the time.

Jtgshu wrote:...what is the deal with the remote control caboose that was behind the loco? Are (were) they using one man crews to drill these trains as well? Or where they just one man jobs over the road? To me, that remote control equipment is a huge variable that I haven't seen mentioned pretty much at all. If they are 1 man road jobs, what does the caboose do, and why is it inbewteen the locos and not behind all the locos, where I would think it would be?

The caboose contains all the equipment for the belt-pack remote control system, which is what allows the single crew member to do switching in yards, industries, etc. When he's operating a road train, he operates from the lead locomotive. When he's switching a yard or industry, he gets out of the locomotive and controls the train with his belt-pack controller.

One-man road trains are comparatively new on MMA, whereas the one-man yard switcher jobs started around 2005, not long after the company came into existence.

I don't think they really care where the remote caboose is located in the consist, as long as it's somewhere in the middle. They wouldn't want it on an end because that would add time and effort (wying the consist) if they want to reuse the same consist on a different train going in a different direction.

I wonder if we will see more regs governing the design of RCO systems. I assume these cabs were rebuilt by the shops in Derby, nothing raises more questions that a poor railroad homebuilding a control system. I wonder how much was custom design vs off the shelf content.

CSX used those flatcars, UP used those gutted GEs, MMA uses these cabs... Will there be a call for consistency, much like consistency of the AAR control stand. Engine mounted systems only?

MEC407 wrote:The caboose contains all the equipment for the belt-pack remote control system, which is what allows the single crew member to do switching in yards, industries, etc.

Thank you Mr. Maine Central, for sharing with the Forum the need for the Caboose in an MM&A consist.

First allow me to relate, a neighbor who I loved as such and deceased during '09 at age 55 ('big C' that affects a non-smoking woman ) was a Flight Attendant with American. She disliked management as much as she enjoyed serving her passengers and once made the comment to me (after we had both had 'a couple of glasses') that if Bob (Crandall) had his way, we would be flying about in drones.

Ed Burkhardt (who I 'knew of' during my 1970-81 railroad career with the MILW) pushed that maxim to the almost extreme, and I'm willing to bet he dreamed of a 1:1 'Lionel Lines'.

But to the point, I have to question to what extent will a not less than two man crew now mandated by the Canadian rail safety agency, Transport Canada, affect a reoccurrence of this incident. Sending an MofW employee, who cannot be knowledgeable of proper tie down procedures, i.e. one engine must be running to ensure proper brake pressure, to the scene after a minor locomotive fire, has to be addressed. No doubt there was a 'culture' in place of 'if you disturb that Engineer's, and now Conductor's, rest and call them to the scene, the clock for their rest will start only at the time they are released after they have ensured that an engine is running and otherwise satisfied that there is adequate brake pressure within the tied down train'. That will result in 'noise' from Management.

From the Bangor Daily News:

Bangor Daily News wrote:Police raided the Canadian offices of Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway on Thursday as part of their investigation into a train crash earlier this month that destroyed the center of the small town of Lac-Megantic, Quebec, and killed 47 people.

“We are executing a search warrant,” Sergeant Benoit Richard of the provincial police, Surete du Québec, told Reuters. “We are searching the offices now.”

Richard said officers were combing through the railway’s office in Farnham, Quebec, about 40 miles east of Montreal, in search of evidence that could help with their investigation into the July 6 tragedy.

Read more at: http://bangordailynews.com/2013/07/25/n ... ter-probe/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Its more than that Mr. Norman, there are specific hours of service regulations that govern rest, and its not up to the T and E employee to respond to a company problem after he is off duty and on his rest, especially if the employee did everything required by him in tying the train down in this instance. Its the companies responsibility for sending the proper person out to the scene, and MOW supervisor is probably not the proper person...did that MOW person contact company officals on a phone and get in touch with someone in the mechanical dept at least? That would be better than just looking at it and saying ..."yup....looks good to me!" and walking away.....

If as an Engineer or train crew member, I did everything I needed to do, and followed all company procedures, and the locomotive caught fire after I went home to sleep and get rest, that simply is not my problem. That is the mechanical depts and the line's managements problem at that point. Just because I might have been the last person to touch it, doesn't mean I did it, or am responsible for it. Although railroad management on all roads seem to subscribe to this line of thinking.

"well you/he/she MUST have did something wrong...." riiiiiiiiiiiiight Mr. Burkhardt showed this attitude prevalent throughout the industry PERFECTLY with his immediate finger pointing. And there is absolutely no debating that. Maybe the engineer did do something wrong, but on the railroad you are really guilty until proven innocent, which is just how it is, unfortunately. Its easier to point the finger and blame, than investigate and really try to figure out what happened, as that could make things even worse by exposing many other faults.

Interesting article appearing in Today's New York Times focused on the human element afflicting the residents of Lac-Megantic, that were neither injured or otherwise directly affected by the incident:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/world ... stant.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Brief passage:

• Throughout the day, regardless of the weather, there is usually a crowd gazing out from the steps of Sainte Agnès Catholic Church. From there, they look down at a statue of Jesus, its arms outstretched in an apparent blessing over the nightmare that lies beyond a tall, temporary fence covered with black plastic and police warning signs.
  
  More than two weeks have passed since a runaway train of oil tank cars, “the ghost train” as it is now known, derailed and exploded here, incinerating much of this community’s downtown and leaving at least 42 of its 6,000 residents dead. The fire is long extinguished and the ruins cooled, but in an indication of the disaster’s severity, the recovery and decontamination effort — on a scale Quebec has rarely seen — has erased relatively little of the destruction.
  
  The snaking police fence now divides the town. Well outside its metal latticework, the odor of crude oil still permeates the air. The leaves and needles of trees several blocks downwind from the blast are brown and curled. The apples sprouting on trees are green on one side and burned on the other. The vinyl siding on houses and apartments is sometimes the same way: blistered and warped on the side facing the fire, while seemingly untouched on the other.

sandyriverman wrote:.......it is important to understand that MMA was operating the train that devastated this little town, with the express permission of the government of Canada....at that time! Since the accident the Canadian government has come under heavy criticism from many places, for allowing that particular practice,
SRM

http://www.ipick.ca/edmonton/lac-megant" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; ... anada-says (July 12th or 13th)

"Maryse Durette, senior media relations adviser with Transport Canada, said in an email that “Regulatory action under the Rail Safety Act can be used if the parameters for single person train operation (SPTO) are not met or if Transport Canada determines that there is a risk to safe railway operations. These matters will all be a part of the TSB investigation.”

In Canada, for a railway to use a single crew member, the company must first carry out a “review of their Safety Management Systems to verify they have the appropriate technology in place to support single person operations,” Durette said.

Transport Canada does not have to authorize or give its permission for the practice, according to Durette. If, on the other hand, the company fails to meet Transport Canada’s guidelines, the agency will tell the railway company that it can’t operate this type of operation.

Luc Bourdon, Transport Canada’s director general of rail safety, told media this week that Transport Canada monitors such operations on a regular basis".

I also saw Former Minister of Transport Lebel say in an on site interview, I think it was around the 9th, that the train was subjected to a safety check in Montreal on Friday, the 5th.